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Abstract 
Checking is one of the most common symptoms observed in Obsessive 
Compulsive Disorder (OCD) with 50-80% of patients (Antony, Downie, & 
Swinson, 1998; Henderson & Pollard, 1988; Rasmussen & Eisen, 1988) and 
an additional ~15% of the general population demonstrating subclinical 
checking compulsions (Stein et al., 1997). A common finding is that checking 
actually impairs the memory of those items checked (van den Hout & Kindt, 
2003a, 2003b), even though the mechanism underlying checking-related 
memory impairment has remained elusive. This is a shortcoming that we 
presently address in a series of short-term memory experiments and 
attentional tasks comparing high and low checkers (see VOCI; Thordarson et 
al., 2004). Generally, our memory tasks required stimuli to be remembered in 
their locations, which was designed to engage the episodic buffer (EB) of 
working memory (WM) (Baddeley, 2000). The key manipulation was to 
present an intermediate probe (between encoding and recall) in the form of a 
resolvable or misleading challenge which questioned an aspect of the 
encoding set; this was either present or absent, respectively. As expected, 
misleading probes specifically (Exp. 1, 2, extreme meta-comparison 3 & 9; 
Harkin & Kessler, 2009; 2011a; Harkin, Rutherford, & Kessler, 2011) and 
intermediate probes generally (Exp. 4; Harkin & Kessler, 2011a) tap into the 
inhibitory impairments of high (not low) checkers, which hampers EB 
functionality and impairs their memory. Indeed, it was only during misleading 
trials that high checkers made more unnecessary eye movements specifically 
to empty locations (Exp. 5; Harkin & Kessler, subm). Furthermore, for 
ecologically valid stimuli high checkers were impaired in inhibiting attention to 
threatening ‘ON’ states (Tasks 6 & 7; Harkin & Kessler, in press) and in their 
ability to recall if an appliance was ‘ON’ or ‘OFF’ (Exp. 8; Harkin, Rutherford, 
& Kessler, 2011). High checkers’ intact performance on baseline no-probe-1 
trials excludes a capacity-based explanation of their WM impairments. 
Overall, confidence measures revealed a general task-independent 
impairment which was attenuated by an intermediate probe. These findings 
were then used to create a classification system based upon Executive-
Functioning, Binding Complexity and Memory Load (EBL) to explain 
otherwise discrepant findings from 58 memory studies (Harkin & Kessler, 
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2011b). Thus, the contribution of this research is not only to (Exp. 1-9) 
indicate an actual mechanism (i.e., episodic buffer of WM) of memory 
impairment in checking/OCD but it also provides a new research platform on 
which to base where we will and will not observe memory impairments in 
OCD participants. The conclusion summarizes the main findings with respect 
to the development and maintenance of OCD symptoms, highlights limitations 
and provides solutions to these through future research.  
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1. Introduction: Repeated checking impairs memory, but how? 
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) is characterized by repetitive, 
intrusive, impulses and thoughts that are experienced as inappropriate and 
anxiety provoking. The lifetime prevalence of OCD is between 1.5% and 3% 
(Stein et al., 1997), making it a debilitating and relatively common disorder. 
OCD patients experience intrusive thoughts (obsessions) that they feel 
compelled to neutralize through ritualistic behaviours (compulsions). Checking 
compulsions are most commonly observed in OCD with 50-80% of patients 
reporting this subtype (Antony, Downie, & Swinson, 1998; Henderson & 
Pollard, 1988; Rasmussen & Eisen, 1988) and an additional ~15% of the 
general population demonstrating subclinical checking compulsions (Stein et 
al., 1997).  
 
Despite the commonality of checking little is understood about the 
mechanisms which mediate this phenomenon (Cuttler & Graf, 2007). One 
prominent theory is that checkers are compelled to check to compensate for 
impairments of memory. For example, in a meta-analysis of checkers memory 
performance, Woods et al. (2002) concluded that not only do they have 
objectively verifiable impairments in working and episodic memory but they 
also suffer from a subjective impairment in memory (i.e., they lack confidence 
in their ability to remember). Checkers may objectively fail to remember if they 
performed an action, such as switching the iron off, and/or they may 
subjectively lack confidence in their ability to remember (Cuttler & Graf, 2007; 
Sher, Mann, & Frost, 1984). Thus,  poor memory and/or lack of confidence 
appears to fuel ritualistic checking, yet as they check and re-check to increase 
certainty this paradoxically decreases memory accuracy and confidence 
(Rachman & Shafran, 1998; Radomsky & Alcolado, 2010). For example, van 
den Hout and Kindt (2003b) asked participants to repeatedly turn on, off or 
check a computer simulation of a six burner gas stove for 20 trials after which 
they were asked to report the vividness, detail and memory confidence for 
their last check of the stove. In the checking, compared to the control-
condition checkers had a significant decrease in the three aforementioned 
metacognitive measures and the authors concluded that checking breeds 
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doubt, not certainty (van den Hout & Kindt, 2003b, 2004). Further, the same 
research group (van den Hout & Kindt, 2003a) showed that repetitively 
checking the same stimulus resulted in a shift in the nature of their memory 
recollections from being detailed and vivid (remember judgment) to being 
hazy, indefinite and unclear (know judgment) (Tulving, 1985). This they 
proposed was similar to the memory-ambivalence reported by clinical 
checkers (Reed, 1985).  
 
Therefore, while these authors reported the outcome of checking, the exact 
mechanism of memory change was not stated. However, Radomsky and 
Alcolado (2010) provided a more specific indication of the domain specificity 
and the mechanism through which checking impaired memory. They asked 
participants to either mentally check their memory of an electrical stove or 
physically check an electrical stove. Mental checking required participants to 
“... imagine your hand manipulating the knobs, just like you would see yourself 
doing so in a real physical check” (Radomsky & Alcolado, 2010, p. 347). 
Memory accuracy was then determined with respect to the question: “Which 
three knobs did you check on the last trial?” (p. 347). The observed 
impairments were modality-specific: Repeated mental checking only impaired 
memory and metamemory for mental but not physical checks. Whereas, 
repeated physical checking only impaired memory and metamemory for 
physical but not mental checks. Domain specificity is further substantiated 
with compulsive staring resulting in distrust in perception not memory (van 
den Hout et al., 2008; van den Hout et al., 2009), whereas checking memory 
produced distrust in memory not perception (see Dek et al., 2010). 
 
1.1. The story so far: Core features of checking-related memory 
impairment  
In light of the aforementioned points and in agreement with Rachman’s (2002) 
suggestion that any cognitive theory of pathological checking must account for 
such memory problems, we highlight the following key aspects of checking 
related memory impairment. 
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(1)  Checking is domain specific, as only the cognitive processes (memory, 
metamemory) that are the object of checking (physical vs. mental; 
Radomsky & Alcolado, 2010) are negatively affected (Dek et al., 2010). 
This is in agreement with Nelson and Narens (1994) who proposed that 
the reactivation of memory traces can never provide an entirely veridical 
representation of the original input. That is, our memories will never be as 
vivid and ‘‘true’’ as the original experience and so unnecessarily checking, 
manipulating, and/or interacting with them appears to further impair the 
veridicality of their contents.  In certain domains compulsive checkers 
might be overly aware of these natural shortfalls of memory traces, 
strongly experiencing doubt and starting to check the same memory trace 
over and over again, yet, without the possibility to enhance certainty.  
 
(2)  The contents of memory are sensitive to interference from internal 
(mental) and external (physical) sources (Radomsky & Alcolado, 2010). 
For example, misleading/intrusive information can be generated internally 
in the form of intrusive thoughts (‘‘I think I left a burner on’’) or can be 
provided by external prompting (i.e., experimentally directed mental 
checking; Radomsky & Alcolado, 2010). Kikul et al. (2011) measured the 
impact of cognitive self-consciousness (CSC: focus on their thoughts and 
mental strategies during encoding) and dual-task manipulations upon the 
subsequent recall of a complex visual stimulus for OCD patients and 
healthy controls. OCD patients’ memory was impaired in the CSC and the 
dual-task conditions, whereas in controls only the dual-task condition 
resulted in impaired memory. This suggests that as the external CSC 
manipulation was congruent with the symptomatology of the OCD group, 
their internal focus on their thoughts attenuated performance in the 
primary memory task. More specifically, Omori et al. (2007) reported a 
negative correlation between poor inhibition and impaired memory in 
OCD-checkers but not OCD-washers. Suggesting that an inability to 
inhibit (i.e., stop thinking about/ignore) internally generated and/or 
externally threatening stimuli mediates checkers’ memory performance. 
Indeed, inhibition is said to be required for the successful performance of 
a task during the simultaneous presence of task-irrelevant-stimuli, 
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responses and (possibly) thoughts (Friedman & Miyake, 2004). Further, it 
was observed that a checking OCD subgroup had poorer memory 
compared to cleaners and controls (Cha et al., 2008) with checking and 
obsessional severity (e.g., “Did I check correctly?”) associated with 
increased anxiety and poorer organization in early memory encoding 
(Jang et al., 2010). From this body of evidence we suggest that checkers 
have a cognitive profile which if pressured in the correct manner – i.e., 
experimentally and/or real-life – will negatively influence their memory 
performance. Yet, if the stimulus domain does not induce intrusive 
thoughts or there is no suitable external challenge then no performance 
deficit will be observed.  
 
(3) Points 1 and 2 converge on the recent perspective that memory 
impairment in OCD/checking are not attributable to a general mnestic 
deficit but rather are secondary to executive dysfunction (Bannon, 
Gonsalvez, & Croft, 2008; Greisberg & McKay, 2003; Olley, Malhi, & 
Sachdev, 2007; Omori et al., 2007; Penades et al., 2005). This explains 
the domain-specificity of checkers’ memory impairment: Disrupted 
memory only occurs when a memory task or real life event taps into a 
dysfunctional component of the executive, i.e., failure to suppress 
intrusive information.  
 
1.2. The present story: The central role of working memory  
From the aforementioned points it is clear that in specific instances checkers’ 
memory is impaired, however, the question as to what stage memory traces 
are interfered with remains unresolved (Coles, Radomsky, & Horng, 2006). Is 
the effect purely confined to episodic long-term memory or does it operate 
already at an earlier stage? Interference may occur within episodic 
representations in short-term Working-Memory (WM) and affect their transfer 
into Long-Term-Memory (LTM). For example, the familiar checkers question 
of “Did I turn ALL the burners off?” could arise seconds after leaving the 
kitchen and could strongly affect how they remember the state of the stove 
hours later. 
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A body of research indicates that memory impairments of OCD patients can 
occur at the level of WM and that this is attributed to deficits in executive 
control and not memory capacity per se. For example, Van der Wee et al. 
(2003) used a spatial variant of the n-back WM task with four levels of load. It 
was only at the highest load level (3-back) that patients with OCD significantly 
differed from controls with errors of 48% versus 25%, respectively. They 
argued that OCD patients may over-scrutinize their performance or have a 
deficit in supervisory (i.e., executive) processes, as opposed to deficits in 
maintenance or manipulation, which suggests that general capacity limitations 
are not responsible for the results. We propose that the stability of executive-
memory impairment at higher levels of task complexity is further supported by 
its presence across a range of WM tasks, for example, the spatial WM task 
(Purcell et al., 1998a, 1998b), paired association learning (Morein-Zamir et al., 
2010) and the corsi block tapping task (Boldrini et al., 2005; Moritz et al., 
2003; Zielinski, Taylor, & Juzwin, 1991; Zitterl et al., 2001). In these instances 
OCD memory impairments are not attributable to capacity per se (i.e., intact at 
lower load levels; see also Ciesielski et al., 2007; Henseler et al., 2008) but 
rather represent a failure of executive functioning to match increasing task 
demands in terms of strategic resource organization. However, we highlight 
the following limitation of this conclusion: As load linearly increases in these 
tasks and OCD impairment occurs at higher load level, one cannot fully rule-
out the role of impaired capacity. In compromise, for example, on the n-back 
task we suggest that load (i.e., increasing visuospatial information) and 
executive control (i.e., maintaining and sorting through that visuospatial 
information) are closely interrelated, making it difficult to tease apart which 
cognitive processes plays the (if at all) dominant role. Thus, one of the aims of 
the present experiments is to provide a clearer delineation between intact 
capacity and memory impairment driven by primary executive dysfunction.  
 
In sum, the literature reveals that poor memory performance of OCD generally 
and checking specifically is explained by an interaction between deficits of 
inhibition, overactive performance monitoring (Veale et al., 1996), and 
impairments in WM. Whereby, an inability to ignore/inhibit irrelevant 
internal/external stimuli, likely triggers an existing preponderance to 
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monitor/examine the contents of WM and impairs the veridicality of their 
contents (see Salkovskis, 1999; Veale et al., 1996). Importantly, these three 
factors have been identified as candidate endophenotypes of OCD, which 
implicates them at the neurocognitive level as central – impairment in first-
degree relatives (heritability) and state independence – to the illness of OCD 
(Chamberlain et al., 2007; Delorme et al., 2007; Menzies et al., 2007; Riesel 
et al., 2011) and checking specifically.  
 
1.2.1. A unifying framework: Baddeley’s (2000) model of working memory  
Despite the likelihood that WM representations are the target for compulsive 
checkers’ concerns (Shimamura, 2000), the specific relationship between WM 
performance and checking is poorly understood (see Woods et al., 2002 for 
review). Here we propose that checkers’ executive impairments – i.e., failing 
to inhibit irrelevant stimuli and/or repeatedly questioning the veridicality of 
memory representations (cf. Nelson and Narens, 1994) – will reduce 
performance already at the stage of WM. Not only does this highlight the 
centrality of executive dysfunction in impaired OCD/checkers’ memory 
performance but it also implies the sensitivity of memory per se to 
interference. Based on these considerations, we propose Baddeley’s (2000) 
model of WM as a unifying framework for explaining: (1) generally, deficits of 
executive control and memory in compulsive checking/OCD and (2) 
specifically, the mechanism underlying poor memory, i.e., executive 
dysfunction interferes with fragile attention-dependent bindings maintained in 
the EB (EB) (see fig. 1) (Harkin & Kessler, 2009). To reiterate, Baddeley’s 
(1986) original model included a central executive, phonological loop and 
visuospatial sketchpad and was deemed separate from long-term memory 
(LTM) (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). While this simple model explained a range of 
data (e.g., phonological similarity; Baddeley, 1966), it could not account for all 
experimental phenomena. For example, the visuospatial sketchpad, a 
capacity limit of 4 units was observed for the maintenance of individual 
features (colors or orientations) as well as for integrated objects with colors 
and orientations (Luck & Vogel, 1997). In addition, the original separation 
between WM and LTM was unsupportable because: (1) chunking in verbal 
WM is aided by existent information in LTM (e.g., Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995), 
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(2) patients with disturbed phonological loop functioning are impaired in long-
term language learning (Baddeley, Papagno, & Vallar, 1988), and (3) bindings 
in visuospatial WM influence long-term visuospatial learning (Logie, 
Brockmole, & Vandenbroucke, 2009).  
 
1.2.2. The centrality of the episodic buffer  
The complementary nature of WM-LTM processes, in addition to efficient 
chunking and binding, hinted at a distinct cognitive resource, one that could 
integrate information from a variety of sources (e.g., phonological, color, 
location, smell) into a single memory episode. The so-called “binding problem” 
(e.g., Treisman, 1996) refers to the fact that information presented in visual 
scenes rarely consists of isolated features. Rather, features pertain to objects, 
objects to locations, and objects are further embedded into episodes together 
with a plethora of contextual information. A parallel processing architecture 
like the human brain needs mechanisms for tracking “what goes with what” in 
order to generate and maintain bindings between multiple features (Hinton, 
McClelland, & Rumelhart, 1986). Therefore, accurate memory (WM and LTM) 
requires the encoding, maintenance and retrieval of bindings between various 
aspects of a multimodal episode (Allen, Baddeley, & Hitch, 2006). Baddeley 
(2000), therefore, extended his classic 1986 WM model to include an “EB” 
that allowed for multimodal, temporarily integrated representations and served 
as an interface with episodic LTM. Based on this development, we proposed 
(Harkin & Kessler, 2009) that an executive dysfunction (e.g., unsuppressed 
intrusive thoughts/stimuli) might strongly impair the consolidation of 
representations in the so-called EB of WM, impairing memory over the short- 
and possibly long-term (Harkin & Kessler, 2009: see fig. 1).  
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Figure 1. Adaptation from Baddeley (2000) as originally proposed by Harkin & 
Kessler (2009). The grey parts of the WM framework highlight the components and 
their interactions which we propose to be involved in compulsive checking. A specific 
central executive dysfunction (inhibition of irrelevant thoughts/stimuli) interferes with 
binding of the episodic buffer disrupting memory performance over the short-term 
and potentially the long term. Further explanations in the text. 
 
Baddeley (2003) later emphasised the parallels between his EB and the 
concept of a “global workspace” (Baars, 2002; Dehaene & Naccache, 2001), 
which is a formal neuro-cognitive approach to conscious/aware processing. In 
short, this embraces the notion that compulsive checking and associated 
executive impairments affect the current stream of consciousness (e.g., 
Salkovskis, Forrester, & Richards, 1998). Thus, intrusive thoughts that doubt 
the veridicality of memory traces (e.g., “Did I REALLY turn all the burners 
off?”) could therefore be more detrimental for compulsive checkers because 
they cannot easily inhibit these thoughts from affecting ongoing conscious 
processing (cf. Bannon, Gonsalvez, & Croft, 2008; Salkovskis, Forrester, & 
Richards, 1998). This concurs with the finding that ‘not just right’ obsessions 
significantly correlated with checking, control and some elements of 
perfectionism (Coles et al., 2003). 
 
Furthermore, Miyake et al. (2000) observed that various facets of executive 
control are interconnected, which neatly explains the manner in which 
executive dysfunction impairs memory functioning. Their latent variable 
VISUOSPATIAL 
SKETCHPAD 
(Locations of stove burners 
and knobs  
/locations of letters) 
EPISODIC LTM 
(Memorizing stove states 
over long-term)  
PHONOLOGICAL LOOP 
(Phonological code for 
knob position 
(“ON”/”OFF”) 
/letter phonemes) 
LANGUAGE  VISUOSPATIAL 
SEMANTICS 
CENTRAL EXECUTIVE 
- Rehearsal/Checking Control  
- Inhibition Dysfunction of 
irrelevant thoughts/stimuli 
 
EPISODIC BUFFER  
(Binding of stove 
burners + knobs to on/off 
codes 
/letters to locations) 
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analysis identified three major control functions of the central executive: (1) 
inhibition: resist disruption from task-irrelevant stimuli, (2) shifting: shift 
attention between different yet task-relevant options, and (3) updating: 
“updating and monitoring of WM representations” (p. 56). Specifically, their 
analysis revealed that while these were relatively independent constructs, 
they were also interdependent, which implies they all rely to some extent upon 
the attentional resources of the central executive (Eysenck et al., 2007). 
Therefore, it follows that an inability to ignore irrelevant stimuli may potentially 
reduce the attention allocated to the concurrent updating of information 
presently maintained in the EB of WM. We, therefore, propose the EB as the 
focal point for memory impairments in OCD/checking: EB functionality 
(binding) is vulnerable to interference through executive dysfunction (e.g., 
failure to inhibit intrusive thoughts/stimuli). In other words, interference from 
executive dysfunction reduces the veridicality of multimodal bindings within 
the EB, attenuating memory performance.  
 
1.2.3. Episodic buffer bindings’ sensitivity to interference  
While there is some debate regarding the exact mechanism for binding 
multimodal features together into a representation (i.e., object-unit hypothesis; 
Luck & Vogel, 1997 versus independent-unit hypothesis; Wheeler & 
Treisman, 2002), researchers tend to agree that attentional effort (executive 
control) is required for their generation and maintenance (Delvenne & Bruyer, 
2006; Fougnie & Marois, 2009; Hyun, Woodman, & Luck, 2009; Makovski, 
Sussman, & Jiang, 2008; Rudner & Ronnberg, 2008; Wheeler & Treisman, 
2002). Thus, critically for the present thesis, the EB is assumed to be 
controlled by the central executive” (Baddeley, 2000, p. 421) which is 
consistent with Wolters and Raffone’s (2008) tri-partite definition of executive 
functioning: (1) Attentional Control: top-down selective activation of task-
relevant representations and suppression of task-irrelevant stimuli and 
responses, (2) Maintenance: holding task-relevant information in an active 
state, and (3) Integration: flexibly bind and manipulate information from 
multimodal sources, in the service of controlling task execution. Therefore, 
memory impairments occur if distraction is sufficient to interfere with 
attentional control specific to the maintenance and integration of bindings in 
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the EB (Elsley & Parmentier, 2009). For example, Wheeler and Treisman 
(2002) measured WM recall with single- and whole-probe displays and 
reported a binding impairment specific to the whole-probe condition. They 
argued that as binding is dependent upon sustained attention so the 
presentation of a whole-probe withdraws attention to those bindings 
simultaneously maintained in WM. Also greater attentional resources – as 
measured by a larger N2pc ERP amplitude – was observed for the binding of 
colors to locations than individual colors (Hyun, Woodman, & Luck, 2009). 
Fougnie and Marois (2009) tested the role of attention in binding using an 
attentionally demanding Multiple Object Tracking (MOT) task, which involved 
tracking through space relevant targets among irrelevant distractors, all of 
which are moving. The MOT was presented between the encoding set of a 
separate memory task (color, shape, color and shape, conjunctions of color 
and shape) and the memory probe at the end of the trial. Only memory for 
feature bindings (conjunctions of color and shape) was impaired and was 
specific to the attentive tracking of the MOT as similar attenuation was not 
observed for a static distractor. They hypothesized that attention iteratively 
refreshes multimodal representations in WM: it is only when a distractor 
sufficiently interferes with attention that there is a failure to maintain features 
in a bound manner (e.g., Harkin & Kessler, 2009, 2011a; Harkin, Rutherford, 
& Kessler, 2011; Kessler & Kiefer, 2005; Mather et al. 2006). This dove-tails 
nicely with findings showing that the more emotionally engaging a given 
distractor is to an individual (or group) the more it interferes with attention-
dependent bindings (Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006; Johnson et al., 2005; Mather, 
2007; Mather et al., 2006). Mather et al. (2006), for example, presented 
pictures of high, medium and low arousal in various locations. Picture-location 
accuracy decreased as arousal increased. Interestingly, depression scores 
were negatively correlated with picture-location accuracy for negative images. 
Emotional arousal, therefore, interfered with binding accuracy at a global (all 
subjects) as well as an individual (depressed) level. In this reasoning, 
complex representations that are salient to a checking/OCD individual/group 
will likely result in memory impairments (i.e., Cha et al., 2008; Jang et al., 
2010).  
 
   11 
1.3. The aim of the present experiments: Targeting the episodic buffer  
With these points in mind, the present series of experiments set out to: (1) 
engage the EB using stimuli which require multimodal conjunctions between 
phonological (letters) or visual (kitchen appliances) and spatial (locations) 
features and (2) hamper EB functionality by presenting an intermediate probe 
that was relevant to the executive impairments of high but not low checkers 
during the WM retention interval. 
 
1.3.1. Primary experimental manipulations  
Specifically, we presented an intermediate probe (between the encoding set 
and memory task) in the form of two types of external challenge which 
resulted in two main trial types:  
 
(1) Resolvable Trials: probing an aspect of the encoded set 
(identity/location) where a correct response is possible, i.e., it is 
resolvable. For example, asking for the color of an item at a location 
where one was presented.  
 
(2) Misleading Trials: probing an aspect of the encoded set 
(identity/location) where a correct response is impossible, i.e., it is 
irresolvable. For example, asking for the color of an item at a location 
where none was presented.  
 
1.3.2. Primary experimental predictions 
In relation to these experimental manipulations we make a strong and a weak 
hypothesis with respect to the memory performance of high compared to low 
checkers.  
 
Accuracy – Strong Hypothesis 
Compulsive checkers have been reported to show a deficit in inhibiting 
intrusive thoughts and distracting stimuli (e.g., Olley, Malhi, & Sachdev, 2007; 
Omori et al., 2007; Savage et al., 2000). As inhibitory functioning is 
associated with the ability resist interference from distractors (Friedman & 
Miyake, 2004), it follows that impaired inhibitory functioning will reduce the 
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ability to accurately maintain task goals when confronted by externally task-
irrelevant stimuli (see Eysenck et al., 2007). We therefore expect that the 
presence of a misleading but irrelevant probe-1 question will especially 
interfere with the WM representations of higher checkers. This, we argue, is 
analogous to the process of having just completed a task (e.g., turning off the 
stove) and then almost immediately starting to check the maintained WM 
representations for their veridicality (see above; Radomsky & Alcolado, 2010). 
Thus, checking the contents of memory is likely to be driven by a thought or 
an external stimulus that is task-related but irrelevant to the successful recall 
of the memory trace, e.g., external misleading cue: “Was that letter there?” 
leading to the thought: “I am unsure!” This assertion is supported by the 
observation that OCD checkers are poorer at tolerating uncertainty (i.e., 
misleading probe-1 letter) than OCD non-checkers and controls (Tolin, 
Woods, & Abramowitz, 2003), and that an inability to tolerate uncertainty is 
associated with subsequent checking and repeating rituals (Lind & Boschen, 
2009; Tolin, Woods, & Abramowitz, 2003). Misleading intermediate probes 
may induce checkers to ‘check another time’ in an attempt to ‘be sure’, 
however, as we have seen this only serves to further undermine memory at 
the level of accuracy and confidence. As a result, we expect that high 
checkers will have poorer memory for misleading but not resolvable trials in 
comparison to low checkers. We suggest that for a misleading probe, 
checkers are more likely to repeatedly compare the visually presented probe 
to the contents of the memorised set, yet, frustratingly without success. At the 
representational level this would lead to a competition between a strong visual 
stimulus and weaker, memorised bindings. The stronger this competition is 
(lack of suppression of misleading information) and the more often this 
competition is repeated (checking) the more strongly the originally encoded 
memories are weakened – ultimately resulting in a performance deficit on the 
actual memory test (probe-2) (see Simplified Comparison Hypothesis: 
Makovski, Sussman, & Jiang, 2008). 
 
Accuracy – Weak Hypothesis 
For high checkers, an intermediate probe (resolvable or misleading) will be 
experienced as generally distracting (executive impairment) which will result 
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in the withdrawal of attention from attention-dependent bindings underlying 
the encoding set. (Gajewski & Brockmole, 2006; Wheeler & Treisman, 2002). 
This will result in high checkers having poorer memory performance for 
misleading and resolvable trials in comparison to low checkers. 
 
Measuring working memory capacity 
For either the weak or the strong hypothesis, and in agreement with previous 
findings (e.g., Ciesielski et al., 2007; Henseler et al., 2008) we predict that 
WM capacity will not explain these group differences. To support this we will 
include trials without an intermediate probe (no-probe-1 trials) which will 
measure WM functioning under ideal conditions. Thus, for these trials we 
expect that high checkers memory performance will not to differ from low 
checkers. In doing so we will provide a clearer demarcation of the conditions 
where primary executive dysfunction results in secondary memory impairment 
in OCD-checking and that WM capacity is not responsible (c.f., Cha et al., 
2008; Omori et al., 2007). However, we do expect to potentially observe 
memory impairments in no-probe-1 trials in our latter experiments, i.e., 7 and 
8. As these experiments use stimuli concordant with the symptoms of high 
checkers, this may evoke anxiety, which as discussed previously (see Dolcos 
& McCarthy, 2006; Johnson et al., 2005; Mather, 2007; Mather et al., 2006) 
may generally interfere with attention to bindings irrespective of an 
intermediate probe. It is important to reiterate, that this is not evidence of a 
general impairment in the WM capacity of high checkers, as the absence of 
impairment in no-probe-1 trials in ours (Exp. 1-4) and others experiments at 
low load levels (e.g., Ciesielski et al., 2007; Henseler et al., 2008; van der 
Wee et al., 2003, 2007) argues against this. 
 
Reaction Times 
We will measure reaction times (RTs) in relation to the memory task. We do 
not expect that RTs will differ between high and low checkers on this 
measure. If this is the case then we will be able to rule out a speed-accuracy 
trade-off with respect to high checkers poorer memory performance, i.e., they 
will not be faster than low checkers. 
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Confidence 
We will also measure confidence after the memory task (probe-2). We justify 
this by observing the centrality of doubt regarding memory performance in 
checking (for reviews see Woods et al., 2002 and Muller & Roberts, 2005). 
With the literature showing two prominent effects: (1) checking impairs 
confidence (e.g., van den Hout & Kindt, 2003a) and (2) poorer confidence 
motivates checking (e.g., Alcolado & Radomsky, 2011). Tolin et al. (2001) 
reported that with repeated exposures to threatening stimuli, OCD patients 
showed a progressive decline in memory confidence across trials compared 
to anxious and non-anxious controls. More specifically, after 1-week, OCD 
checkers had poorer confidence in memory for threatening stimuli compared 
to non-checking OCD patients. This suggests that poor memory confidence is 
a characteristic of OCD in general, but is particularly pronounced amongst 
checkers in the long-term. A finding that is concordant with the plethora of 
evidence showing that repeated checking reduces memory confidence 
specific to the domain of checking (Dek et al., 2010; Radomsky & Alcolado, 
2010; Radomsky, Gilchrist, & Dussault, 2006; van den Hout & Kindt, 2003a, , 
2003b) with this metamemory effect occurring in as few as two checks (Coles, 
Radomsky, & Horng, 2006). Considering this alongside the evidence that 
OCD checkers have less confidence in their memories compared to OCD 
non-checkers and controls (MacDonald et al., 1997; McNally & Kohlbeck, 
1993; Sher, Frost, & Otto, 1983); low memory confidence in checkers may 
contribute to the self-perpetuating mechanism of further checking and 
reduced confidence (Rachman, 2002). This agrees with the recent research 
demonstrating that poor memory confidence predicts repeated checking. For 
example, Nedeljkovic and Kyrios (2007) showed that low trait memory 
confidence was associated with severity of checker’s obsessional symptoms 
(i.e., “Did I turn it off?”) and higher-order executive processes related to 
memory (i.e., attention/concentration) (Nedeljkovic & Kyrios, 2009a). In a 
similar manner, Cougle, and colleagues reported that checkers doubted their 
own memory abilities, lacked confidence in their memory for OCD stimuli, and 
that confidence correlated with memory accuracy (Cougle, Salkovskis, & 
Thorpe, 2008; Cougle, Salkovskis, & Wahl, 2007). This suggests that low 
memory confidence may be a risk factor for checking especially in a context of 
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uncertainty (Tolin et al., 2003), a suggestion confirmed by Alcolado and 
Radomsky (2011) who showed that manipulating confidence (positive vs. 
negative false feedback) influenced subsequent urges to check. Those who 
received false feedback (low memory confidence condition) had stronger 
urges to check than those who received positive feedback (high memory 
confidence condition). In addition, Nedeljkovic and Kyrios (2007) proposed 
that covert checking (i.e., comparing misleading P1 to contents of WM) and 
poor metamemory are particularly detrimental for tasks that are dependent 
upon the maintenance of internal representations, i.e., the type of WM task 
used in the current experiments. 
 
In the context of the present experiments, checking implies a lack of 
confidence in the veridicality of the reactivated WM information that is 
detrimental without the original sensory information to check against, or even 
with competing new sensory information present. As a result, we expect high 
checkers will have generally poorer memory confidence relative to low 
checkers; a difference that will be further mediated by the presence of an 
intermediate probe. In addition, if high checkers are specifically unable to 
ignore a misleading probe – due to impairments of inhibitory functioning – not 
only will they have poorer memory in a misleading context but they will also 
reveal poorer memory confidence relative to low checkers. 
 
1.4. Creating high checking and low checking groups  
All of the present experiments require us to determine the checking tendency 
of each individual participant. To this end we used the checking subscale of 
the Vancouver-Obsessional Compulsive Inventory (VOCI; Thordarson et al., 
2004). The VOCI consists of 55 items that comprise 6 subscales: 
Contamination (12 items), Checking (6 items), Obsessions (12 items), 
Hoarding (7 items), Just Right (12 items), and Indecisiveness (6 items). Each 
item is rated 0 (not at all), 1 (a little), 2 (some), 3 (much), or 4 (very much) in 
response to the prompt: ‘‘How much is each of the following statements true 
of you?’’ The VOCI possesses excellent inter-item reliability in student, 
community, OCD, and clinical control populations (Cronbach’s  alpha: 50.96,  
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0.90,  0.94,  and  0.98, respectively). Although participants completed all 
items of the VOCI, only the checking subscale was used to create a high and 
a low checking group.  
 
1.5. The structure of the present thesis  
The present experiments will measure memory performance of high 
compared to low checkers in novel WM tasks – fulfilling the aforementioned 
design criteria – and a specific measure of inhibitory (i.e., executive) 
functioning.  
 
Chapter 2. Checkers’ show robust and consistent impairments in a misleading 
context: A simple working memory task  
Experiments 1, 2 and an extreme group meta-comparison provide our first 
attempt to interfere with the WM performance of high but not low checkers 
(see Harkin & Kessler 2009). Simply, we present letters in locations and 
measure the impact of a misleading versus resolvable intermediate (probe-1) 
upon the WM and metamemory performance of high and low checkers. In line 
with our strong hypothesis, we expect that high checkers will be unable to 
ignore a misleading intermediate probe which will then impair memory 
performance on the subsequent WM (probe-2) task. We do not expect to 
observe difference in basic WM capacity (no-probe-1 trials). 
 
Chapter 3. Checkers’ memory impairments persist in more complex working memory 
experiments 
Experiments 3 and 4 attempt to increase the group differences observed in 
Experiments 1 and 2 (see Harkin & Kessler, 2011a). In Experiment 3 we 
increase the complexity of the encoding set (letters in locations) by presenting 
the letters in different colours. We expect that increasing the binding load of 
the encoding set will increase its sensitivity to interference, which may boost 
the memory impairments of high checkers observed in Experiment 1 and 2. 
Then, in Experiment 4 we attempt to increase the strength of interference 
caused by the intermediate probe by presenting it as a strong visuospatial at a 
resolvable or misleading location. We predict that this strong visuospatial 
distractor (relative to Exp. 1, 2, and 3) will definitively tap into checkers’ 
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impairments in inhibiting irrelevant stimuli and so boost memory impairments. 
In this instance, high checkers may be generally distracted by such an 
intermediate probe leading to poorer WM performance in misleading and 
resolvable trials alike (i.e., supporting the weak hypothesis). 
 
Chapter 4. Do checkers actually check?: An eye movement study 
In Experiment 5, we address a primary methodological limitation of our 
previous experiments (see Harkin, Miellet, & Kessler, subm). Specifically, we 
cannot say with certainty that high checkers do actually check the contents of 
WM when presented with a misleading intermediate probe. To this end, we 
use eye tracking as a means of measuring fixation number and fixation 
duration across three critical periods of our original WM paradigm (i.e., Exp. 1, 
2; Harkin & Kessler, 2009). We focus on these eye movement measures as 
these mimicked the symptoms of checking, i.e., fixation number related to 
unnecessary checking and fixation duration similar to perseveration. Simply, 
we expect that in misleading trials high checkers’ inhibitory impairments for 
misleading information results in them checking (longer looking at) the 
contents of WM in a manner which is unnecessary (specifically in misleading 
trials) and uninformative (empty locations), in comparison to low checkers and 
resolvable trials. Checking empty locations will provide specific evidence that 
in a context of uncertainty (misleading trials) high checkers’ attempt to remove 
it by examining locations were no additional task-relevant information is 
present. 
 
Chapter 5. Using ecologically valid stimuli to address previous experimental concerns 
In Tasks 6 and 7 (see Harkin & Kessler, in press) and Experiments 8 and 9 
(see Harkin, Rutherfored, & Kessler, 2011) we again attempt to tap more 
strongly into the executive impairments of checkers by using stimuli (i.e., 
electrical kitchen appliances) that are more concordant with their symptoms. 
Please note that the reference to Tasks 6 and 7 (as opposed to Experiments 
6 and 7) is to avoid confusion which arose in explaining and discussing the 
counterbalanced design which was used in this case. Tasks 6 and 7 attempt 
to determine if checkers do in fact suffer from executive impairments in a 
novel application of the Inhibition of Return (IOR; Posner, Cohen, & Rafal, 
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1982) paradigm. If so, this will provide explicit evidence that checkers suffer 
inhibitory impairments for stimuli that are specific to their symptomatic 
concerns. Experiments 8 and 9 then require participants to memorise the 
location of the same (Tasks 6 and 7) electrical kitchen appliances presented 
on a kitchen countertop. Between encoding and the memory task we again 
presented a spatial location probe as it previously (Exp. 4) revealed strong 
and robust group differences. We then tested memory by asking if an 
appliance had been ‘ON’ or ‘OFF’ (Exp. 8) or if it was correctly located (Exp. 
9). By using such symptom specific stimuli, high checkers may possibly reveal 
novel and potentially larger WM impairments relative to low checkers. 
 
Chapter 6. The role of working memory in compulsive checking and OCD: A 
systematic classification of 58 experimental findings 
Then using evidence from the previous experiments (1-9) and that of the 
existing OCD literature we provide a classification system which allows us to 
position individual OCD memory experiments and explain why they did or did 
not report memory impairments (see Harkin & Kessler, 2011b). This 
classification system moves away from the classic verbal versus visual 
distinction and issues of basic capacity. Rather, we extend the argument that 
memory impairments in OCD are secondary to executive dysfunction and 
highlight that the following three main factors which underlie memory 
impairment in OCD: (1) E: executive functioning efficiency, (2) B: binding 
complexity of stimuli used and (3) L: overall load of task upon WM resources. 
We use this EBL classification to explain otherwise discrepant findings from 
58 studies. 
 
Chapter 7. Conclusion: Overview, clinical implications, limitations and future 
research, and contribution to OCD memory research   
Finally, we conclude with an overview of our current experimental findings as 
they relate to our primary hypotheses, followed by a discussion of the manner 
in which checkers’ attention/WM impairments contribute to the maintenance 
and development of their symptoms. Then limitations of the research are 
identified and, when appropriate, avenues of future research are proposed as 
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a solution. Finally, the contribution of our findings and theories are then 
discussed with respect to OCD memory research as a whole. 
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2. Checkers’ show consistent and robust memory impairments in a 
misleading context: A simple working memory task  
The following three experiments were our first attempt to measure the impact 
of an irrelevant intermediate probe upon subsequent WM performance of low 
and high checkers (see Harkin & Kessler, 2009). We presented 4 letters 
randomly in 6 possible locations (encoding set); with the primary memory task 
(probe-2) requiring the participant to determine if an individual letter was 
correctly or incorrectly located with respect to the original encoding set. We 
chose an easy primary task (4 letters in 6 locations) to avoid group differences 
due to differences in WM capacity at high load (see Van der Wee, 2003; 
Purcell et al., 1998a, 1998b) and we included a control condition without 
intermediate probe (no probe-1) to obtain a baseline indication of capacity. 
The checking manipulation between the encoding set and the memory task 
was induced by presenting a probe that was potentially misleading in its form. 
Participants were asked explicitly where a specific letter had been, while this 
letter, e.g. “T” or “K” (see fig. 1), either was (hence, resolvable) or was not 
(hence, misleading) part of the encoded set. For the latter, we expect that 
questioning the location of a letter that is not solvable will tap into checkers 
established executive impairments in inhibition (Olley, Malhi, & Sachdev, 
2007; Omori et al., 2007) the inherent irresolvability of misleading information 
will induce a degree of repeated checking of the veridicality of the encoded 
representations especially in high checkers (Veale et al., 1996). This is in 
agreement with the observation that intolerance of uncertainty (i.e., aversion 
to uncertainty about the presence/absence of probe-1) mediates checking in 
OCD (Lind & Boschen, 2009; Tolin et al., 2003). Thus, high checkers will have 
impaired memory performance in a misleading but not a resolvable context 
compared to low checkers and these differences will not be due to capacity, 
i.e., no group difference on no-probe-1 trials. We expect that confidence – 
measured after the memory task – will be poorer in high compared to low 
checkers and that this will be mediated by the presence of an intermediate 
probe. We tested these hypotheses in two experiments (Exp. 1: low vs. high 
checkers; Exp. 2: replication of Exp. 1) and an extreme group meta-
comparison (using high checkers from Exp. 1 and 2 which scored in the 
clinical range according to the VOCI; Thordarson et al., 2004).  
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2.1. Experiment 1 
2.1.1. Method 
Participants 
40 Participants (mean 22.7 years: 12 male, 26 female) from the University of 
Glasgow gave written informed consents. British Psychological Society ethical 
requirements were met, including that of participant debriefing. A median split 
of VOCI checking scores was used to obtain two groups: low (mean = 1.11, 
SD = 1.10) and high (mean = 9.53, SD = 5.49) “checkers”.  
 
Stimuli and Procedure 
Participants sat 90cm from a 19’’ computer screen ran at 800x600 resolution 
with their head on a chin rest. Stimuli were capital letters in font Arial, size 18 
and were presented against a black background within a 2 (columns) by 3 
(rows) matrix covering an area of 300x420 pixels. After 1000ms fixation, 4 
letters were presented randomly in 4 of the 6 possible locations and 
participants had 2000 ms to encode the identity and the location of each letter 
(see fig. 2). After 500 ms, the probe-1 question requested the location of a 
specific letter. Participants indicated the location through a 2x3 spatially 
mapped keypad and were instructed to respond within 4000 ms (to keep the 
WM delay constant). Whether the probe-1 letter had or had not been part of 
the encoded set created the resolvable versus misleading (irresolvable) trials. 
In a baseline condition probe-1 was omitted to measure WM performance on 
the primary task under ideal conditions.   
 
A 1000 ms interstimulus interval (ISI) separated probe-1 and probe-2. Since 
baseline trials did not include the intermediate probe-1 a black screen was 
shown for 5500 ms between encoding and probe-2 (equaling the ISI between 
encoding and probe-2 on the other trial types). Probe-2 was the actual 
memory test for each trial and required participants to indicate if a letter was 
correctly located with respect to the originally encoded set. In all trials the 
probe-2 letter had been part of the encoded set in terms of identity while the 
probe location was correct only on 50% of the trials. 
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Figure 2. Schematic procedure of resolvable and misleading trials. A set of 4 letters 
presented randomly in 4 out of 6 possible locations had to be encoded within 2 
seconds. Encoding was then followed after 500 ms by a first probe letter (probe-1) 
which was either part or not part of the encoded set, i.e., was resolvable or 
misleading. Subsequently participants had to indicate if the probe-2 letter was 
correctly or incorrectly located with respect to the encoded set, which was the actual 
memory test. Finally confidence in the probe-2 response had to be indicated on a 
scale from 1 (highly certain) to 6 (highly uncertain). Further explanations in the text.  
 
Finally, a scale was displayed prompting participants to indicate their degree 
of confidence in their probe-2 response (6 levels: 1=totally certain to 6=totally 
uncertain). Three self-paced breaks were included and the experiment lasted 
approximately 90 minutes. The resolvable block comprised 180 trials with 120 
resolvable trials, 40 misleading trials, and additional 20 baseline trials (no 
probe-1). Correspondingly, the misleading block (180 trials) was made up of 
40 resolvable trials, 120 misleading trials, and again 20 baseline trials. The 
sequence of these blocks was counterbalanced across participants in order to 
avoid order effects.  
 
Design 
A two (group: low vs. high checkers) by two (block type: mostly resolvable vs. 
mostly misleading block) by three (probe-1 trial type: resolvable, misleading, 
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   23 
no probe-1) mixed design was employed with group as the between- and 
block and probe-1 as the within-subjects factors.  
 
2.1.2. Results 
MANOVA’s for a 2x2x3 design were carried out for reaction times, accuracy 
and confidence on probe-2 responses due to violations of the sphericity 
assumption (Mauchley’s tests). As our theoretical predictions focused on the 
effect of checking induced by resolvable vs. misleading probe-1 trials we also 
conducted 2x2x2 ANOVA’s removing the no-probe-1 trials. The datasets of 
two participants were not used in further analysis as accuracy was at chance 
levels in at least one condition. All other participants performed well above 
chance level in all conditions (> 70% accuracy). 
 
Probe-2 reaction times 
The MANOVA (2x2x3) for probe-2 latencies revealed a main effect of trial 
type (F(2,72)=10.65, p<0.001) and the ANOVA for the reduced 2x2x2 design 
(without no-probe-1 trials) also revealed a main effect of trial type 
(F(1,36)=9.46, p<0.004). This indicates that the misleading trials were the 
slowest (Table 1).  
 
Table 1: Reaction times for all participants for resolvable, 
misleading and no probe-1 trial types. 
 
Trial Type Resolvable Misleading No Probe-1 
RT (msec) 1782.021 1896.743 1982.715 
 
Probe-2 accuracy 
The MANOVA (2x2x3) for probe-2 accuracy revealed a main effect of block 
(F(1,36)=5.64, p<0.03) which was indicative of generally less accuracy in the 
misleading block than the resolvable block. The main effect of trial type was 
also significant (F(2,35)=3.53, p <0.04) and indicated the greater accuracy in 
the no-probe 1 trials relative to the resolvable and misleading trials. 
Importantly, the simple effect for no-probe 1 trials (baseline) revealed no 
significant difference between high- and low-scorers (F(1,36), p<0.5, p>0.48) 
indicating that WM capacity was comparable between groups. 
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Figure 3. Experiment 1: Group (low vs. high checkers) x block (resolvable vs. 
misleading) x trial type (resolvable vs. misleading) interaction plot for probe-2 
accuracy. Vertical bars denote standard errors. 
 
Next, we removed the no-probe-1 trials to focus on the more relevant 
resolvable and misleading trials. The ANOVA for the reduced 2x2x2 design 
revealed a significant 3-way interaction (see fig. 3) for group x block x trial 
type (F(1,36)=4.35, p<0.05). To clarify which conditions generate this complex 
interaction we split the analysis into two more simple 2-way ANOVAs of group 
x block, for resolvable and misleading trials separately (see left and right plots 
in fig. 3). Only the interaction for misleading probe-1 trials (right plot in fig. 3) 
reached significance (F(1,36)=5.98, p<0.02), suggesting that accuracy (on the 
subsequent probe-2) for misleading trials differed significantly between blocks 
and between checking groups. Most interestingly, this difference appears to 
exist only within the misleading block (low checkers: 93.90 vs. high checkers: 
90.79) supporting our strong hypothesis that high checkers memory 
performance is more impaired in the misleading compared to the resolvable 
context.  
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Probe-2 confidence 
The MANOVA (2x2x3) for confidence in probe-2 responses revealed a 
significant main effect of trial type (F(2,35)=8.67, p<0.001) with misleading 
probe-1s inducing the least confidence in subsequent probe-2 responses. In 
addition, however, there was a significant 3-way interaction of group x trial 
type x block (F(2,35)=4.16, p<0.03). Figure 4 shows that high checkers 
indeed show decreased confidence compared to low checkers, but that this 
difference is not consistent across trial types and blocks, i.e., a quite similar 
pattern is observed for the two groups for resolvable trials in both blocks (left 
in fig. 4) while a more dissimilar pattern is revealed for misleading and no 
probe-1 trials (middle and right in fig. 4).   
 
 
Figure 4. Experiment 1: Group (low vs. high checkers) x block (resolvable vs. 
misleading) x trial type (resolvable, misleading, or no P1) interaction plot for 
confidence in probe-2 responses. The scale ranged from 1 (highly certain) to 6 
(highly uncertain), i.e., lower values reflect higher confidence. Vertical bars denote 
standard errors.  
 
The ANOVA for the reduced 2x2x2 design (without no-probe 1 trials) failed to 
reveal any significant results, suggesting that the MANOVA results were 
substantially driven by the difference between misleading and no-probe1 trials 
(see fig. 4 middle and right graphs).  
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Finally we directly compared confidence between resolvable and misleading 
trials for equal frequencies to further understand the role of the misleading 
trials in the significant 3way interaction of the MANOVA. That is, we compared 
the 120 resolvable trials of the resolvable block to the 120 misleading trials of 
the misleading block. “Group” was included as a second factor. This 2x2 
ANOVA revealed a significant group x trial type interaction (F(1,36)=8.56, 
p<0.006) that is shown in Figure 5. This interaction further substantiates the 
difference in confidence ratings between groups observed for misleading trials 
within the misleading block (middle graph fig. 4), where high checkers had 
less confidence than low checkers.  
Experiment 1: Confidence Interaction Plot for Group x Trial Type
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Figure 5. Experiment 1: Group (low vs. high checkers) x trial type (resolvable trials in 
the resolvable block vs. misleading trials in the misleading block) interaction plot for 
confidence in probe-2 responses. To re-iterate, lower values reflect higher 
confidence. Vertical bars denote standard errors. 
 
2.1.3. Discussion of Experiment 1 
We found evidence in reaction time (RT) and confidence ratings (CR) data, 
suggesting that our manipulation was successful in inducing checking, 
although the WM task was very easy (all conditions revealed mean 
accuracies over 90%). This effect was most evident in RTs, where across 
blocks and groups probe-2 responses were performed faster after a 
More 
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Less 
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resolvable probe-1 than after a misleading probe-1. This effect was supported 
by the confidence ratings, where misleading trials led to lower confidence than 
resolvable and no-probe-1 trials. Furthermore, high checkers had less 
confidence than low checkers on misleading trials compared to resolvable 
trials when the respective trial types where blocked together. Finally and most 
importantly we observed group differences in performance accuracy for 
misleading trials within the mostly misleading block as reflected in a significant 
interaction of group, trial type and block. This suggests that checkers cannot 
easily ignore a misleading cue even if the experimental context emphasizes 
the irrelevance of the cue (i.e., strong hypothesis). Since this is the result with 
the potentially strongest impact on our understanding of compulsive checking 
we wanted to ensure its reliability. In a replication study we presented the 
misleading block only and focused on the group differences for the misleading 
trials. 
 
2.2. Experiment 2 (replication of Experiment 1) 
2.2.1. Method 
Participants 
40 volunteers (mean age 23.88: 14 male, 25 female) participated in this 
second study and a median split of the VOCI scores was used again to obtain 
a group of high (mean = 8.65, SD = 3.70) and a group of low (mean = 1.05, 
SD = 1.18) scorers on the checking scale.  
 
Stimuli and Procedure 
The same stimuli and procedure as in Experiment 1 were employed. The only 
change was that only the misleading block was presented (2/3 misleading 
trials).  
 
2.2.2. Results 
In order to test for a replication of the main finding of Experiment 1 we carried 
out hypothesis driven t-tests to compare probe-2 accuracy for high and low 
checkers. We expected high checkers to show again a lower performance for 
misleading probe-1 trials, which was supported by a significant t-test 
(t(1,37)=2.276, p<0.029) (fig. 6). The t-tests for the resolvable and no-probe-1 
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trials did not reach significance (both t(1,37)<0.35, p>0.56), supporting the 
notion that there were no general differences in WM capacity. This again 
supports the strong hypothesis which we proposed in section 1.4.2. With 
respect to confidence ratings (CR) numerically observed group differences did 
not reach significance (resolvable, misleading, no-probe-1: p>0.28). 
 
Figure 6. Experiment 2: Group comparison (low vs. high checkers) for probe-2 
accuracy on misleading trials only. Vertical bars denote standard errors. 
 
2.2.3. Discussion of Experiment 2 
The accuracy outcome is a clear replication of the main finding in Experiment 
1, allowing for a convincing conclusion that higher checking disposition is 
related to attenuated performance within the episodic part of WM if misleading 
information is provided. However, in both experiments we used a median split 
to create the two checking groups (low versus high). As a result, the high 
checking group in both experiments (Exp 1 = 9.53; Exp 2 = 8.65) scored 
below the clinical mean (15.6) of compulsive checkers on the checking 
subscale of the VOCI (Thordarson et al., 2004) making our conclusions 
tentative with respect to the clinical population. Therefore, we conducted a 
“meta-comparison” where we compared the extremely high checkers (mean 
score 15.8) to the lowest scorers (0.5) across both experiments. 
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2.3. Extreme Groups Meta-Comparison 
We compared the data of the 10 participants with the highest scores on the 
checking subscale of the VOCI (mean = 15.8, SD = 2.57) to the data of the 10 
lowest scoring participants (mean = 0.5, SD = 0.71) from both experiments. 
Critically, the high group scored in the clinical range for checking according 
the VOCI (Thordarson et al., 2004). Only the data from the misleading block 
were employed for participants drawn from Experiment 1 (n=6) to keep the 
data congruent to Experiment 2. Like in Experiment 2, hypothesis driven t-
tests were conducted. Our strong hypothesis was again supported as only for 
misleading trials did extreme high checkers differ significantly from extreme 
low checkers (t(1,18)=2.289, p<0.034) (see fig. 7). Whereas, the t-tests for the 
resolvable (t(1,18)=0.141, p>0.175) and no-probe 1 (t(1,18)=0.33, p>0.745) 
trials did not reach significance, supporting the notion that the two extreme 
groups were comparable with respect to general WM capacity. Again, 
numerically observed group differences for confidence ratings did not reach 
significance (resolvable, misleading, no-probe-1: p>0.39). 
 
Figure 7. Extreme Scorers Meta-Analysis: Group comparison (extreme low vs. 
extreme high checkers) for probe-2 accuracy on misleading trials only. Vertical bars 
denote standard errors. 
 
2.4. General Discussion 
The aim of these first experiments was to show that internal WM 
representations, i.e., cross-modal bindings within the EB, can be affected by 
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unproductive checking. Deteriorated WM performance was expected to be 
more pronounced in participants with a high checking predisposition. We 
found evidence in reaction time (RT) and confidence ratings (CR) data of 
Experiment 1 suggesting that our manipulation was successful in inducing a 
certain amount of detrimental checking in all participants. This effect was most 
evident in the RTs of Experiment 1 (Table 1), where across groups responses 
on the actual memory test (probe-2) were performed faster after a resolvable 
probe-1 than after a misleading probe-1. This effect was supported by the 
confidence ratings, where misleading trials led to lower confidence than 
resolvable and no-probe-1 trials. Importantly, this concurs with the classic 
attention-based WM rehearsal finding of Awh and Jonides (2001) who 
reported slower memory probe RTs when attention was previously directed to 
a different location (mismatch condition/misleading trials) compared to the 
same location (match condition/resolvable trials).  
 
Regarding our group hypothesis Experiment 1 revealed less confidence for 
high checkers than low checkers in misleading trials but not in resolvable trials 
(fig. 5). However, in Experiment 2 and in the extreme groups meta-
comparison only numerical differences were observed, possibly suggesting 
(1) that the task was too easy to affect metacognitive judgments in a 
straightforward way or (2) that the method of recording a confidence reduced 
actual between-group differences as participants perhaps responded more to 
end the trial than to indicate their actual confidence. As a result, we use 
different confidence response measures in latter experiments. That is, group 
differences were only revealed as part of quite complex 3-way and 2-way 
interactions in Experiment 1, which was not possible with the reduced design 
in Experiment 2 and the meta-comparison. Importantly and in agreement with 
previous findings (e.g., Ciesielski et al., 2007; Henseler et al., 2008) we did 
not observe general differences in WM capacity between high and low 
checkers: performance on resolvable and no probe-1 trials was comparable in 
both experiments as well as in the extreme groups meta-comparison. This 
suggests that group differences are not a WM capacity issue per se - 
especially with low demands employed here and in other research (e.g., 
Morein-Zamir et al., 2010; Purcell et al., 1998a; van der Wee et al., 2003). 
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According to our group hypothesis regarding probe-2 accuracy, we observed 
differences in performance accuracy in Experiment 1 when irrelevant but 
misleading probes were maximally concentrated: for misleading trials when 
these trials where highly frequent (misleading block). This crucial finding was 
replicated in Experiment 2 and was also revealed in the extreme group 
comparison across experiments underpinning the clinical relevance of our 
findings. This provides a convergence of support for our strong hypothesis 
that in misleading trials high checkers’ WM performance will be poorer 
compared to low checkers.  
 
We conclude that our experimental manipulation resonated with personal 
checking dispositions and affected WM representations. It appears that low 
checkers have learned more readily to ignore irresolvable probes especially in 
an experimental context where such probes were highly frequent so their 
irrelevance became even more obvious (misleading block). In contrast, high 
checkers might have “checked yet another time” whether the probe letter 
“really” wasn’t anywhere. That is, high scorers appeared to be less able to 
suppress the misleading probes and the associated intrusive thoughts. In turn, 
this might have initiated repeated scans through WM to compare the 
irresolvable probe with each letter-location binding over and over again. We 
propose that the competition between a strong, visually present letter-stimulus 
and the fragile letter-location bindings in the EB weakens these multimodal 
representations. This assertion is supported by the simplified comparison 
theory of Makovski, Sussman and Jiang (2008). In this they suggested that 
exhaustively comparing every probe item (i.e., misleading P1) with those 
maintained in memory (encoding set: letters in locations) may come at a cost 
to WM performance. Therefore, repeated checking due to insufficient 
suppression of misleading information might have therefore resulted in 
repeated competition and increasingly weaker bindings. This is in agreement 
with research showing that: (1) checkers (not washers) have impairments in 
memory that are associated with dysfunctional inhibitory control (Omori et al., 
2007), (2) urges to check are mediated by the degree of experienced 
intolerance of uncertainty (Rachman & Hodgson, 1980; Tolin et al., 2003) (i.e., 
which checkers likely experienced when externally challenged by a 
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misleading letter) and (3) doubt/uncertainty regarding the contents of memory 
will increase the likelihood of covert checking (Alcolado & Radomsky, 2011; 
McNally & Kohlbeck, 1993), which in turn may interfere with the integrity of 
internal representations (Makovski, Sussman, & Jiang, 2008; Nedeljkovic & 
Kyrios, 2007; Radomsky & Alcolado, 2010). This latter point is supported by 
the established sensitivity of attention-dependent bindings of the EB to 
interference.  
 
In Figure 1 we provided our original adaptation of Baddeley’s (2000) model to 
predict and interpret our findings of compulsive checking. Thus, while we 
originally proposed Baddeley’s (2000) model of WM in explanation of the 
manner (i.e., executive-memory interaction) and cognitive location (i.e., EB) 
underlying memory impairment in OCD-checking, we now further elucidate 
upon this. According to this framework compulsive checking could involve 
three components that together make up a vicious circle.  
 
(1)  Executive dysfunction could result in a lack of suppression of misleading 
information, which is in strong agreement with the susceptibility to 
intrusive thoughts (Bannon, Gonsalvez, & Croft, 2008; Salkovskis, 1999) 
and the general executive dysfunction (Olley et al., 2007; Omori et al., 
2007) reported in clinical OCD samples. The misleading/intrusive 
information can be internally generated in form of intrusive thoughts (“I 
think I left a burner on”) or can be externally provided in form of 
challenging questions (“Where was the letter?” or “Are you ABSOLUTELY 
SURE that you turned all burners off?”). This explains domain-specific 
WM deficits because WM performance is only disrupted when the WM 
task requires a component of the central executive that is dysfunctional, 
e.g., does not suppress intrusive information (Dek et al., 2010; Radomsky 
& Alcolado, 2010). If there is no external challenge or the stimulus domain 
does not induce intrusive thoughts then no performance deficit will be 
observed (Friedman & Miyake, 2004). This point should be considered in 
all WM research that compares OCD performance to typical populations. 
In the case of our experiments we provided an external challenge and we 
observed the effects although the stimuli were not related to individual 
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checking domains. Our considerations might also provide an explanation 
for the potential progression of subclinical checking towards clinical. 
Checking might be likely to create conditioned associations over time 
between external or internal challenges of performance (e.g. “Did you/I 
turn the stove off?”) and intrusive thoughts (e.g. “I think I left a burner on”) 
mediated by anxiety (e.g., MacLeod & Mathews, 1991). This would in turn 
incrementally increase the likelihood of detrimental checking in this 
specific domain and could lead to self-reinforcement of intrusive thoughts 
(e.g., Hartston & Swerdlow, 1999). 
 
(2)  The lack of suppression of misleading information in turn might trigger 
repeated checking of the EB contents. In the case of our findings, the 
competition between a visually present probe letter and fragile letter-
location bindings in the EB of WM weakens these bindings the more often 
this competition is repeated. With intrusive thoughts the challenge for the 
bindings is generated within the system itself and the more often the 
bindings are reactivated and their veridicality challenged the less reliable 
they will become. Paradoxically, while high-scorers check to improve their 
performance it actually undermines performance by reducing the accuracy 
of the WM representation (Radomsky & Alcolado, 2010). In that sense 
checking critically differs from mere rehearsal. Both processes imply 
reactivation of memory representations, yet, while rehearsal reactivates 
“without questioning”, checking seems to imply a lack of confidence in the 
veridicality of the reactivated information that is detrimental without the 
original sensory information to check against, or even with competing new 
sensory information present.  
 
(3)  The final component is the consolidation of EB representations into 
episodic LTM. If the EB representations are progressively weakened by 
checking then the consolidated representations in LTM will be affected as 
well (Tolin et al., 2001), thus, further increasing the likelihood of 
subsequent checking in LTM that has been shown to decrease accuracy 
and confidence in episodic representations (van den Hout & Kindt, 2003a, 
2003b). Savage et al. (1999; and Deckersbach et al., 2000; Penades et 
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al., 2005; Savage et al., 2000; Segalas et al., 2008) reported intact copy 
but impaired immediate and delayed memory performance of OCD 
patients on the Rey-Complex Figure Task (i.e., a complex visuospatial 
stimulus requiring the organization and maintenance of multiple 
feature/object-location bindings). Preserved copy performance and no 
additional loss of information between the immediate and delayed 
conditions indicated that memory capacity did not moderate memory 
performance. Rather, a failure in executive functioning to efficiently 
encode visuospatial information during the copy phase mediated impaired 
performance in their immediate and delayed recall. In other words, 
impairment of the visuospatial organization and reconstruction in the 
observers’ EB had a direct impact on the amount of information encoded 
and recalled immediately after construction and the longer term. 
Furthermore, OCD checkers have exhibited poorer memory confidence for 
threatening stimuli that they had been repeatedly exposed to (akin to 
repeated checking) one week earlier compared to non-checking OCD 
patients (Tolin et al., 2001). A self-awareness of repeated loss of accuracy 
and confidence in memories may finally increase the likelihood and the 
strength of misleading intrusive thoughts which would then be harder to 
ignore (e.g. Hartston & Swerdlow, 1999). High checkers might therefore 
end up in a vicious circle of checking at various stages of memory that 
does not improve but further deteriorates memory traces (Nedeljkovic et 
al., 2009b). The notion proposed here slightly shifts the explanatory focus 
from retrieval to consolidation, which has direct clinical relevance. We 
suggest that a combined WM and LTM explanation might provide a 
comprehensive etiological starting point for the qualitatively different 
experience that individuals with checking disorders appear to exhibit in 
their pathological desire to check and their dissatisfaction with it after it 
has been executed.  
 
Therefore, we place executive dysfunction at the heart of high checkers WM 
impairments as opposed to deficits in WM capacity per se. 
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2.4.1. Limitations and future research 
While we argue that our data have added to the checking-memory literature in 
an important way we have identified the following limitations and future 
avenues of research that have emerged with respect to Experiments 1 and 2.  
Firstly, the use of sub-clinical samples of high checkers may appear to limit 
the conclusions that can be made with respect to clinical populations. 
However, we argue that the results of our extreme groups meta-comparison 
(clinically scoring versus lowest scoring participants across Exps. 1 and 2) 
substantiates the clinical implications of our findings. Furthermore, the result 
that even within the typical population checking tendencies impact on WM 
performance is of importance. For example, subclinical checkers have shown 
similar deficits to those observed in clinical OCD, i.e., the Wisconsin Card 
Sorting Task (Gershuny & Sher, 1995) and the Wechsler Memory Scale 
(Sher, Mann, & Frost, 1984). Further, this same group have shown memory 
deficits for everyday activities (Sher, Mann, & Frost, 1984), prospective 
memory impairments (Cuttler & Graf, 2007, 2008, 2009) and were poorer at 
distinguishing real from imagined events (Rubenstein et al., 1993). This has 
lead some researchers to suggest that a subclinical analogue is a valid means 
of understanding a variety of features relevant to clinical OCD, especially as 
they are free from confounds such as medication, clinical state, or co-
morbidity (Mataix-Cols et al., 1997; 1999a). Indeed, considering this alongside 
the commonality of checking in OCD (50-80%; (50-80%; Antony, Downie, & 
Swinson, 1998; Henderson & Pollard, 1988; Rasmussen & Eisen, 1988) and 
the population generally (15%; Stein et al., 1997),  subclinical checkers may 
provide a ‘purer’ means for determining the specific impact of executive 
deficits upon WM functioning. Future research, however, should ensure the 
validity of our claims by using a larger clinically scoring or a clinically 
diagnosed sample. Also, if the observed WM performance is specific to 
pathological checking, then it should differ from performance associated with 
other obsessive-compulsive sub-types (e.g., hoarding, contamination, cf. 
Abramowitz, McKay, & Taylor, 2005) and other disorders, i.e., generalized 
anxiety disorder, social phobia and depression. Secondly, with respect to the 
probe-1 design we did not explicitly manipulate checking per se but 
hypothesized that high checkers are likely to check the content of WM more 
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often relative to low checkers if irrelevant but misleading information is 
provided. It could however be that checkers are simply more distracted by an 
irrelevant probe, which reduces the attentional processes required for 
rehearsing the encoded information (see Cuttler & Graf, 2007, for a similar 
notion). This does not necessarily imply enhanced checking behaviour per se. 
Nevertheless, the detriment in memory performance of high checkers was 
observed for misleading trials only, while resolvable and no-probe-1 trials 
were comparable. This suggests that it was the misleading content and not 
the mere presence of a distracting probe that attenuated WM performance. 
Yet this does not fully rule out the possibility of distraction and future research 
should directly manipulate checking within a WM paradigm, which 
unfortunately is not trivial without overly affecting the primary WM task. For 
example, in a delayed-match-to-sample-task Rotge et al. (2008) provided 
OCD patients with the opportunity to check and recheck the original encoded-
set to allow verifications with respect to the accuracy of the memory probe. 
They reported that while OCD patients WM performance was intact, they did 
make more verifications and spent longer before subsequent checks 
compared to healthy controls. Interestingly, these behavioural patterns were 
more pronounced in checkers. Thus, allowing checkers to physically check 
may show that they do in fact check but it will likely attenuate WM 
impairments which are sensitive to verifications occurring purely within WM. 
Indeed, we test this very hypothesis in Experiment 5, where we measure the 
eye movements of high and low checkers to examine group differences when 
presented with misleading compared to resolvable probes. In addition, what 
participants were experiencing during the WM task could have been recorded 
in more detail after the experimental procedure. For example, participants 
could have been asked to: (1) rate the degree of uncertainty they felt when 
presented with a misleading compared to a resolvable probe, (2) explain how 
and when they actually check the contents of their memory, and/or (3) what 
different strategies did they employ (if any) for misleading, resolvable and no-
probe-1 trials. This information could have then been independently coded 
and analysed, with the aim of revealing phenomenological differences 
between high and low checkers in how they experienced and dealt with a 
misleading compared to resolvable intermediate probes. Thirdly, the use of 
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letters and locations has limited ecological validity with respect to checkers' 
idiographic believe systems and anxieties. The use of ecologically valid stimuli 
within a WM paradigm might reveal even stronger effects than the ones 
reported here – especially if the high-checking group was drawn from a 
clinical population. This could also shed light on the implications of anxiety 
associated with specific checking domains (e.g. MacLeod & Mathews, 1991). 
This point is addressed specifically in Experiments 7 and 8 by requiring 
participants to encode and recall electrical kitchen appliances located on a 
kitchen countertop. Finally, the basic WM task employed here was very easy. 
Stronger group differences regarding the impact of misleading information 
could be revealed with a harder task (cf. Van der Wee et al., 2003). A point 
specifically addressed in Experiments 3 and 4 presented below. 
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3. Checkers’ memory impairments persist in more complex working 
memory experiments 
Experiments 3 and 4 are a logical extension from the findings and 
methodology of Experiments 1 and 2 (Harkin & Kessler, 2009). Whereby, we 
set out to determine in more detail the relation between WM, misleading 
information, and checking disposition. Our experimental extensions were two-
fold. Firstly, in  Experiment 3 we increased the complexity of the WM task by 
including a further feature dimension (colour) to test whether a harder task 
would increase the performance difference between high and low checkers 
(i.e., van der Wee et al., 2003). Our reasoning being that in normal subjects, 
inhibitory functioning is impaired when concurrent demands upon the central 
executive are high (Eysenck et al., 2007). For example, Graydon and Eysenck 
(1989) reported that the negative effect of distracting stimuli on task 
performance increased as a function of greater load within WM. Also Lavie et 
al. (2004) showed that selective attention performance was more negatively 
affected by distracting stimuli when demands upon WM were high but not low. 
Therefore, as our present experimental manipulation (Experiment. 3) calls 
upon extra attentional resources – compared to Experiments 1 and 2 – 
interference with this attention may further attenuate memory performance, 
especially in checkers who previously were shown to be poorer at inhibiting a 
misleading intermediate probe. Secondly, in Experiment 4 we challenged the 
fragile letter-location bindings via their “weaker link” by asking which letter had 
been in a specific location, while there either had or had not been a letter. In 
this case, locations were the weaker link as they have no permanent 
representations in LTM to aid WM encoding. In contrast, Harkin and Kessler 
(2009) asked where a specific letter had been, thus, accessing the 
representations via their stronger letter-identity part (stronger because letters 
are stored in LTM). The expectation was that this could further undermine the 
trust that high checkers have in their memory representations resulting in 
more pronounced group effects.  
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3.1. Experiment 3 
Similar to Harkin and Kessler (Exp. 1 and 2; 2009) the checking manipulation 
consisted of presenting an intermediate probe (between the encoding set and 
the actual memory test) that could be misleading in the sense that it was not 
resolvable. In Experiment 3 (see fig. 8) this probe asked for the colour of a 
letter that was either part of the encoding set, hence resolvable (e.g., What 
colour was Z), or not part of the encoding set, hence irresolvable (e.g. What 
colour was K). We wanted to investigate whether enhancing the WM task 
difficulty by adding colour as another feature dimension would result in 
stronger group effects with high checkers’ performance being dramatically 
worse than low checkers’ for misleading/irresolvable trials. Checking induced 
by the misleading information could have an increasingly negative effect the 
more difficult the task is. We were also expecting to observe similarly 
enhanced group effects for confidence, i.e., high checkers revealing less 
confidence in their WM performance than low. 
 
3.1.1. Method 
Participants 
40 Participants (mean 19.55 years; 7 male, 33 female) from the University of 
Glasgow gave written informed consents. British Psychological Society (BPS) 
ethical requirements were met. We used the checking subscale of the VOCI 
(Thordarson et al., 2004) and employed a median split of checking scores to 
obtain two groups: low (mean = 1.74, SD = 1.69) and high (mean = 12.57, SD 
= 5.32) “checkers”.  
 
Stimuli and Procedure 
Participants sat 90cm from a 19’’ computer screen ran at 800x600 resolution 
with their head on a chin rest. Stimuli were capital letters in font Arial, size 18 
and were presented against a black background within a 2 (columns) by 3 
(rows) matrix covering an area of 300x420 pixels. After 1000ms fixation, 4 
letters were presented randomly in 4 of the 6 possible locations and 
participants had 2000 ms to encode the identity and the location of each letter 
(fig. 8). After 500ms, the probe-1 question asked for the colour of a specific 
letter. Participants indicated the colour through 6 colour coded keypad 
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responses and were instructed to respond within 4000 ms (to keep the WM 
delay constant). Whether the probe-1 letter had or had not been part of the 
encoded set created the resolvable versus misleading (irresolvable) trials. 
Asking for the colour of a letter added to the difficulty of this task, particularly 
in the case of misleading trials. In a baseline condition probe-1 was omitted to 
measure WM performance on the primary task under ideal conditions.   
 
Figure 8. Experiment 3: Schematic procedure of resolvable and misleading trials. A 
set of 4 letters in 6 possible colors were presented randomly in 4 out of 6 possible 
locations had to be encoded within 2 s. Encoding was then followed after 500 ms by 
probe (probe-1) asking for the color of a letter that was present or not, i.e., was 
resolvable or misleading. Subsequently participants had to indicate if the probe-2 
letter match or mismatched it location with respect to the encoded set, which was the 
actual memory test. Finally confidence in probe-2 response had to be indicated on a 
scale from 1 (highly certain) to 6 (highly uncertain). Further explanations in the text. 
 
A 1000 ms interstimulus interval (ISI) separated probe-1 and probe-2. Since 
baseline trials did not include the intermediate probe-1 a black screen was 
shown for 5500 ms between encoding and probe-2 (equalling the ISI between 
encoding and probe-2 on the other trial types). Probe-2 was the actual 
memory test for each trial and required participants to indicate if a letter was a 
match or a mismatch in terms of location with respect to the originally 
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encoded set. It is important to note that we only analysed probe-2 
performance and how it changed depending on the various probe-1 
manipulations. In all trials the probe-2 letter had been part of the encoded set 
in terms of identity while the probe location was a match on 50% of the trials. 
Finally, a scale was displayed prompting participants to indicate their degree 
of confidence in their probe-2 response (6 levels: 1=totally certain to 6=totally 
uncertain). Three self-paced breaks were included and the experiment lasted 
approximately 90 minutes. The resolvable block comprised 180 trials with 120 
resolvable trials, 40 misleading trials, and additional 20 baseline trials (no-
probe-1). Correspondingly, the misleading block (180 trials) was made up of 
40 resolvable trials, 120 misleading trials, and again 20 baseline trials. The 
sequence of these blocks was counterbalanced across participants in order to 
avoid order effects.  
 
Design 
We employed a 2 (group: low vs. high checkers) by 2 (block type: mostly 
resolvable vs. mostly misleading block) by 3 (probe-1 trial type: resolvable, 
misleading, no probe-1) mixed design with group as the between- and block 
and probe-1 as the within-subjects factors.  
 
3.1.2. Results 
MANOVA’s were employed due to violations of the sphericity assumption 
(Mauchly’s tests). Statistics for the 2x2x3 design were carried out for reaction 
times, accuracy and confidence on probe-2 responses. Note we only 
analysed performance on probe-2 (depending on the different levels of the 
intermediate probe-1). As our theoretical predictions specifically focused on 
the effect of checking induced by resolvable vs. misleading probe-1 trials we 
also conducted a 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA removing the no-probe-1 trials. 
 
Probe-2 response latencies 
The MANOVA (2 x 2 x 3) for probe-2 latencies failed to reveal any significant 
main effects or interactions.  
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Probe-2 response accuracy 
The MANOVA (2 x 2 x 3) for probe-2 accuracy revealed a main effect of 
probe-1 trial-type (F(2,37)=18.38, p<0.001). Further analyses revealed that 
resolvable and misleading probe-1 significantly differed from no-probe-1 
(F(1,38), p<0.001, p<0.001, respectively). Resolvable versus misleading 
probe-1 approached but did not reach significance (F(1,38)=3.0224, p=0.09). 
This indicates greater probe-2 accuracy for no-probe-1 trials compared to 
misleading and resolvable trials and that there was a trend toward less 
accuracy for misleading trials. There was a significant main effect of probe-2. 
Correctly located probe-2 trials where significantly less accurate than 
incorrectly located trials (74.4% vs. 88.7%: F(1,38)=33.33, p<0.001). We 
argue that an accurate correct probe-2 response requires the precise memory 
of the probe letter in its original location so that the match between probe and 
memory exceeds the response threshold. In contrast, incorrectly located 
probe-2 trials can be accurately performed using incomplete/partial 
information such as overall letter locations and/or possibly letter shape 
information that can quickly generate a mismatch (i.e., round ‘D’ vs. jagged 
‘X’). Especially with a complex task like the one employed here (in contrast to 
Harkin & Kessler, 2009) where several features have to be bound together 
this asymmetry has become obvious in performance.    
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Figure 9. Experiment 3: Group (low vs. high checkers) x probe-2 (correct vs. 
incorrect) x trial type (resolvable, misleading, no-probe-1) interaction plot for probe-2 
accuracy. Vertical bars denote standard errors.  
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Most importantly, there was also a significant 3-way interaction (fig. 9) for 
group x probe-2 x probe-1 trial type. This interaction was the result of high 
and low checkers having different accuracy for different levels of probe-2 and 
probe-1 trial-type. First, the main effect of probe-2 was apparent in the data 
pattern in Figure 9: accuracy was poorer overall for correct compared to 
incorrect probe-2 trials. Second, no group differences (low vs. high checkers) 
were revealed for mismatch probe-2 across the three probe-1 trial types 
(F(1,38)= resol: p=0.12; misl: p=0.65; no-p1: p=0.27). This indicates that 
group differences are likely to reside in the match probe-2 condition. 
Therefore, we conducted an ANOVA by removing the no-probe-1 trials as no 
significant group differences were revealed, indicating that WM capacity was 
intact. The ANOVA for this reduced design again revealed the significant 3-
way interaction for group x probe-2 x trial type (F(1,38)=7.54, p=0.009). The 
simple interaction for group x probe-1 trial type for correct probe-2 trials was 
significant (F(1,38)=4.95, p=0.032) (left plot fig. 9). To determine which effects 
generated this interaction we analysed the simple effects. The only effect that 
reached significance was the high checkers’ performance on resolvable 
(73.1%) versus misleading (67.1%) trials (F(1,38)=6.95, p=0.012). The same 
comparison for low checkers failed to reach significance (71.9% vs. 73.4%; 
p=0.58). This supports our hypothesis that high checkers have an executive 
deficit in inhibiting information that is misleading and irrelevant. As a result 
checkers seem to look for the colour of a letter that was actually not presented 
disrupting the ‘true’ information retained in memory.  
 
Probe-2 confidence ratings 
The MANOVA (2 x 2 x 3) for confidence on probe-2 responses revealed 
significant main effect of probe-1 (F(2,37)=28.415, p<0.001). No-probe-1 trials 
had the most confidence and were statistically different from resolvable 
(F(1,38)=41.99, p<0.001) and misleading trials (F(1,38)=51.99, p<0.001). 
There was a significant main effect of probe-2 trial type (F(1,38)=27.256, 
p<0.001), indicating that there was less confidence for correct probe-2 trials 
versus incorrect. The MANOVA revealed a 3-way interaction for group x block 
x probe-2 that approached significance (F(1,38)=3.88, p=0.056). However, the 
ANOVA for the reduced design (removed no-probe-1 trials) produced a 
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significant 3-way interaction (F(1,38)=5.04, p=0.031) (fig. 10a: MANOVA and 
fig. 10b: ANOVA).     
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Figure 10a. Experiment 3: MANOVA for Group (low vs. high checkers) x block 
(resolvable vs. misleading) x probe-2 (correct vs. incorrect) interaction plot for 
confidence in probe-2 responses. The scale ranged from 1 (highly certain) to 6 
(highly uncertain), i.e., the lower value reflect higher confidence. Vertical bars denote 
standard errors. 
 
Experiment 1: ANOVA 
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Figure 10b. Experiment 3: ANOVA for Group (low vs. high checkers) x block 
(resolvable vs. misleading) x probe-2 (match vs. mismatch) interaction plot for 
confidence in probe-2 responses. The scale ranged from 1 (highly certain) to 6 
(highly uncertain), i.e., the lower value reflect higher confidence. Vertical bars denote 
standard errors. 
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There was a tendency to have less confidence in correct than incorrect probe-
2 responses, a pattern that corresponds with poorer accuracy in correct 
versus incorrect probe-2 responses. The removal of no-probe-1 trials 
(ANOVA) increased the magnitude of difference between groups, with high 
checkers having poorer confidence across conditions (block and probe-2) 
compared to low. This suggests that for no-probe-1 trials, high checkers have 
comparable confidence to low checkers. 
 
3.1.3. Discussion of Experiment 3 
In conclusion, high checkers’ performance was poorest for misleading trials in 
the correct probe-2 condition. No difference was observed between groups in 
the easier incorrect probe-2 condition, indicating that irrelevant and 
misleading stimuli capture the attention of high checkers to a greater extent 
than low. This also indicates the capacity differences between groups are not 
responsible for the slight group performance difference in the correctly located 
probe-2 condition. However, while this pattern was not confined to the 
misleading block only, as had been the case in our previous findings (Harkin 
& Kessler, 2009), it was not more pronounced in that the difference between 
the groups was not dramatically enhanced. It would seem that by increasing 
the complexity of the WM task performance drops for everyone by a similar 
amount with high checkers not suffering disproportional losses of 
performance. Confidence responses, however, revealed that the mere 
presence of an intermediate probe (resolvable or misleading) resulted in high 
checkers’ poorer confidence overall, which was not observed as clearly in our 
previous studies. For high checkers, therefore, the presence of an irrelevant 
intermediate probe in a hard WM task appears to affect confidence more 
strongly than their actual performance compared to low checkers. 
 
3.2. Experiment 4 
Since increased complexity of the WM task resulted in a general drop in 
performance without a more accentuated group effect we employed an 
alternative strategy. If checking is really detrimental to bindings by inducing a 
competition between incoming perceptual information (misleading probe) and 
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the fragile multimodal bindings in the EB then it could be even more 
detrimental for high checkers if the veridicality of the encoded representations 
was questioned with respect to their ‘weaker link’. In our case the locations 
are the weaker link compared to letters as they do not have a LTM trace that 
could support their retention. The prediction therefore was that we would 
observe very clear group effects with a misleading probe that specifically 
challenges the spatial part of the WM representations. 
 
Hence, for the intermediate probe (probe-1) we asked which letter was 
presented at a particular location while there either had (resolvable) or had 
not been a letter (misleading) (see fig. 11). We expected high checkers’ 
memory performance to be generally impaired for resolvable and misleading 
conditions. This would support a general executive difficulty in suppressing 
irrelevant information (Wolters and Raffone, 2008). Specifically, the largest 
impairment was expected for the most difficult (match probe-2) and frustrating 
conditions (misleading trials/block). Intact basic WM capacity is expected in 
baseline no-probe-1 trials. 
 
3.2.1. Method 
Participants 
40 Participants (mean 20.12 years: 10 male, 30 female) from the University of 
Glasgow gave written informed consents. BPS ethical requirements were met. 
A median split of VOCI checking scores was used to obtain two groups: low 
(mean = 0.89, SD = 1.15) and high (mean = 10.48, SD = 5.96) “checkers”.  
 
Stimuli, Procedure, and Design 
This experiment used the same encoding (4 letters in 6 locations) and 
memory test (probe-2 correct or incorrect location) as Experiment 1. However, 
in this case the 4 letters were randomly selected from D, F, G, H, J, and K. 
This served the intermediate probe-1 manipulation. After 500 ms, the 2x3 
matrix was again presented, but empty, and this time the participant was 
asked to indicate what letter had been at an indicated location. Participants 
selected the letter they believed to be at that location by pressing the 
corresponding letter-key on the keyboard and were instructed to respond 
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within 4000 ms (to keep the WM delay constant). The probe-1 spatial cue 
either indicated a location where a letter had been present (resolvable) or a 
location that had been empty (misleading).  
 
 
Figure 11. Experiment 4: Schematic procedure of resolvable and misleading trials. A 
set of 4 letters presented randomly in 4 out of 6 possible locations had to be encoded 
within 2 s. Encoding was then followed after 500 ms by probe (probe-1) asking what 
letter was at a cued location, where a letter was present or not, i.e., was resolvable or 
misleading. Subsequently participants had to indicate if the probe-2 letter either 
correctly or incorrectly located with respect to the encoded set, which was the actual 
memory test. Finally confidence in probe-2 response had to be indicated on a scale 
from 1 (highly certain) to 6 (highly uncertain). Further explanations in the text. 
  
In a baseline condition probe-1 was omitted to measure WM performance on 
the primary task under ideal conditions. Finally, as in Experiment 3 a scale 
was displayed prompting participants to indicate their degree of confidence in 
their probe-2 response (6 levels: 1=totally certain to 6=totally uncertain). 
Three self-paced breaks were included and the experiment lasted 
approximately 90 minutes. The same overall design as Experiment 3 was 
employed. 
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3.2.2. Results 
Again full MANOVA (2 x 2 x 3) and reduced ANOVA (2 x 2 x 2) designs were 
employed to analyse, reaction times (RT), accuracy (ACC), and confidence 
(CF).  
 
Probe-2 response latencies 
The MANOVA (2 x 2 x 3) for probe-2 latencies revealed a main effect for 
probe-2 trial type (F(1,38)=25.18, p<0.001) with correct probe-2 responses 
(1969ms) faster than those that were incorrect (2120ms). There was a 
significant 2-way interaction for block x trial-type (F(2,76)=6.16, p<0.004). 
Resolvable trials in a resolvable block had a faster RT than misleading trials, 
a pattern that was reversed for misleading trials in the misleading block. This 
suggests that when a trial and a block were congruent then RTs were faster 
than when they were incongruent. In addition, no-probe-1 trials were slower in 
a predominantly misleading block than a resolvable block. This indicates that 
a misleading block increases decision-making time and block context was 
sufficient to influence decision-making time in baseline WM trials.  
 
Probe-2 response accuracy 
The MANOVA (2 x 2 x 3) for probe-2 accuracy revealed a main effect for 
probe-2 (F(1,38)=17.65, p<0.001), with more accurate responses for incorrect 
compared to correct, replicating Experiment 3. The main effect of block was 
significant (F(1,38)=10.98, p<0.003), with less accuracy overall in the 
misleading block compared to the resolvable. This matches our expectations 
that a misleading block is particularly distracting and attenuates WM 
performance. The main effect of trial-type was significant, and indicated 
significantly greater accuracy in the no-probe-1 trials compared to resolvable 
and misleading (both comparisons: p<0.001). The absence of this main effect 
in the reduced ANOVA (removal of no-probe-1 trials) supports the impact of 
no-probe-1 trials.  
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Figure 12. Experiment 4: Main Effect of Group (low vs. high checkers) for probe-2 
accuracy. Vertical bars denote standard errors. 
 
Finally and most importantly, the main effect of group reached significance 
(F(1,38)=5.83, p<0.021) with high checkers being less accurate than low 
checkers across all conditions (fig. 12). This group difference was observed 
for resolvable (t(1,38)=5.66, p<0.023) as well as for misleading (t(1,38)=5.53, 
p<0.024) trials (fig. 13, left). While the group difference did not reach 
significance for the baseline no-probe-1 trials, there was a statistical trend for 
lower performance of high checkers (p=0.092).  
 
Although we found a main effect of group for the first time, which supports the 
claim that our strategy of challenging WM via the ‘weaker spatial link’ was 
indeed more detrimental for high checkers, we also expected at the same 
time that basic WM capacity in the baseline trials (no-probe-1) would not differ 
between high and low checkers. Hence, we conducted a more specific group 
analysis for the no-probe-1 trials and found that high checkers had 
significantly less accurate no-probe-1 responses in a misleading compared to 
a resolvable context (t(1,38)=14.82, p<0.001), a difference that was not 
observed for low checkers (t(1,38)=2.42, p=0.127) (fig. 13, right). Thus, the 
trend for a group effect on no-probe-1 trials was mainly driven by the 
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misleading context. Comparable performance in the resolvable context 
indicates that, conform to our expectations, high checkers are not impaired in 
WM capacity per se but negatively influenced by the misleading context. 
However, we are aware of the limitation of conducting post-hoc contrasts in 
the absence of a significant interaction, In defence, we propose that as we 
predicted repetitive checking within a misleading context (strong hypothesis) 
that this carried over onto no-probe- trials, thus we justify the use of these 
exploratory contrasts but highlight their limited statistical robustness. 
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Figure 13. Experiment 4: Left Graph: Group (low vs. high checkers) x trial-type 
(resolvable, misleading, no-probe-1) interaction plot for probe-2 accuracy. Right 
Graph: Group (low vs. high checkers) x block-type (resolvable vs. misleading) for no-
probe-1. Star denotes significant difference. Vertical bars denote standard errors. 
 
Probe-2 response confidence ratings 
The MANOVA (2 x 2 x 3) for confidence in probe-2 responses revealed a 
significant main effect of group (F(1,38)=4.25, p<0.05), with high checkers 
having less confidence overall than low checkers (see fig. 14). High checkers 
revealed a lack of confidence that operates irrespective of a specific condition. 
Such a general deficit was not observed previously, suggesting that an 
intermediate spatial probe was particularly detrimental to checkers’ 
confidence. A significant main effect of probe-1 trial type (F(1,38), 16.10,  
p<0.001) was driven by the significant differences of misleading and 
Probe-1 Type Block Type 
Misleading Resolvable Misleading Resolvable No-Probe-1 
Experiment 4: Accuracy Plot for (1) Group x Probe-1 (left) 
 and (2) Group x Block (right) 
   51 
resolvable trials compared to no-probe-1 trials. This was further modulated by 
block as indicated by a significant 2-way interaction between block and trial-
type (F(1,38)=5.45, p<0.007). This interaction directly reflected the block x 
trial-type accuracy pattern with less confidence for conditions with less 
accuracy and vice-versa.  
 
Figure 14. Experiment 4: Main Effect of Group (low vs. high checkers) for 
confidence. Vertical bars denote standard errors. 
 
 
3.2.3. Discussion of Experiment 4 
Experiment 4 revealed that high checkers had poorer accuracy and less 
confidence overall. In support of our weaker hypothesis (see Section 1.4.2.) 
high checkers’ memory was generally impaired by the presence of distracting 
spatial information in form of an intermediate probe whether it was resolvable 
or not. Checkers were also significantly poorer at suppressing the cumulative 
effect of misleading spatial information (misleading block) which interfered 
with baseline performance (no-probe-1 trials). Reaction time data supported 
this, as a misleading block context was sufficient to increase decision making 
time also in baseline trials. A misleading block was, therefore, generally 
distracting but especially so for high checkers.  
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3.3. General Discussion 
Overall the results support and extend the previous findings that checking 
goes hand in hand with a lack of confidence and may lead to attenuated WM 
performance under certain circumstances. This seems to be the case when 
distracting and/or misleading information is presented, which, instead of being 
ignored, seems to induce repeated checking of the encoded memory traces. 
Paradoxically, while high-scorers check to improve their memories it actually 
undermines performance by reducing the accuracy of the WM representation. 
In that sense checking critically differs from mere rehearsal. Both processes 
imply reactivation of memory representations, yet, while rehearsal reactivates 
“without questioning”, checking seems to imply a lack of confidence in the 
veridicality of the reactivated information that is detrimental without the 
original sensory information to check against - especially if competing new 
sensory information is present.  
 
In Experiment 3 checkers' memory was poorest in a combination of 
misleading and correct probe-2 trials. Overall performance for both groups 
was poorer for correct-probe-2 trials, suggesting we may have induced a 
certain degree of checking in all participants by increasing WM task difficulty. 
This is in agreement with MacDonald et al. (1997) who in a very difficult task 
(recall 50 words that were presented for 1sec after 7mins of distractor tasks) 
reported no difference in recall proportion between checkers (0.179), non-
checkers (0.142) and controls (0.188). As indicated by the low memory 
scores, in such an experiment (and perhaps ours) extant OCD/checkers’ 
executive-memory impairments would need to be extremely acute to impact 
memory performance and significantly differentiate them from controls. 
However, for checkers, misleading trials were especially disrupting conform to 
our hypotheses. High checkers also had less confidence in their responses, 
indicating a metacognitive deficit that seems to affect WM performance which 
corroborates the findings in Harkin and Kessler (2009). In line with previous 
findings (Ciesielski et al., 2007; Henseler et al., 2008; Harkin & Kessler, 2009) 
there were no group differences on the resolvable and the no-probe-1 trials, 
suggesting that even in a difficult WM task the observed differences between 
high and low checkers on misleading trials were not an issue of WM capacity 
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per se. However, the group differences on misleading trials were not 
dramatically enhanced compared to the previously reported effects in an easy 
WM task (Harkin & Kessler, 2009). This indicates that high checkers did not 
suffer disproportionally from the enhanced task difficulty, which further 
underpins our claim that checkers are not impaired at the level of WM 
capacity per se.  
 
In Experiment 4 we challenged participants in a more refined way. In this 
case, an intermediate probe questioned participants about a specific location 
which was either resolvable (letter at this location) or misleading (no letter at 
this location). We argue that this challenges the integration of letter-location 
representations through their ‘weakest link’, i.e., spatial location. Considering 
that memory spans are better for word stimuli compared to nonsense word 
stimuli, with the only difference being the availability of words in LTM (Hulme, 
Maughan, & Brown, 1991). We propose that while letters have an existent 
representation in LTM, contributing to retention in WM, spatial locations do 
not, which should make the latter more sensitive to interference affecting this 
dimension across memory, i.e., bindings of locations to letters. Support for 
this can be drawn from the research which has shown impacted verbal-spatial 
(Elsley & Parmentier, 2009) versus intact object-feature binding (Allen, 
Baddeley, & Hitch, 2006) with concurrent mental load. From this we can infer 
that attention is mobilized to a greater extent when binding occurs across the 
boundaries of the slave systems of WM, i.e., the visuospatial sketchpad 
(location) and phonological loop (letters) (Elsley & Parmentier, 2009). The 
stimuli we present are multimodal which refers to fact that different 
components of our stimuli are processed in different cortical streams, 
specifically: the ventral (‘What’) and dorsal (‘Where’) streams for object and 
location representations, respectively (Goodale & Milner, 1992). Therefore, if 
accurate task performance is dependent upon accurate object (‘What’) and 
location (‘Where’) information then this will rely upon the maintenance of 
accurate object-location conjunctions in what Baddeley had termed the “EB” 
(see Keizer, Colzato, & Hommel, 2008; Olson et al., 2006). Within the WM 
model of Baddeley (2000) this suggests that information which requires 
binding across the ‘What’ and ‘Where’ streams is likely to be more sensitive to 
   54 
interference compared to that which is processed primarily within one stream. 
Thus, due to the lack of location representations in LTM sustained attention is 
required for their accurate maintenance in WM, which in turn makes letter-
location bindings particularly sensitive to interference when challenged at the 
level of location.   
 
This may explain why Experiment 4 was the first to reveal poorer accuracy 
overall for high compared to low checkers in an easy WM task, suggesting in 
line with our weaker hypothesis (see Section 1.4.2.) that an intermediate 
spatial probe was in fact strongly distracting for checkers (fig. 13, left). The 
observed trend towards poorer performance for high compared to low 
checkers in the baseline condition (no-probe-1 trials) is noteworthy (fig. 13, 
left). We attribute this to the cognitive style that checkers adopt in a 
misleading context which they ‘carry-over’ to the processing of baseline trials 
(see fig. 13, right). This also fits the established profile of clinical 
checking/OCD typified by the inflexibility to shift cognitive processing style in 
the face of changing demands and despite its detriment to performance (e.g., 
Fenger et al., 2005; Omori et al., 2007; Veale et al., 1996). In conclusion, the 
very clear group differences we obtained in Experiment 4 indicates that 
checkers WM performance are susceptible to challenges by distracting or 
even misleading information, especially if this challenge is directed towards 
weakly encoded information like the episodic spatio-temporal context of 
events that is not supported by LTM concepts.  
 
Together Experiments 3 and 4 provide evidence that the episodic spatio-
temporal context is indeed the weaker link in the EB representations. In 
Experiment 3 high-checkers performance is attenuated in the more difficult 
correct probe-2 condition which seems to require exact letter-location 
information relative to incorrect trials that can be accurately performed using 
partial information only. However, the overall greater difficulty of Experiment 3 
reduced the between-group effects (c.f., MacDonald et al., 1997) whereas 
accessing representations via spatial locations in Experiment 4 enhanced 
group effects. High-checkers’ questioning of the veridicality of letter-location 
bindings accessed via the weaker location feature resulted in deteriorated 
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overall performance (86.6%) compared to the performance observed by 
Harkin and Kessler (2009) with an identical encoding and retrieval task, yet, 
with an identity-cue as probe-1 task (93%). Low-checkers, on the other hand, 
revealed more comparable overall performance here (91.8%) and in the 
original Harkin and Kessler (2009) paper (92.8%). An alternative explanation 
could be that the high checker group in the present Experiment 4 was special. 
However, this is not the case: in Harkin and Kessler (2009) Experiment 1 
revealed a mean score of 9.5, Experiment 2 a score of 8.7 and in the extreme 
group comparison the high checkers reached a score of 15.8. The present 
Experiment 3 revealed a mean score of 12.6, so the score of 10.5 in the 
present Experiment 4 falls well within this range. Together these points 
support our argument that location – extending to the spatio-temporal context 
in general - is the weaker link in EB bindings compared to letter identity, and 
that this weakness becomes most apparent when individual checking 
disposition is high.  
 
3.3.1. Limitations and future research 
Two main limitations of the current experiments should be mentioned. Firstly, 
we did not manipulate checking per se but assume checking is responsible for 
poorer WM performance as opposed to general distraction caused by an 
intermediate probe. With respect to Experiment 3, however, if distraction was 
causal then impairment would be expected for resolvable trials, whereas 
checkers performance is only attenuated on misleading trials. This allows us 
to argue that misleading trials are special for checkers whereby they check 
and compare it to each letter of the encoding set. General distraction is likely 
to underlie checkers poorer performance in resolvable and misleading trials in 
Experiment 4. However, for checkers misleading trials were particularly salient 
and difficult to shift attention from, suggesting that general distraction is not 
the whole story. Future research should directly manipulate checking within a 
WM paradigm, which is not easy to implement without confounding impact on 
the complexity of primary WM task. Secondly, as previously suggested 
(Experiment 1 and 2) letters and locations have limited ecological validity to 
the specific symptoms of checkers, a criticism we deal with in subsequent 
Experiments 5, 6, 7, and 8.  
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4. Do high checkers’ actually check: An eye movement study. 
The previous experiments have helped shed some light on the cognitive 
processes which differentiate the WM performance of high from low checkers 
(Harkin & Kessler, 2009, 2011a; Harkin, Rutherford, & Kessler, 2011). In our 
original WM task (Harkin & Kessler, 2009) we employed a simple delayed-
match-to-sample paradigm, where participants had to encode 4 letters and 
their locations and then after a delay recall if one of the letters was correctly or 
incorrectly located. Our novel manipulation was to present an intermediate 
probe – between encoding and the memory task – which asked participants to 
indicate the location of a letter that was either part (resolvable) or not part 
(misleading) of the encoding set. We found that only high checkers’ WM 
performance (correct/incorrect letter location task) was impaired when 
preceded by a misleading but not a resolvable trial. Considering that an 
intermediate probe is irrelevant to the performance of the memory test, we 
conclude that checkers are more distracted by a misleading probe as it is not 
part of the encoded set. Checkers either cannot suppress the distractor itself, 
or cannot suppress the urge to check triggered by the misleading distractor 
(cf. Harkin & Kessler, 2009). This is a process which we suggest is perhaps 
driven by impairment in inhibitory functioning specific to the checking but not 
the washing subtype (Omori et al., 2007). We propose that as misleading 
trials are special to high checkers they check the contents of WM to verify if a 
misleading letter was present or not. This is consistent with Lind and Boschen 
(2009) who reported that intolerance of uncertainty (i.e., raised by a 
misleading probe) mediated the propensity to check . However, as observed 
in the research discussed above (Radomsky & Alcolado, 2010), checking only 
serves to impair the veridicality of the contents of WM which occurs, we 
suggest, at the level of letter-location bindings maintained in the EB of WM  
(Baddeley, 2000).  
 
While we provided a more precise characterisation of the relationship 
between inhibitory dysfunction and episodic short-term memory in checkers, 
we were aware that our conclusions were somewhat limited. Specifically, we 
could not determine with certainty whether the presence of a misleading 
probe indeed differentiated the manner in which high and low checkers 
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scanned the contents of their WM. Therefore, the present study addressed 
this question by comparing eye movements of high and low checkers 
specifically during the presentation of the misleading distractors. .While 
previously we had placed a time-constraint of 4000ms on the responses to the 
misleading distracters (henceforth called  ‘Probe-1’) (Harkin & Kessler, 2009) 
we now provided participants with unlimited time to make their Probe-1 
response (see fig. 15). We hypothesised that high checker’s responses would 
be slow, which would also allow us to investigate in detail their eye movement 
patterns in contrast to low checking controls. Rotge et al. (2008) indeed 
reported that  OCD checkers took longer than OCD non-checkers for verifying 
WM probes. They concluded that increased response time for ‘choice making’ 
represented the degree of uncertainty and doubt that checkers had at the 
moment of choice. Unsurprisingly, in trials where checkers had longer 
response times this lead to more overt repetitive checking behaviors, i.e., 
uncertainty motivated checking (Lind & Boschen, 2009; Tolin et al., 2003). 
Accordingly we expected to find eye movement patterns in our study that 
would reflect the internal (i.e. mental) checking behaviours of high checkers. 
This would confirm our conclusion based on our previous research that 
misleading distractors triggered repeated mental checking of WM contents in 
high checkers only.  
 
Thus, measuring eye movements in our WM task (fig. 15) allowed us to 
answer our own outstanding research question and to add substantially to the 
existing OCD eye movement research which has revealed mixed results at 
best (for reviews see Gooding & Basso, 2008; Jaafari et al., 2011; Sweeney, 
Levy, & Harris, 2002). For example, in a recent review of thirty-three eye 
movement studies Jaafari et al. (2011) reported that OCD patients were 
characterised only by rather unspecific deficits in form of smooth pursuit 
impairments and longer response latencies in anti-saccade tasks. The 
majority of these studies concentrated purely on the functionality of the 
oculomotor system bearing little information on the cognitive and emotional 
deficits in compulsive checking. No emphasis has been put so far on eye 
movements during more complex cognitive or memory tasks, thus, the 
present study was likely to make a substantial contribution in this respect.  
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Figure 15. Schematic representation of Periods 1-5 for resolvable and misleading 
trials: (1) Period 1: encoding set of 4 letters presented randomly in 6 possible 
locations (2000ms), (2) Period 2: delay period (2000ms), (3) Period 3: probe letter 
(Probe-1) which was either part (resolvable = T) or not part (misleading = K) of the 
encoded set, (4) Period 4: probe letter (Probe-2) which was wither correctly or 
incorrectly located with respect to the encoded set, which was actually the memory 
task, and (5) Period 5: confidence in the memory task was then indicated using a 
confidence and not confident response. The eye and/or behavioural measurements 
recorded and analysed in each period are also provided. Further explanations in the 
text. 
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Specifically, it has been argued that eye movements reflect both attention and 
rehearsal within WM making it a valid measure of differences in executive 
function between high and low checkers in the present study (for review see 
Theeuwes, Belopolsky, & Olivers, 2009). For example, it has been repeatedly 
observed that participants tend to fixate on the previous location of an 
encoded item during delay, indicating that the contents of short-term memory 
guide attention which in turn guides eye movements (Altmann, 2004; Deubel 
& Schneider, 1996; Olivers, Meijer, & Theeuwes, 2006). An assertion 
corroborated by Theeuwes, Belopolsky and Olivers (2009) who suggested 
that attention always precedes an eye movement, and that attention may 
serve as the vehicle by which information is stored in WM (Dehaene et al., 
2006; Dehaene, Sergent, & Changeux, 2003; B. K. Schmidt et al., 2002).  
 
In the present study we divided our WM task (see fig. 15) into three ‘periods of 
interest’ during which we recorded eye movements. We concentrated our 
analysis on number and duration of fixations, which were most likely to reflect 
internal checking behaviours, i.e., more and longer fixations reflecting internal 
checking. Period 1 was the 2000ms encoding period, where 4 letters were 
presented in 6 possible locations. Period 2 was the 2000ms delay period after 
encoding and before the presentation of the intermediate (resolvable or 
misleading) Probe-1. Accordingly, Period 3 refers to the presentation of a 
resolvable or misleading intermediate Probe-1 trial. As shown in Figure 15, 
the employed WM task included two further Periods, referring to Probe 2 
presentation and indication of confidence, respectively. However, eye 
movements were not recorded during these periods, hence, only behavioural 
data will be reported for each period (response times, accuracy and response 
confidence, respectively). 
 
It was an open question whether we would observe group differences in eye 
movements during Periods 1 or 2. Either checking as a cognitive style could 
already take place during encoding and during the undisturbed delay period, 
or checkers might not differ from non-checkers unless their executive 
attention deficit was explicitly triggered by a misleading probe. Conform to 
previously reported findings, the latter was likely under conditions of low 
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memory load as employed here (Boldrini et al., 2005; Ciesielski et al., 2007; 
Harkin & Kessler, 2009, , 2011a; Henseler et al., 2008; Morein-Zamir et al., 
2010; Moritz et al., 2003; Purcell et al., 1998a, , 1998b; van der Wee et al., 
2003; Zielinski, Taylor, & Juzwin, 1991; Zitterl et al., 2001). However, in 
Period 3 we expected high checkers to make more and longer fixations in 
misleading compared to resolvable trials, as misleading trials specifically tap 
into the inhibitory impairments of high- but not of low checkers (see Harkin & 
Kessler, 2009) fuelling their urge to overcome uncertainty by means of 
excessive checking (Veale et al., 1996). We therefore also expected high 
checkers to have slower response times on Probe-1s in misleading trials 
compared to low checkers. In contrast, for resolvable trials we did not expect 
to observe group differences for eye movements or response times if our 
hypothesis was correct that the executive impairments of high checkers had 
to be specifically triggered by a misleading Probe-1 (Omori et al., 2007; 
Harkin & Kessler, 2009, 2011a, 2011b; Harkin, Rutherford, Kessler, 2011).  
 
Taking these arguments to a finer level of analysis we expected to observe 
that on misleading trials high checkers will spend longer examining the six 
locations of the encoding set matrix and specifically empty encoded set 
locations, in comparison to low checkers and resolvable trials. If supported, 
this will provide an exact indication that checkers’ executive impairments 
result in them accessing the encoded set matrix as a whole and that 
specifically they spend longer perseverating on empty locations where no 
letter had been presented at all.   
 
Confirmation of these hypotheses will provide evidence that checkers’ 
inhibitory impairments do in fact lead them to check the contents of WM in a 
manner which is unnecessary (specifically in misleading trials) and 
uninformative (empty locations). Checking uninformative locations would 
require additional time and resources, possibly affecting -or at least delaying 
behavioural performance. 
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4.1. Experiment 5 
4.1.1. Method 
Participants 
35 student participants (mean 20.8 years: 18 males, 17 females) from the 
University of Glasgow gave written informed consents. British Psychological 
Society ethical requirements were met, including that of participant debriefing. 
The Vancouver Obsessional Compulsive Inventory (VOCI; Thordarson et al., 
2004) was employed to evaluate all participants regarding their checking 
tendencies. The VOCI is a 55 item, self-report questionnaire for assessing the 
severity of OCD symptoms. Conform to our previous research (Harkin & 
Kessler, 2009, 2011a; Harkin, Rutherford & Kessler, 2011), the checking 
subscale was used in the present study to created obtain two groups: 17 low 
(mean: 0.71, SD: 0.92) and 18 high (mean: 12.67, SD: 5.78) ‘‘checkers’’. 
 
Eye Tracking 
Eye movements were recorded at a sampling rate of 1000 Hz with the SR 
Research Desktop-Mount EyeLink 2K eyetracker (with a chin/forehead-rest), 
which has an average gaze position error of about 0.25°, a spatial resolution 
of 0.01° and a linear output over the range of the monitor used. Only the 
dominant eye of each participant was tracked although viewing was binocular. 
The experiment was implemented with E-prime®. Calibrations of eye fixations 
were conducted at the beginning of the experiment using a nine-point fixation 
procedure as implemented in the EyeLink API (c.f. EyeLink II User Manual: 
SR.Research.Ltd, 2002) and using E-prime® software. Calibration was 
validated with the EyeLink software and repeated when necessary until the 
optimal calibration criterion was reached. At the beginning of each trial, 
participants were instructed to fixate a dot at the centre of the screen to 
perform a drift correction. If the drift correction was more than 1°, a new 
calibration was launched to insure optimal recording quality. 
 
Procedure 
Participants sat 60cm from a 19’’ computer screen ran at 800x600 resolution 
with their head on a chin rest. Stimuli were capital letters in font Arial, size 18 
and were presented against a grey background within a 2 (columns) by 3 
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(rows) matrix covering an area of 300x420 pixels, subtending 11.5 degrees 
horizontally of visual angle and  13.3 of visual angle vertically. After 1000 ms 
fixation, 4 letters were presented randomly in 4 of the 6 possible locations and 
participants had 2000 ms to encode the identity and the location of each letter 
(fig. 15). After 2000 ms, the probe-1 question requested the location of a 
specific letter which had been either part (hence, resolvable) or not (hence, 
misleading) of the encoded set. Participants indicated the location through a 
2x3 spatially mapped keypad and responded in their own time. Participants 
could ‘skip’ the intermediate probe by pressing the ‘0’ button on the number 
pad with their most dominant thumb at any time. This provided reaction times 
and ‘skip’ percentages specific to the termination of resolvable and misleading 
Probe-1 trials which we could then analyse statistically (see fig. 15, Period 3). 
This differed from the original Harkin and Kessler (2009) procedure which 
limited the probe-1 response period to 4000 ms. In a baseline condition 
probe-1 was omitted to measure WM performance on the primary task under 
ideal conditions. A 1000 ms interstimulus interval (ISI) separated probe-1 and 
probe-2. Since baseline trials did not include the intermediate probe-1 a grey 
screen was shown for 5000 ms between encoding and probe-2. Probe-2 was 
the actual memory test for each trial and required participants to indicate if a 
letter was correctly located with respect to the originally encoded set. In all 
trials the probe-2 letter had been part of the encoded set in terms of identity 
while the probe location was correct only on 50% of the trials. Finally, through 
a binary response option participants were then prompted to indicate their 
degree of confidence in their probe-2 response (1 = confident vs. 2 = not 
confident). There were 190 trials in total, 10 of which (at the beginning) we 
practice trials including resolvable and no-probe-1 trials only. The main 
experiment was then done in two blocks (with 5min rest period between), 
each comprising of 60 misleading, 20 resolvable, and 10 no-probe-1 trials 
presented in random order. This asymmetric trial type distribution was 
adopted from Kessler and Harkin (2009). 
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4.1.2. Results 
Breakdown of individual Periods (1-5) 
We present our data analyses (eye movement and/or behavioural responses) 
in the same sequence in which the participant viewed and/or responded to 
each aspect of the experiment: Period 1 (encoding), Period 2 (2000ms delay), 
Period 3 (Probe-1), Period 4 (Probe-2) and Period 5 (confidence). We focused 
our eye movement recordings on Periods 1, 2 and 3 as these were the 
intervals of interest specifically related to our group hypotheses. 
 
Period 1: 2000ms encoding set presentation 
Independent-samples t-tests revealed that low and high checkers did not 
statistically differ in terms of fixation durations (t=1.32, df=33, p=0.19) or 
number of fixations (t=0.87, df=33, p=0.39) they made during the 2000ms 
presentation period of the encoding set (Period 1). Conform to our 
expectations high and low checkers do not differ in their allocation of attention 
during early encoding.  
 
Period 2: 2000ms delay period 
Independent-samples t-tests revealed that low and high checkers did not 
statistically differ in terms of fixations durations (t=1.76, df=33, p=0.088) or 
number of fixations (t=1.71, df=33, p=0.09) they made during the 2000ms 
delay (Period 2) between the encoding set and intermediate Probe-1.  
 
Period 2b: 5000ms extended delay in no-probe-1 trials 
We conducted separate independent sample t-tests for no-probe-1 trials, due 
to them having a longer 5000ms delay period. In terms of fixation duration 
there was no statistical difference between low and high checkers (t=1.46, 
df=33, p=0.16). However, we did find that high checkers (9.08) made 
significantly less fixations than low checkers (10.97) (t=2.12, df=33, p=0.04). 
While this finding is surprising it actually serves to highlight the abnormality of 
high checkers’ making more fixations during misleading trials in our 
subsequent Period 3 analysis.  
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Period 3: misleading and resolvable intermediate Probe-1 
Response Times (RT) 
A two (Group: low checkers vs. high checkers) by two (trial-type: resolvable 
vs. misleading) mixed design was used with group as the between- and trial-
type as the within-subjects factors. There was a main effect for Trial-Type 
(F(1,33)=51.123, p<0.000), with slower RTs for resolvable (2240.9ms) 
compared to misleading (1807.7ms) trials. Critically, there was a Group x 
Trial-Type interaction (F(1,33)=6.065, p<0.02). Analysis of the simple 
comparisons revealed that there was no significant group difference in RTs for 
resolvable trials (LC = 2196.4ms vs. HC = 2285.5ms: F(1,33)=0.308, p=0.58), 
compared to a significant group difference for misleading trials (LC = 
1613.9ms vs. HC = 2001.4ms: F(1,33)=4.871, p<0.04) (see fig. 16). This 
suggests that both low and high checkers match a resolvable probe to its 
location within the encoded set. In contrast, on misleading trials, only high 
checkers appear to ‘check’ if a misleading probe “really” was there, whereas 
low checkers quickly dismiss it and quickly terminate the presentation of 
misleading probes. Critically, there was no difference between low and high 
checkers in their percentage of ‘Skip’ responses (LC: 97.9% vs. HC: 96.9%; 
p=0.28) on misleading trials. This indicates that despite high checkers taking 
longer to confirm that a misleading probe is absent they do so at the same 
ceiling level as low checkers.  
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Figure 16. Probe-1 RTs for Group (Low checkers vs. High checkers) for Trial-Type 
(resolvable and misleading). 
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Eye Measurements 
Period 3 is the most critical of our three analyses, specifically, as high 
checkers had slower Probe-1 RTs for misleading trials (compared to low 
checkers; see Fig. 15). We expected that in Period 3 high checkers would 
also engage in more and longer fixations in misleading trials relative to low 
checkers. We employed a two (Group: low checkers vs. high checkers) by two 
(trial-type: resolvable vs. misleading) mixed design was used with group as 
the between- and trial-type as the within-subjects factors. Thus, we conducted 
a 2 x 2 ANOVA design for fixation duration and number of fixations 
separately. For fixation duration a main effect of Trial-Type (F(1,33)=71.98, 
p<0.000) was observed, reflecting shorter fixation durations on average in 
misleading (226.5ms) compared to resolvable trials (250.5ms). No effects 
involving group reached significance (all p<0.17).  
 
For the number of fixations a main effect of Trial-Type (F(1,33)=10.19, 
p<0.004) was again observed, reflecting fewer fixations in misleading (6) 
compared to resolvable trials (6.6). However, a significant Group x Trial-Type 
interaction (F(1,33)=5.69, p<0.023) was also observed. Most importantly, this 
was the result of high checkers executing significantly more fixations (6.6) 
than low checkers (5.4) in misleading trials (F(1,33)=4.795, p<0.04), a pattern 
that was not present on resolvable trials (HC: 6.7 vs. LC: 6.5: F(1,33)=0.305, 
p=0.59) (see fig. 17). Thus, low checkers mirrored the previous interaction for 
Trial-Type (less fixations for misleading compared to resolvable trials), 
whereas high checkers did not. Furthermore, considering that misleading 
trials are the most common trial-type presented (66%) this did not result in 
high checkers having carry-over effects (i.e., based on expectations) which 
inflated eye movements during encoding (Period 1), maintenance (Period 2) 
or for resolvable Probe-1s (Period 3). This highlights the methodological 
relevance of measuring eye movements during Periods 1 and 2 and allows us 
to argue that high checkers do not seem to develop trial expectations (i.e., 
based upon the majority of trials being misleading) which influence how they 
either encode (Period 1) or maintain (Period 2) letters and their locations.  
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Fixations in encoding locations in Period 3 
Consistent with our first hypothesis, we had observed that during Period 3 
high checkers made more fixations during misleading trials compared to low 
checkers (see fig. 17). However, as these fixations were calculated from all 
possible screen locations of a misleading (and resolvable) probe, we cannot 
determine with certainty that high checkers actually access the encoded set or 
if they perhaps made more fixations to the Probe-1 prompt (misleading trials: 
“Where was K?”; fig. 15) relative to low checkers. 
 
Figure 17. Fixation number for Group x Trial-Type interaction plot. 
 
 
Based on our finer-grained hypotheses we expected that when presented with 
a misleading probe high checkers examined the matrix of six locations 
presented empty during Period 3 (see fig. 15). We further expected that they 
particularly perseverated on empty locations compared to low checkers and 
that these checking-related patterns would be observed in misleading but not 
in resolvable trials. This would provide evidence that,  when confronted with a 
misleading letter probe, checkers experience a particularly high degree of 
uncertainty regarding the presence or absence of the probe, which they 
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attempt to negate by checking all locations even those where no letter had 
been presented. To this end, we re-coded the matrix of six locations - 
presented empty during Period 3 (see fig. 15) - according to their contents 
during encoding (Period 1). Specifically, we determined whether a particular 
location had contained 1) the target (resolvable trials only), 2) any letter 
(resolvable and misleading trials) or 3) whether a location had been empty 
(see fig. 18). With this information we could then determine where participants 
specifically looked during Period 3, in terms of the ‘correct’ contents of WM, 
despite the 2 x 3 matrix being empty. In concordance with our re-coded 
locations we multiplied number of fixations by fixation duration to provide a 
“total fixation time” (TFT) on (1) target locations (resolvable trials only), (2) 
non-target letter locations, and (3) empty locations.  
  
Results for TFT 
For comparing misleading and resolvable trials we focused on total fixation 
time (TFT) measures for empty and non-target letter locations only (there was 
no target location in misleading trials). We  calculated a 2 (Group: high 
checkers vs. low checkers) x 2 (Trial-Type: misleading, resolvable) x 2 
(Encoded Set Content: empty, letter) ANOVA, with Group as a between- and 
Trial-Type and Encoded Set Content as the within-subjects factors. The 
number of fixations and fixation duration values for low (LC) and high 
checkers (HC) which were combined to create the TFT values are provided in 
Table 2. It is important to note that these values are smaller than those 
previously reported in Figure 17 as we now focused our analysis on the six 
matrix locations as opposed to the whole intermediate probe screen (incl. the 
probe sentence “Where was K?”; see fig. 15).  
 
A significant group effect (F(1,33)=5.85, p<0.022) revealed that high checkers 
(443.8ms) spent longer overall looking at the locations (empty and letter) of 
the encoded set matrix compared to low checkers (315.2ms). The Group x 
Trial-Type interaction approached significance (F(1,33)=3.75, p=0.06). 
Consistent with our hypothesis, this was driven by high checkers revealing 
significantly longer TFT measures in misleading trials compared to low 
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checkers (F(1,33)=7.62, p<0.01), whereas no group differences were 
observed in resolvable trials (F(1,33)=2.29, p=0.14). Critically, this supports 
our previous Group x Trial-Type interaction presented in Figure 17 and shows 
that when presented with a misleading probe high checkers access the six 
encoded set locations to a greater extent (TFT) than low checkers. 
 
Figure 18. Breakdown of Period 3 analysis for resolvable (top) and misleading 
(bottom) trials in terms of encoding set contents presented in Period 1.  
 
As we were interested in TFT at empty locations we conducted a 2 (Group: 
high checkers vs. low checkers) x 2 (Trial-Type: misleading, resolvable) 
ANOVA. There was a marginal Group x Trial-Type interaction (F(1,33)=3.75, 
p=0.063) (see fig. 19; left plot). Analysis of the simple group comparisons 
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revealed that, in comparison to low checkers, high checkers had a 
significantly longer TFT in misleading (LC: 493.3ms vs. HC: 732.7ms; 
F(1,33)=6.09, p<0.019) but not resolvable trials (F(1,33)=0.77, p<0.39). Thus, 
high checkers spent 239.4ms longer looking at empty locations relative to low 
checkers. This suggests that checkers’ inhibitory impairments for misleading 
trials result in them checking locations where no task-relevant information is 
present and may reflect an attempt to negate uncertainty, i.e., “Was that 
(misleading) letter there, I will check every possible location to be sure.” Also 
within group effects revealed that high checkers had a significantly larger TFT 
(F(1,33)=14.27, p<0.0007) on misleading compared to resolvable trials, a 
pattern not present on low checkers (F(1,33)=0.97, p<0.34). Importantly, there 
were no group effects for letter locations (see fig. 19; right plot) suggesting 
that the Group x Trial-Type interaction in the 3 way ANOVA was driven by 
high checkers perseverating on empty locations.  
 
 
 
Figure 19. Group (Low Checker vs. High Checker) x Trial-Type (Resolvable, 
Misleading) x Encoding Set Content (Empty; left plot, Letter; right plot) Total Fixation 
Time (number of fixations x fixation duration = TFT) interaction plot for Period 3. 
Please note that * denotes p<0.0001 significance level and ** p<0.019. There were 
no other significant effects between or within the high and low checking groups. 
* 
** 
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Table 2. Number of Fixations and Fixation Durations (mean/stdev) for low (LC) and 
high checkers (HC) which were combined to create the Total Fixation Time (TFT) 
values at specific encoding content locations (see interaction plot in fig. 19). For 
resolvable and misleading trials alike this included empty (E) and letter (L) locations, 
and specifically for resolvable trials a Probe-1 target letter location (T).  
Measure Number of Fixations Fixation Durations 
Trial-Type Resolvable Misleading Resolvable Misleading 
Encoding 
Content E L T E L E L T E L 
Mean 1.36 0.86 2.15 1.49 0.85 292.54 186.32 584.14 313.54 176.96 LC Std 0.50 0.20 0.52 0.41 0.20 97.66 56.70 207.68 79.33 66.55 
Mean 1.45 0.95 1.98 1.74 1.03 344.90 221.24 656.04 403.34 223.78 HC Std 0.41 0.33 0.79 0.43 0.45 
 
91.78 97.45 236.69 94.54 115.40 
 
 
Finally, high and low checkers did not significantly differ (p=0.64) in TFT to 
correct Probe-1 target-letter locations (resolvable trials only). This highlights 
that high checkers are not impaired in their ability to accurately locate an 
actual target letter based on their WM representations. Overall, on misleading 
trials high checkers focus significantly more on the six encoding set locations 
as a whole, and specifically longer at empty locations in comparison to low 
checkers and resolvable trials. 
 
Periods 4: (Probe-2 response times and accuracy  
A two (Group: low checkers vs. high checkers) by three (trial-type: resolvable, 
misleading, no-probe1) by two (probe-2 location: correct, incorrect) mixed 
design was used with group as the between- and trial-type and probe-2 
location as the within-subjects factors. Thus, ANOVAs for a 2 x 3 x 2 design 
were carried out on Probe-2 reaction times and accuracy. 
 
Response Times (RT) 
A main effect of Trial-Type (F(2,66)=11.20, p<0.000), reflected faster RTs for 
misleading (1896.8ms) compared to resolvable (2130.8ms) and no-probe-1 
trials (2153.9ms). Critically, the reaction time pattern for misleading and 
resolvable trials was reversed to that which we observed in our original 
experiment (Misl: 1896.7ms vs. Resol: 1782ms; Harkin & Kessler, 2009). 
Therefore, the between-experiment difference exists for resolvable trials.  We 
suggest that the self- versus automatic-termination of the preceding 
intermediate Probe-1 in our present and original experiment (respectively) 
likely explains this. In the present experiment, participants had to provide the 
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actual location (i.e., corresponding button response within 2x3 matrix) of a 
resolvable Probe-1 letter. This deliberate response process was observed in 
significantly slower reaction times for resolvable compared to misleading 
Probe-1 responses, a pattern which appears to have carried-over into slower 
Probe-2 reaction times in the resolvable condition. In contrast, in the previous 
experiment, participants did not have to exogenously or endogenously locate 
a resolvable Probe-1 letter (i.e., it was up to them but the task did not demand 
it) which was then reflected in their faster (relative to current experiment) 
Probe-2 responding in the resolvable condition. A main effect for Probe-2 
Location (F(1,33)=70.39, p<0.000) revealed that RTs were overall faster for a 
correctly located (1919.5ms) compared to an incorrectly located (2183.5ms) 
letter. There was a significant Group x Trial-Type x Probe-2 Location 
interaction, which was driven by different between-group response patterns in 
the correct and incorrect Probe-2 conditions. Specifically, the only between-
group (LC vs. HC) comparison to statistically differ in the correct probe-2 
condition was for no-probe-1 trials (F(1,33)=4.77, p<0.004), whereas in the 
incorrect probe-2 condition the group difference was only present for 
misleading trials (F(1,33)=4.96, p<0.03).  
 
Accuracy (ACC) 
No main effects or interactions with or without group reached significance, the 
absence of group effects support our expectations. We suggest that allowing 
participants to self-terminate the presentation of the intermediate Probe-1 
allowed high checkers to compensate for existing executive impairments. This 
we argued possibly removed high checkers’ WM impairments specific to 
misleading trials which we previously observed when Probe-1 terminated 
automatically (see Harkin & Kessler, 2009).  
 
Period 5: Confidence Responses (CR) 
Confidence (CR) was calculated as the individual percentage of responses 
(per trial type) indicating that the participant was not confident that their 
response with respect to Probe-2 had been correct. CR data were subject to 
the same design and 2 x 3 x 2 ANOVA that were carried out in Period 5. A 
main effect for Trial-Type (F(2,62)=34.6, p<0.000) reflected less confidence 
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overall for misleading trials compared to resolvable (F(1,31) = 22.77, p<0.000) 
and no-probe-1 trials (F(1,31) = 43.2, p<0.000). Further, resolvable trials 
resulted in less confidence than no-probe-1 trials (F(1,31) = 38.3, p<0.000). 
This suggests that a misleading intermediate probe resulted in less 
confidence for all participants. No effects involving group reached 
significance. Two participants were removed from the confidence analysis due 
to an error in the data sampling.  
 
 
4.2. General Discussion 
Conform to our hypotheses checkers’ eye movements revealed that they were 
less able to ignore a misleading probe than non-checkers. Firstly, checkers 
made more fixations during the presentation of a misleading probe compared 
to low checkers, a group difference that was not observed for resolvable trials. 
This group by trial-type interaction was mirrored in response times, where 
checkers took significantly longer to ‘skip’ a misleading trial relative to low 
checkers; again a pattern not present for resolvable trials. Secondly, we used 
the contents of the encoding set (Period 1) to determine what was driving 
participants’ fixations, i.e. what types of information they preferably checked 
during the Probe-1 period (Period 3). This revealed that in misleading trials 
high checkers’ Total Fixations Times (TFT) were greater to the six locations of 
the encoding set matrix and specifically its empty locations, in comparison to 
low checkers and resolvable trials. No group effects were observed for letter 
locations suggesting that high checkers greater TFTs to the encoding set 
matrix as a whole were driven by group differences at empty locations. The 
specificity of this pattern argues against the idea that checkers simply made 
more fixations as the result of their longer manual Probe-1 RTs. If this was the 
case then checkers would not show such a specific preference for empty 
locations in misleading trials. No similar group differences in eye movements 
were observed during Period 1 or 2, which indicates that checkers were not 
affected in their default mechanisms for how they either encode or maintain 
letters in locations within the EB of WM (Baddeley, 2000). Further, we 
observed that on the extended 5000ms delay period for no-probe-1 trials high 
checkers actually made less fixations than low checkers, which serves to 
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highlight the specificity and importance of the relationship between misleading 
probes and the greater eye movements of high checkers. In addition, the TFT 
to a resolvable target letter indicated that checkers were not impaired in their 
ability to correctly locate a simple letter representation within WM. Rather, 
checkers’ inhibitory impairments only impacted on behaviour (eye 
movements) when they were challenged by a misleading probe. Therefore, 
conform to our current expectations and previous papers (Harkin & Kessler, 
2009, 2011a), misleading trials tap into checkers’ established impairments in 
inhibition (Olley, Malhi, & Sachdev, 2007; Omori et al., 2007) which results in 
them engaging in excessive checking of their representations in WM, 
comparing these even against empty, uninformative locations.  
 
The abnormal ‘searching’ eye movements of high checkers during misleading 
trials are consistent with OCD patients having impairments in performance 
monitoring. Performance monitoring in OCD has been examined with event 
related potentials (ERP), specifically with respect to the so-called ‘error 
related negativity’ (ERN; Gehring et al., 1993) produced by the anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC). While the literature on the ERN is extensive, it reflects 
a number of cognitive functions potentially associated with obsessive-
compulsive symptoms, such as error checking, detection of conflicting 
responses/stimuli, monitoring of performance/conflict, “worse than expected 
outcomes”, strategy implementation, and uncertainty (Botvinick et al., 2001; 
Braver et al., 2001; Gehring et al., 1993; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Ridderinkhof 
et al., 2004; van Veen et al., 2001). It is therefore unsurprising that enhanced 
ERN amplitudes have been observed in OCD and that these correlated with 
symptom severity (Ciesielski et al., 2011; Gehring, Himle, & Nisenson, 2000; 
Ursu et al., 2003). Also van der Wee et al. (2003) observed that in an n-back 
WM task OCD patients had greater ACC activity at all levels of task difficulty 
relative to controls. This was not interpreted as a deficit in WM capacity but 
rather as one of abnormal performance monitoring and/or compensatory 
executive processes. This is highly consistent with our current findings, where 
WM performance (Probe-2) was not affected in checkers, but where we 
observed atypical eye movement patterns during misleading distractions, 
reflecting inhibitory deficits and compensatory mechanisms for coping with 
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enhanced uncertainty as a result (e.g. checking empty locations just “to make 
sure”). 
 
Enhanced ERNs have also been observed in subclinical high scoring 
obsessive-compulsive participants (Hajcak & Simons, 2002), which highlights 
the possible quantitative nature of inhibitory/performance monitoring 
impairments across subclinical and clinical participants. This is consistent with 
the perspective that a subclinical analogue is a valid means of understanding 
a variety of features relevant to clinical OCD, especially as they are free from 
confounds such as medication, clinical state, or co-morbidity (Mataix-Cols et 
al., 1997; 1999a). Subclinical checkers may therefore provide a ‘purer’ 
indication of inhibitory impairments in our WM task. Specifically, checkers’ 
inhibitory impairments reduced their ability to inhibit a misleading probe, which 
likely induced uncertainty and resulted in them checking the contents of WM 
at empty, uninformative locations. 
 
In a manner similar to Ciesielski et al. (2007) and Henseler et al. (2008) our 
findings reveal latent inhibitory impairments despite WM performance being 
intact. It is therefore important for us to explain why checkers did not show the 
same WM impairment (Period 4) when preceded by a misleading intermediate 
probe (Period 3) as we had previously reported (see Harkin & Kessler, 2009). 
In our previous experiments, the intermediate probe was terminated 
automatically after 4000ms. It can therefore be assumed that, in misleading 
trials, high checkers were unnecessarily searching the contents of WM when 
this process was terminated ‘mid-flow’. This, in turn, may have interfered with 
attention to bindings maintained in the EB, thus impairing memory. By 
contrast, in our present experiment, participants could terminate an 
intermediate probe in their own time; this provided high checkers with 
sufficient time to achieve their elevated threshold of satisfaction (i.e., 
overcome uncertainty) before terminating a misleading trial. This is consistent 
with the observation that checkers take longer before making a choice in a 
situation of uncertainty (see Rotge et al., 2008), and that uncertainty per se 
motivates checking (Lind & Boschen, 2009; Rotge et al., 2008; Tolin et al., 
2003). In the current case self-pacing most likely allowed checkers to engage 
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and optimise their compensatory mechanism and search the contents of WM 
in a manner which did not interfere with episodic bindings, preserving their 
memory accuracy in this low load task. Indeed, the fact that on misleading 
trials there were no significant group differences on ‘Skip’ responses – and 
that both groups performed at an optimal level (both >96.9%) – is evidence 
that high checkers used the extra time to attain certainty (i.e., correctly skip 
misleading P1 in their own time) and preserve WM performance. 
 
4.3. Conclusion 
Using eye movement measures we show for the first time that high checkers’ 
inhibitory impairments for misleading information results in them 
unnecessarily searching the contents of WM (four letters and two empty 
locations). Behaviourally, this was expressed with checkers taking 
significantly longer to terminate a misleading intermediate probe in 
comparison to non-checkers who quickly dismissed it as misleading and 
irresolvable. Furthermore, the fact that both groups were similarly excellent at 
correctly skipping a misleading probe suggests that while high checkers took 
longer to achieve certainty (i.e. that it was not there) self-termination allowed 
them to preserve the integrity of the bindings maintained in the EB. We 
concentrated our eye movement measures on number and duration of 
fixations which were the best candidates for reflecting internal checking 
behaviours. Specifically, during the presentation of misleading probes, not 
only did checkers execute more fixations, but they fixated longer on the six 
encoding set locations and specifically at locations that had been empty 
during encoding. Thus, not only do misleading trials trigger internal checking 
behaviours in checkers, but for these trials they are also more likely to search 
locations where no actual task relevant information had been presented. It 
would appear that misleading trials specifically tap into the inhibitory 
impairments of checkers, inducing uncertainty which they try to overcome by 
means of excessive checking, searching even uninformative, empty locations.  
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5. Using ecologically valid stimuli to address previous experimental 
concerns 
Tasks (6 and 7) and experiments (8 and 9) address two central points with 
respect to our previous experiments (1-5). First, while we previously 
concluded that checkers suffer from impairments in inhibitory functioning, we 
do not provide explicit evidence of this impairment. Second, that while we 
reported robust and replicable effects using letters in locations (Experiments 1 
to 4; Harkin & Kessler, 2009, 2011a), it is apparent that such stimuli do not 
directly relate to checking compulsions in clinical obsessive-compulsive 
disorder (OCD). We therefore provide a necessary methodological step 
forward by employing electrical kitchen appliances that are more concordant 
to checkers primary concerns (Rachman, 2002; Thordarson et al., 2004). As 
such we address our methodological concerns in two different experimental 
paradigms using the same electrical kitchen appliance stimuli. Task 6 and 7 
make a direct attempt to determine if checkers do in fact have executive 
impairments regarding Inhibition of Return (Posner & Cohen, 1984) effects. 
Then, Experiments 8 and 9 use our classic WM task with an intermediate 
spatial probe (i.e., Exp. 4; Harkin & Kessler, 2011a). As we use the same 
stimuli in both types of experiments, inhibitory (attenuated IOR) and memory 
impairment for the same stimulus features will provide a strong indication that 
executive dysfunction leads to memory impairment (Greisberg & McKay, 
2003). 
 
5.1. Deficient Inhibition-of-Return in checkers only when attention is 
directed to the threatening aspects of a stimulus  
In our original experiments (Exp. 1 and 2; Harkin & Kessler, 2009) considering 
that an intermediate probe is irrelevant to the performance of the memory test, 
we conclude that checkers are more distracted by a misleading probe as it is 
not part of the encoded set. Checkers either cannot suppress the distractor 
itself, and/or cannot suppress the urge to check triggered by the misleading 
distractor (strong hypothesis). A process which we suggested is driven by 
impairment in inhibitory functioning specific to the checking but not the 
washing subtype (Omori et al., 2007). However, in alignment with our weak 
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hypothesis our second series of experiments revealed that checkers suffered 
similar memory impairments for resolvable and misleading spatial probes (see 
Exp. 4; Harkin & Kessler, 2011a). Thus, while there is a delicate balance 
between resolvability (strong hypothesis) and general distraction (weak 
hypothesis), in either case it appears that checkers’ poorer memory is due to 
an executive deficit of inhibitory functioning which impairs attention-dependent 
bindings within the EB. However, while we concluded that checkers suffer 
from impairments in inhibitory functioning, we did not provide explicit evidence 
of this impairment. Therefore, Tasks 5 and 6 are a direct attempt to determine 
if checkers do in fact have executive impairments regarding Inhibition of 
Return (IOR; Posner & Cohen, 1984) effects. Thus, if these experiments show 
that checkers do in fact suffer inhibitory impairments for checking specific 
stimuli then this will inform the inconsistent OCD literature on the need for 
symptom and stimulus specificity. 
 
5.2. Inhibition impairments in OCD highlight a need for experimental-
symptom specificity 
Generally, it is argued in the literature that OCD has a common underlying 
trait: a reduced ability to selectively inhibit irrelevant external stimuli or internal 
thoughts (e.g., “Did I leave the iron ON?”), which, in turn may trigger 
subsequent neutralizing compulsions (e.g., repeatedly checking that a switch 
is turned OFF) and memory deficits (Bannon, Gonsalvez, & Croft, 2008; 
Harkin & Kessler, 2009, 2011a, 2011b). The centrality of impaired inhibitory 
control is further underlined by it being proposed as a possible candidate 
endophenotypic marker of OCD (Chamberlain et al., 2005, 2007; Chamberlain 
& Menzies, 2009; Penades et al., 2007).  
 
However, not all paradigms of selective attention involving stimulus inhibition 
have consistently revealed deficits in OCD (for review see Muller & Roberts, 
2005). For example, word Stroop tasks have revealed both interference  and 
non-interference (Kampman et al., 2002; Kyrios & Iob, 1998; McNally et al., 
1994; Moritz et al., 2008) effects for emotional words in OCD. These 
inconsistencies may in part be due the fact that words are not particularly 
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relevant to the symptoms of those with OCD and as such fail to adequately 
and consistently interfere with attention (Moritz et al., 2008). Another measure 
of inhibitory functioning that has revealed inconsistent findings in OCD is the 
Inhibition of Return task. This paradigm presents an irrelevant cue to the left 
or right of fixation before a subsequent target appears in either the cued 
(valid) or in the uncued (invalid) location. It was found that response latencies 
to targets were longer to a previously attended location (valid), than an 
unattended location (invalid). Thus, attending to a target in a previously cued, 
yet irrelevant location was slower as inhibition impeded attention from 
returning to that location, i.e., IOR. Furthermore, it is now known that attention 
and inhibition are not purely space-based (Behrmann, Zemel, & Mozer, 1998; 
Grison et al., 2005; Jordan & Tipper, 1998; Kessler & Tipper, 2004; Tipper, 
Grison, & Kessler, 2003; Tipper, Jordan, & Weaver, 1999), but also occur in 
relation to objects as research revealed greater IOR after the cuing of an 
object compared to that of a ‘pure’ location (Jordan & Tipper, 1998; Tipper, 
Jordan, & Weaver, 1999). IOR is thought to be of adaptive value by biasing 
attention away from previously attended locations and objects to those that 
are novel and unsearched (Klein & MacInnes, 1999). Impaired IOR could 
therefore result in perseverations on previously searched locations or objects, 
and by failing to attend to new stimuli the individual is more likely to 
repeatedly revisit the same items/locations again and again (Tipper, Grison, & 
Kessler, 2003). This bears a striking similarity to the core symptoms of 
perseveration we observe during compulsive checking in OCD.  
 
Despite this theoretical overlap, however, IOR effects in OCD have revealed a 
mixed pattern of results. In one instance, OCD patients were generally slower 
for targets following cue images (for valid and invalid) that were relevant to 
OCD obsessions, whereas in other studies no group differences in inhibitory 
functioning were reported at all. Thus, in these studies it appears that while 
OCD patients were distracted by OCD relevant images IOR remained intact. 
Furthermore, in OCD patients inconsistent findings have been reported 
regarding visual fields, i.e., reduced IOR in the left visual field (LVF; Rankins 
et al., 2004) or in the right visual field (RVF: E. Nelson, Early, & Haller, 1993). 
Specifically, in the latter case IOR was even reversed into positive priming 
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(PP) in the RVF, while IOR was preserved (but decreased) in the LVF. These 
discrepancies may be in part due to differences in IOR methodology, with 
some of the studies using the classic abstract IOR paradigm (Moritz & von 
Muhlenen, 2005; E. Nelson, Early, & Haller, 1993; Rankins et al., 2004) while 
others employed word- (Moritz & von Muehlenen, 2008) or image cues (Moritz 
et al., 2009) that are relevant to OCD symptomatology.  
 
In order to resolve these discrepancies the present studies extend the 
previous work on emotional IOR tasks (Moritz & von Muehlenen, 2008; Moritz 
et al., 2009). We believe that a combination of stimulus and symptom 
specificity within the domain of checking may be required to reveal robust 
impairments of executive control and inhibitory functioning (Enright, Beech, & 
Claridge, 1995; Harkin & Kessler, 2011b; Omori et al., 2007). An assertion we 
justify with the following observations. First, in an extensive review of memory 
and attention in OCD, Muller and Roberts (2005) highlighted that OCD is a 
heterogeneous disorder comprised of multiple subtypes each with their own 
unique psychological markers (i.e., checkers vs. washers; see Omori et al., 
2007). Thus, Muller and Roberts recommended that attention and memory 
tasks may benefit from using stimuli that are specific to an individuals primary 
OCD concerns. For example, Amir, Najmi and Morrison (2009) highlighted 
that high scoring OCD participants had an attentional bias to ideographically 
selected – therein threatening – word stimuli (versus neutral words) and that 
this bias correlated with symptom severity. This highlights that the tighter the 
symptom-stimuli concordance then this increases the likelihood of observing 
an attentional bias specific to the symptomatic but not the asymptomatic 
group. Second, in our previous work on WM deficits in high checkers we 
revealed that fragile multimodal integration of stimulus-identity and – location 
was most susceptible to distraction (Harkin & Kessler, 2009, , 2011a). 
Suggesting that in the correct experimental circumstances high checkers’ 
attention can be distracted from the primary memory task.  
 
Specifically, in two IOR tasks we employed electrical kitchen appliances as 
stimuli that could be switched ‘ON’ or ‘OFF’. The two tasks were administered 
to the same participants within the same session, so in fact were two 
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experimental blocks, which we balanced in sequence. The two tasks differed 
in the way the unpredictive cues were administered. In Task 6 the cues were 
yellow coloured outlines around one of the two objects that were left and right 
of fixation (see fig. 20, left). Always, one appliance was ‘ON’ and the other 
one ‘OFF’. In Task 7 (see fig. 20, right) the irrelevant cue was administered by 
switching one of the two appliances ‘ON’ and then ‘OFF’ again. The two 
tasks/blocks were counterbalanced across two groups of participants in order 
to control for sequence effects. Thus, our tasks differ from previous OCD IOR 
studies in two critical ways. First, in both tasks ecologically valid stimuli are 
presented throughout the task as opposed to the brief presentation of 
unpredictive abstract cues (Moritz & von Muhlenen, 2005; E. Nelson, Early, & 
Haller, 1993; Rankins et al., 2004), OCD relevant words (Moritz & von 
Muehlenen, 2008) or ecologically valid images (Moritz et al., 2009) before the 
target. As a result, we suggest that our tasks bear greater similarity to the 
prolonged nature of checking, where they repeatedly check the content (i.e., 
ON/OFF switches) of ecologically valid stimuli (i.e., iron, kettle, stove) for the 
presence and/or absence of threat. Second, Task 7 provides a novel addition 
to the literature by explicitly manipulating the content of ecologically valid 
stimuli (OFF to ON) to act as the unpredictive cue.   
 
Therefore, due to the differences between the tasks we arrived at two 
probable hypotheses. First, a general hypothesis applicable to high checkers 
performance in both tasks, where we predicted that ‘ON’ appliances in Task 6 
and ‘ON’ cues in Task 7 would grab the attention of high checkers and 
attenuate their IOR effect in both tasks. Second, a task-specific hypothesis 
where we predicted that focusing high checkers’ attention directly onto the 
electrical state of the appliances (OFF to ON) in Task 7 would attenuate IOR, 
while with an abstract cue (yellow outline in Task 6) the state of the appliance 
might go unnoticed, thus not affecting IOR. An outcome conform to this 
second, task-specific prediction would help explain the rather fragile and 
inconsistent IOR findings in the literature and highlight the need for 
ecologically valid stimuli in this research.   
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5.3. Tasks 6 and 7 
5.3.1. Methods general to Tasks 6 and 7 
Participants 
102 participants (mean age: 23.44 years; 32 males, 70 females) from the 
University of Glasgow gave written informed consents. British Psychological 
Society ethical requirements were met, including that of participant debriefing.  
 
We counterbalanced the two task-related blocks across two groups of 
participants and used their checking scores on the VOCI to create a low and 
high checking group within each sequence. As we wanted to measure 
inhibitory functioning in relation to checking related stimuli we used a stringent 
cut-off criterion using the checking subscale of the VOCI to create two distinct 
groups: (1) <=1 for low checkers and (2) >=7 for high checkers. For sequence 
1 this resulted in mean checking scores for low (n = 24) and high checkers (n 
= 25) of 0.33 (SD: 0.48) and 14.6 (SD: 6.23), respectively. For sequence 2 
this resulted in mean checking scores for low (n = 26) and high checkers (n = 
27) of 0.29 (SD: 0.47) and 12.96 (SD: 4.86), respectively. Thus, both low 
checking groups (Sequence 1 and 2) scored within the range of healthy 
community adults and so likely had little or no issues with checking. In 
comparison, both high checking groups (Sequence 1 and 2) scored in the 
clinical checking range for OCD patients (see  Thordarson et al., 2004). This 
underlines that they do in fact have a problem with repeated checking and 
that this checking is for appliances, ON/OFF switches, etc (cf. VOCI-items on 
the checking subscale), justifying the use of such stimuli/manipulations in our 
tasks. It is important to note that we observed no statistical differences in the 
age (p=0.81) or gender distribution (p=0.2) between low and high checkers. 
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Figure 20. Schematic representation of the procedures used in Task 6 (left) and 
Task 7 (right). Further explanations in the text. 
 
Stimuli 
We employed ecologically valid stimuli that were concordant with 
checking/OCD symptomatology. For example, the Vancouver Obsessional-
Compulsive Inventory (VOCI; Thordarson et al., 2004), and the checking 
subscale specifically, ask respondents to indicate if they repeatedly check and 
recheck things like “switches, faucets, appliances, and doors” and “that the 
stove is turned off” (Thordarson et al., 2004). Additionally, Rachman (2002) 
highlighted the specific nature of perseverations: “Yes, I remember that I did 
check the stove but I cannot remember if I checked it satisfactorily. Was the 
switch fully turned off? I cannot remember if it is safe” (p. 631). In 
concordance with this symptomatology, we used images of electric kitchen 
appliances (fryer, iron, kettle, toaster, coffee machine, hob, microwave, 
sandwich maker) as stimuli and manipulated their “ON” and “OFF” states in 
Target = Blue Box 
Task 6: 
Cue = Yellow Box 
Task 7: 
Cue = Appliance ‘ON’
Target = Blue Box 
CUE = Change 
in State from 
‘OFF’ to ‘ON 
and then OFF 
 again’ 
CUE CUE 
TARGET TARGET CUE-TARGET SOA: 500ms 
or 1000ms
FIXATION FIXATION 
‘ON’
‘OFF’
‘OFF’
‘OFF’
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two object-based variations of the IOR task in Tasks 6 and 7, respectively. 
Due to the different cueing procedures in the two tasks the designs were not 
directly comparable; hence, we conducted separate ANOVA analyses. We will 
therefore report the two tasks separately. 
 
5.4. Task 6 
5.4.1. Method 
Procedure 
Participants sat in front of a computer screen set to 1680x1050 resolution with 
their head on a chin rest at 60 cm viewing distance. An experimental trial was 
initiated by the participant pressing the space bar; this revealed a kitchen 
countertop with two kitchen appliances for 2000ms. One of these appliances 
was always ‘ON’ and the other ‘OFF’ (see fig. 20, left schematic). A fixation 
cross was then presented between the two appliances and the presentation 
time of this was varied (600ms, 800ms, 1000ms) to prevent the build up of 
temporal cue expectancies, which are known to influence the orientation of 
attention (Posner & Snyder, 1975). A yellow cue square was then flashed for 
100ms around one of the appliances; participants were instructed not to 
respond to this. Then, after a delay (SOA) of either 500ms or 1000ms, a blue 
target square was flashed for 100ms around one of the appliances as the 
target. Participants indicated if it had been presented around the left (left 
index finger, ‘X’ key) or right appliance (right index finger, ‘M’ key). In addition 
to these experimental cue-target trials we also added target-only filler trials, 
where the blue target was presented right away during the time interval where 
usually the yellow cue would appear. This manipulation was intended to 
maintain participants’ attention during the cueing interval of the trial. 
 
Appliance state and visual field (‘ON’ left or ‘ON’ right), side of cue (left or 
right), target validity (valid/cued or invalid/uncued) and SOA (500, 1000ms) 
were all counterbalanced. There were 166 trials in total, including 6 practice, 
80 valid and, 80 invalid cue trials. RTs were the main dependent variable. RTs 
were discarded when less than 150ms (anticipations) and greater than 
1500ms (misses).  
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Design 
RT data were submitted to a 6-way mixed ANOVA with Group (low vs. high) 
and Sequence (Task 5 first vs. Task 5 second) as between-subjects factors 
and SOA (500ms vs. 1000ms), Target State (ON vs. OFF), Validity 
(valid/cued vs. invalid/uncued) and Visual Field (left vs. right) as within-
subjects factors. We employed median RTs as individual statistics to reduce 
the influence of variance inherent in using sub-clinical sample.  
 
5.4.2. Results 
Importantly Validity reached significance (F(1, 98) 89.94, p< 0.001): valid 
(347.1ms) were slower than invalid trials (312.9ms), indicating a typical IOR 
effect. Sequence revealed a main effect (F(1, 98) 6.09, p< 0.02): Task 6 first 
(349.7ms) was slower than Task 5 second (310.4ms), indicating a possible 
practice effect for Task 5 when it was performed second in sequence. There 
was a main effect for Stimulus Onset Asynchrony (SOA) (F(1, 98) 32.6, p< 
0.000) which reflected faster responding for 1000 SOA (324.8ms) compared 
to 500 SOA (335.3ms). The SOA x Sequence interaction was significant (F(1, 
98) 5.06, p< 0.03). This appeared to reflect a greater difference between an 
SOA of 500 and 1000 when Task 6 was performed second (317.7ms – 
303.1ms = 14.6ms) compared to first (352.8ms – 346.5ms = 6.3ms). 
 
Two higher order interactions involving Group reached significance. Group x 
Validity x Target x Visual Field reached significance (F(1, 98) 5.33, p< 0.03). 
This appeared to reflect two main data patterns: (1) greater IOR for high 
checkers in the left visual field for ON compared to OFF targets and (2) 
greater IOR for high checkers in the left compared to the right VF. Group x 
Validity x SOA x VF x Sequence reached significance (F(1, 98) 4.46, p< 0.04). 
This appeared to reflect two main data patterns: (1) greater IOR for high 
checkers in the left visual field at 500 SOA in Sequence 2 (Task 1 performed 
second) compared to Sequence 1 (Task 6 performed first) and (2) greater 
IOR for checkers in the right visual field at 1000 SOA in Sequence 2 
compared to Sequence 1. While these two higher order interactions are 
complex and difficult to interpret, we suggest that the primary finding is that 
IOR functioning is intact (if slightly enhanced in certain conditions) for high 
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checkers in Task 6, possibly reflecting the complex IOR pattern in relation to 
visual fields observed in previous studies. This is important when considered 
alongside the abnormal IOR response pattern of this group in Task 7.  
 
Table 3.  Task 6: Mean and StDev RTs for Group (low LC vs. high HC checkers) x 
SOA x Target State x Validity. 
 
 
SOA 500 500 500 500 1000 1000 1000 1000 
 
Target 
State OFF OFF ON ON OFF OFF ON ON 
 
Validity Invalid Valid Invalid Valid Invalid Valid Invalid Valid 
Mean 312.54 347.83 311.34 347.88 304.09 339.95 301.57 338.88 LC Stdev 90.11 92.90 91.68 91.08 92.43 98.72 87.79 100.70 
  
        
Mean 326.28 350.78 321.88 358.00 311.82 346.67 307.23 341.11 HC Stdev 84.61 85.97 85.85 87.74 80.71 92.79 86.99 92.66 
 
5.5. Task 7 
5.5.1. Method 
As before, pressing the spacebar revealed a kitchen countertop with two 
kitchen appliances, however in this task both appliances were ‘OFF’ (see fig. 
20, right schematic). After a variable delay (1600ms, 1800ms, 2000ms) one of 
the appliances flashed ‘ON’ (for 300ms) then ‘OFF’ again. Then, after a delay 
(SOA) of 500ms or 1000ms, a blue target square was flashed for 100ms 
around one of the appliances.  
 
The side of cue (‘ON’ left vs. ‘ON’ right), target validity (valid/cued vs. 
invalid/uncued) and SOA (500 vs. 1000ms) were all counterbalanced. There 
were 160 trials in total, including 80 valid and 80 invalid cue trials. RTs were 
the main dependent variable. RTs were subject to outlier rejection based upon 
being greater than 150ms (anticipations) and less than 1500ms (misses). 
 
Design 
RT data were submitted to a 5-way mixed MANOVA with Group (low vs. high) 
and Sequence (Task 7 first vs. Task 7 second) as between-subjects factors 
and SOA (500ms vs. 1000ms), Validity (valid/cued vs. invalid/uncued) and 
Visual Field (left vs. right) as within-subjects factors.  
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5.5.2. Results 
SOA reached significance (F(1, 98) 94.2, p< 0.000): RTs were slower at 500 
ms SOA (327.7ms) compared to 1000 ms SOA (309.9ms). Validity reached 
significance (F(1, 98) 19.81, p< 0.001): valid (322.9ms) were slower than 
invalid trials (314.7ms), indicating a typical IOR effect. The Group x SOA 
interaction was significant (F(1, 98) 10.4, p< 0.002). This appeared to reflect 
marginally significantly different RTs for high (323.7ms) compared to low 
checkers (323.7ms – 296.2ms = 27.5ms) at 1000 SOA (p=0.07) compared to 
more similar RTs (335.5ms – 319.9ms = 15.6ms) at 500 SOA (p=0.3). 
 
Importantly the Group x Validity interaction was significant (F(1, 98) 10.09, p< 
0.002): Low checkers had faster RTs for invalid (301.1 ms) compared to valid 
trials (314.9 ms) an effect which was small but highly consistent reaching 
significance (F(1, 98) 38.53, p< 0.000). In comparison, there was little 
numerical difference for high checkers' RTs between invalid (328.4ms) and 
valid trials (330.8ms) which was reflected in it failing to reach significance 
(F(1, 98) 0.83, p= 0.37). Thus, the low scoring group showed a typical IOR 
pattern (invalid – valid = -13.8 ms), whereas the high scoring group showed 
an abnormally attenuated IOR pattern -2.4 ms) (see fig. 21). The robustness 
of this Group x Validity interaction was further reflected in its significance 
when Task 6 was performed by different groups of low and high checkers 
either first (F(1, 51) 4.63, p< 0.037: LC: -14.8 vs. HC: -4.6) or second  (F(1, 
51) 5.9, p< 0.02: LC: -13.2 vs. HC: -1.9) in sequence. Analysis of the validity 
effects for each sequence separately revealed that in either sequence low 
checkers had typical IOR effects (both p<0.000), while IOR effects were 
attenuated for high checkers in either sequence (both p>0.4). The fact that 
different groups of low and high checkers performed Task 7 in Sequence 1 
and 2 shows that this effect is specific to high checkers and to the 
experimental cue manipulation (i.e., switch ON and OFF) as opposed to an 
effect related to a specific task sequence and/or sub-group of individuals. 
 
No other higher order interactions with or without group reached significance 
in Task 7. This is important as it may suggest that the complex interactions 
involving group observed in Task 6 may have been due to the more complex 
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design (i.e., cued appliance ON/OFF as well as target appliance ON/OFF) 
and the resulting smaller trial numbers per cell.  
 
Figure 21. Group IOR Effects in Task 6. The high checking group showed attenuated 
and almost absent IOR compared to the typical IOR effect of the low checking group.  
 
Table 4. Task 7: Mean and StDev RTs for Group (low checkers: LC vs. high 
checerks: HC) x SOA x Validity 
 
 
SOA 500 500 1000 1000 
 
Validity Invalid Valid Invalid Valid 
Mean 310.57 328.91 291.34 300.85 LC Stdev 71.03 74.93 71.67 74.23 
  
    
Mean 335.49 336.58 322.18 325.76 HC Stdev 88.76 84.30 87.63 90.01 
 
5.6. General Discussion 
Conform to our second, task-specific hypothesis, we attenuated IOR for high 
checkers when the cue involved an explicit manipulation of the state of a 
kitchen appliance, i.e., ‘off’-‘ON’-‘off’ (Task 7). In comparison, typical IOR was 
observed for high checkers in the more classic IOR task, where the cue was 
an irrelevant yellow box flashing around an appliance (Task 6). This suggests 
that high checkers did not have a global impairment of attentional 
disengagement and subsequent inhibition (i.e., IOR intact in Task 6) but 
rather that their attentional functioning was impaired when the task directly 
engaged existing attentional biases for threatening stimuli (Task 7). This 
reveals the rather fragile nature of atypical IOR patterns in high scoring 
Task 7: Overall Group IOR Effect (Invalid-Valid) 
-16 
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checkers, hence, shedding some light on the variability of findings reported in 
the literature so far.  
 
For example, Moritz et al. (2009) found that OCD patients were generally 
slower in responding to a target (dot) when the cue was an image relevant to 
OCD symptomatology (e.g., for checking: fire; for washing: dirty toilet). As this 
effect failed to interact with cue validity or SOA they concluded that OCD 
patients were generally more distracted by OCD-related visual images. In line 
with their previous research (Moritz & von Muehlenen, 2008; Moritz & von 
Muhlenen, 2005) they proposed that OCD patients did not exhibit generally 
impaired inhibitory functioning. Tapping into such impairments may require 
stimuli that elicit negative and more acute responses in those with OCD 
(Harkin & Kessler, 2009; Moritz et al., 2009), which may explain the divergent 
results for our high checkers across the two tasks (IOR in Task 6, attenuated 
IOR in Task 7) and generally within the research so far. Specifically, in Task 
1, the mere presence of an ‘ON’ appliance failed to interfere with the 
disengagement of attention after an irrelevant yellow box cue. As a result, we 
found a typical IOR effect in both groups. On the other hand, the explicit use 
of an appliance’s state as a cue (Task 7: switching between ‘OFF’ - ‘ON’ - 
‘OFF’) was sufficient to interfere with the normal functioning of attention in the 
high but not the low checking group. In other words, switching an appliance 
‘ON’ as a cue was sufficiently salient to override normal disengagement and 
re-orienting of attention to the centre followed by inhibition of the just attended 
irrelevant object/location (Grison et al., 2005; Jordan & Tipper, 1998). In 
contrast, for the low checking group switching ‘ON’ an appliance merely acted 
as an irrelevant cue, again producing typical IOR.  
 
As attentional biases to threat play a central role in the etiology and 
maintenance of anxiety disorders (Mathews & MacLeod, 2002; Mogg & 
Bradley, 1998; Williams et al., 1997), our research may be particularly 
informative to potential interventions which target attentional processes in 
checking/OCD (Wells, 1990; 2000) conform to interventions proposed for 
other anxiety disorders. For instance, the so-called attentional modification 
training (AMT) proposed by MacLeod et al. (2002) attempts to improve 
   89 
attentional efficiency by targeting and directing attention away from 
threat/anxiety inducing information to less threatening information not 
associated with anxiety by using a dot-probe discrimination task. MacLeod et 
al. (2002) simultaneously presented a threatening and a neutral word followed 
by a visual (dot) probe. The primary task was to indicate as quickly as 
possible the location of this dot-probe. The key manipulation was to randomly 
assign participants to one of two conditions where there was either a strong 
contingency between the location of the probe and a threat-related word or a 
neutral word. Participants in the attend-threat condition had faster response 
latencies to threat-words and had higher levels of negative mood when they 
performed a stressful task compared to participants in the attend-neutral 
condition. Despite their results being limited to non-clinical mildly anxious 
students they proposed that AMT may provide an appropriate means of 
treating clinical anxiety. A suggestion corroborated by Amir et al. (2009) who 
trained (8 sessions over 4-weeks) individuals with generalized anxiety 
disorder (GAD) to selectively attend to the location of a non-threat word in one 
group (AMT) but not in another group (i.e., no contingency between probe 
location and word-type). GAD participants in the AMT condition reported a 
decrease in their attentional bias to threat words and a decrease in their 
anxiety. The authors concluded that attention is central to the etiology and 
maintenance of GAD symptoms as retraining attention reduced anxiety. The 
robustness of AMT in the dot-probe is further substantiated by two studies 
which reported a similar attenuation in symptoms and anxiety levels using 
face stimuli (i.e., disgust versus neutral) for groups with high anxiety (Eldar & 
Bar-Haim, 2010) and generalized social phobia disorder (Schmidt et al., 
2009). Therefore, not only has AMT shown that attentional biases are 
malleable to intervention but also that systematically directing attention away 
from threat reduces anxiety, i.e., attention moderates symptoms.  
 
Thus, while little (if any) research has been conducted into AMT and 
checking/OCD so far, the similarities between the dot-probe and the present 
IOR task point towards attention training as a possible means for attenuating 
the attentional bias and symptoms of high checkers. Firstly, could the dot-
probe be systematically applied (i.e., similar to Amir et al.) to high checkers’ 
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attentional bias to ‘ON’ states which would then restore normal inhibitory 
functioning for ‘ON’ cues in the IOR task? Secondly, if AMT could reverse 
high checkers’ attentional bias for ‘ON’ states and generally to threatening 
stimuli/features, would this then translate to improved memory performance 
for these stimuli/features?  
 
Critically, we subsequently report (Exp. 8) that high checkers have a robust 
impairment in their ability to recall if a kitchen appliance was either ‘ON’ or 
‘OFF’ (Harkin, Rutherford, & Kessler, 2011). Based on our theory (Harkin & 
Kessler, 2009, 2011b) we take this as evidence for a strong interaction 
between executive functioning (selective attention) and WM processes 
(binding within the ‘EB’, cf. Baddeley, (Baddeley, 2000)). We proposed that 
attention to the threatening feature of an appliance (i.e., its ON/OFF state) 
hampered the binding of the state to the actual appliance and its location (see 
Harkin, Rutherford & Kessler, 2011) by either directly interfering in form of an 
exogenous distractor and/or by initiating repetitive detrimental checks of WM 
contents in form of an endogenous distraction. This argument is explored in 
more detail in Experiment 8. This is important as Salkovskis, Forrester and 
Richards (1998) pointed out that OCD is characterised by endogenous 
distractions in form of “intrusive thoughts”. Accordingly, it has been found that 
high checkers’ memory performance is improved when attentional focus is 
shifted away from the actual memory task (Radomsky, Ashbaugh, & Gelfand, 
2007). This suggests that contrary to the checkers’ intuition, a relaxing, non-
checking attentional focus actually improves memory performance particularly 
when combined with reduced attention to intrusive thoughts. Therefore, 
training selective attention with respect to exogenous distractors only (e.g. 
AMT) might not be most effective intervention for OCD in the long run. Wells 
(Wells, 2000) proposed an attention-based intervention specific to the 
intrusive thinking of OCD. This attentional training (ATT) method aims to 
enhance executive control over attention and cognitive processes through 
selective attention, attention switching and divided attention exercises. ATT 
treats spontaneously occurring intrusive thoughts as “noise” that does not 
require attention but suppression. However, in one of the few studies of ATT 
in relation to OCD, Watson and Purdon (2008) failed to show that it improved 
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symptoms beyond those of thought replacement, distraction or no intervention 
control conditions. In this case, it may have been that the single ATT session 
was insufficient to improve symptoms beyond a placebo effect. Alternatively, 
considering the specificity of our IOR group-effects in Task 7, it is possible 
that the effectiveness of ATT could have been enhanced by tailoring the 
attentional aspects of the intervention to the symptoms of specific subgroups 
(i.e., ‘ON’ states for checkers) or individual patients (i.e., ideographic 
selection). Taking all these consideration into account, we propose that 
training of exogenous as well as endogenous selective attention within the 
wider context of WM processing, aiming to specifically attenuate repetitive 
checking of WM contents (Harkin & Kessler, 2009, 2011a, 2011b; Harkin, 
Rutherford, & Kessler, 2011) may be most effective for improving a wider 
range of OCD symptoms in the long term.  
 
5.7. Conclusion 
In conclusion, we have confirmed our second, task-specific hypothesis 
regarding IOR being affected in high checkers. For high checkers, IOR 
mechanisms were basically intact (Task 6) and only affected when attention 
was drawn to a threatening aspect of ecologically valid stimuli (Task 7: 
switching ON an electric appliance). This is an essential piece of evidence 
that potentially explains why IOR effects in OCD are rather fragile and 
somewhat inconsistent in the literature. Not only does this highlight the 
necessity of symptom- and stimulus-specificity but it directs future research to 
measuring IOR effects for other OCD subtypes using stimuli specific to their 
symptoms. A limitation of this study is that participants were not asked to 
subjectively appraise the threat of our stimuli and so we cannot determine 
how threatening our stimuli were for high compared to low checkers. 
However, as our group effects were specific to Task 7 this indicates that the 
presence of an unpredictive ON cue was sufficiently threatening to grab the 
attention of high checkers at the cost of normal IOR functioning. Indeed, these 
effects occurred by using stimuli that were general (i.e., present on checking 
subscale of VOCI) to the symptoms of checking despite them not being 
idiographically selected or appraised (in contrast to Amir et al., 2009). 
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Suggesting that if we had allowed individual high checkers to select visual 
stimuli relevant to their unique symptoms we may have observed a greater 
attenuation of IOR effects than presently observed. Alternatively, we would 
have expected larger effects if we had used checkers whose concerns were 
only for electrical appliances.  
 
Regardless, our findings corroborate the notion that distractions that are 
salient to OCD symptomatology cannot be easily ignored by those with clinical 
and subclinical expressions of checking/OCD. As we have argued in our 
recent research on WM impairments in subclinical checkers, deficits in 
attentional selection and suppression could be the essential factors for 
episodic memories being affected in the short- and long-term. Episodic 
representations are inherently multimodal, hence, fragile and susceptible to 
persistent interference by irrelevant external stimuli (an iron left ‘ON’) or 
internal thoughts (‘Did I leave the iron ON?’) that cannot be efficiently 
suppressed (Harkin & Kessler, 2009, , 2011a, , 2011b; Harkin, Rutherford, & 
Kessler, 2011).  
 
Another possible limitation of the present study was that in using a subclinical 
group this raises the issue of their relevance as an analogue to a clinical 
group. We agree, however, with Mataix-Cols et al. (1997,1999a) that 
subclinical OCD groups are a valid means of determining which cognitive 
factors play a role in clinically defined OCD, particularly considering their 
reduced medication and potential for co-morbidities. We therefore expect that 
the pattern observed here with subclinical checkers could be more 
pronounced using clinical OCD patients, yet, also more variable. We conclude 
that drawing attention to the threatening aspect of an ecologically valid 
stimulus is the most promising candidate to reveal deficient disengagement of 
attention, yielding attenuated IOR. 
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5.8. Impaired executive functioning in checkers with ecologically valid 
stimuli reveals novel and classic working memory impairments 
Experiments 8 and 9 use the same ecologically valid stimuli that were used in 
the previous IOR tasks where high checkers showed attenuation in normal 
inhibitory functioning for electrical appliances when they were cued with an 
‘ON’ state. Therefore, Experiments 8 and 9 in using such stimuli addressed 
two central issues to our research: (1) Our previous WM experiments (1-4) 
used letters in locations which have little validity with respect to the primary 
concerns of high checkers, and (2) if high checkers showed attenuated IOR 
for ‘ON’ cues will they show a related memory impairment for the same and/or 
associated features? Thus, we presented 4 electrical kitchen appliances 
located in 6 possible locations, of which two were ‘ON’ (electrical light was 
bright red) and two were ‘OFF’ (electrical light was dark red). The primary 
memory task (probe-2) required the participants to recall if an appliance had 
been ‘ON’ or ‘OFF’ (Exp. 8) or if an appliance was correctly located (Exp. 9) 
as shown in Figure 22. In both experiments, we used an intermediate spatial-
location probe similar to Experiment 4 of Harkin and Kessler (2011a), where it 
had produced stable group effects (i.e., low standard deviations) and 
substantial memory impairments in high compared to low checkers. This 
intermediate probe was presented at a location where an appliance had either 
been present (resolvable) or at a location that had been completely empty 
(misleading), participants had to indicate if the appliance at that location had 
been ‘ON’ or ‘OFF’. An additional yet critical development of our methodology 
related to trial-type ratio. In our previous experiments we presented two 
blocks, one with predominantly misleading trials (66%) and a counterbalanced 
block of resolvable trials as a result we could not exclude the influence that 
this had upon checkers’ WM performance. Therefore, we currently used an 
equal trial-ratio (33% resolvable, 33% misleading, 33% no-probe-1) which 
allowed us to develop a clearer understanding of the specific effect(s) of trial-
type and/or group on memory performance (probe-2). We predict that using 
such stimuli and probing the spatial location of threatening aspects of them 
may potentially enhance executive dysfunction, impair attention-dependent 
bindings (i.e., Exp. 7: state to appliance or Exp. 8: appliance to location) and 
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perhaps produce novel memory and metacognitive impairments compared to 
our previous work. 
 
5.9. Experiment 8 
5.9.1. Method 
Participants 
40 Participants (mean 20.8 years: 12 males, 28 females) from the University 
of Glasgow gave written informed consents. British Psychological Society 
ethical requirements were met, including that of participant debriefing. We 
used the checking subscale of the VOCI and used a median split of checking 
scores to obtain two groups: 20 low (mean: 0.5, SD: 0.61) and high (mean: 
13.85, SD: 4.12) ‘‘checkers’’. Further, no statistical differences between the 
low and high groups were revealed in gender distribution (p=0.72) or age 
(p=0.27).  
 
Procedure 
Participants sat 60cm from a computer screen with their head on a chin rest. 
At the beginning of each trial a fixation cross was presented for 2000ms. A 
kitchen countertop was then presented for 6000ms with 4 electrical kitchen 
appliances presented randomly in 6 possible locations as shown in Figure 22. 
Two of these appliances were ‘ON’ as indicated by a red light and two were 
shown to be ‘OFF’ with no accompanying light. After this a mask was 
presented for 1000ms, this was to reduce the influence that possible image 
retention may have played in subsequent retrieval (i.e., distinct appliances 
and/or their ‘ON’ states), thus isolating disturbances in later memory-probe 
performance to those of WM. After this a probe-1 question asked if a device at 
a specific location was either ‘ON’ or ‘OFF.’ As in our previous research (Exp. 
2; Harkin & Kessler, 2011a) this probe was presented (3000ms) at a location 
where there had been (resolvable) or had not been (misleading) a device in 
the original encoding set. Participants were asked to indicate if the device at 
this location (resolvable or misleading) was either ‘ON’ (left index finger of 
right hand) of ‘OFF’ (middle index finger of right hand). This probe previously 
produced stable group effects (i.e., low standard deviations) and substantial 
memory impairments in high compared to low checkers. Additionally, using 
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such an intermediate probe was motivated by our recent findings that an 
explicit, yet task irrelevant ‘ON’ cue interfered with normal inhibitory 
functioning (i.e., Inhibition of Return; Posner & Cohen, 1984) of high but not 
low checkers (Task 2; Harkin & Kessler, in press). Thus, for high checkers 
drawing attention to the functional and threatening aspects of electrical 
appliances and probing empty locations may resonate with the established 
executive impairments of high checkers in inhibiting irrelevant thoughts and/or 
stimuli (Olley, Malhi, & Sachdev, 2007; Omori et al., 2007; Savage et al., 
2000). Baseline trials were also included; these presented an empty kitchen 
countertop (i.e., no probe-1) designed to measure WM under ideal conditions. 
A mask was again presented (1000ms) before the actual memory task. In 
Experiment 8, probe-2 simply presented a single electrical appliance at the 
centre of the screen, the participant had to indicate if they recalled it as being 
‘ON’ (right index finger) or ‘OFF’ (right middle index finger) with respect to the 
original encoded set. Finally, participants were asked to indicate their 
confidence in their probe-2 decision as indicated simply by a ‘Confident’ (right 
index finger) or ‘Not Confident’ (right middle index finger) response.  
 
There were 156 trials in total, 12 of which (at the beginning) were practice 
including resolvable and no-probe-1 trials only. The main experiment was 
then done in two blocks (with 5min rest period between), each comprising 24 
resolvable, 24 misleading and 24 no-probe-1 trials presented in random order. 
Importantly, we employed an equal ratio of trial type in the current 
experiments: 33% resolvable, 33% misleading, 33% no-probe-1, while in our 
previous studies we had employed at least one block with 66% misleading 
trials (- and a counterbalanced block of predominantly resolvable probe-1 
trials, cf. Harkin & Kessler, 2009, 2011). We did this to remove the influence 
of trial-type ratio which had to be counter-balanced across 2 blocks in our 
previous experimental designs. This allowed us to develop a clearer 
understanding of the specific effect(s) of trial-type and/or group on memory 
performance (probe-2). For example, in our original experiment (Harkin & 
Kessler, 2009) it is possible that high checkers’ poor performance on 
misleading trials was driven by the novelty/surprise caused by an unfamiliar 
trial type. 
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Figure 22: Procedure and stimuli in Experiments 8 and 9. The Experiments differed 
only on Probe-2. Please note that appliances were only ever presented in the top 2 
(vertical) x 3 (horizontal) countertop locations. 
 
 
Design 
A two (Group: low vs. high checkers) by three (Probe-1: resolvable, 
misleading, no-probe-1) by two (Probe-2 State: ON, OFF) mixed design was 
employed with group as the between- and probe-1 and probe-2 state as the 
within-subjects factors.  
 
5.9.2. Results and Discussion of Experiment 8 
MANOVAs for a 2 x 3 x 2 design were carried out for reaction times, accuracy 
and confidence on probe-2 responses due to violations of the sphericity 
assumption (Mauchley’s tests). 
 
 
Encoding  
Probe-1: Resolvable or Misleading 
Was the device: 
‘ON’ or ‘OFF’? 
Was the device in this 
location: ‘Yes’ or ‘No’? 
Probe-2: Exp.8 Probe-2: Exp.9 
Mask 
Mask 
Was the device at this 
location ‘ON’ or ‘OFF’? 
OR 
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Probe-2 Response Latencies 
The MANOVA (2 x 3 x 2) for probe-2 latencies revealed a main effect of 
group, high checkers (1898.4ms) were significantly slower in responding than 
the low group (1573.4ms) (F(1,38) = 10.65, p<0.05) (see fig. 23). A main 
effect for trial type (F(2,76) = 5.59, p<0.006), reflected slower RTs overall for 
misleading trials compared to resolvable (F(1,38) = 9.32, p<0.005) and no-
probe-1 trials (F(1,38) = 9.20, p<0.005). This suggests that for all participants 
making a probe-2 location decision is particularly sensitive to a misleading 
intermediate probe: encouraging participants to examine the state of an 
appliance at a location where there is none slows subsequent location based 
responding. 
 
A significant main effect for probe-2 state (F(1,38) = 24.7, p<0.001) revealed 
that all participants were slower in responding to an appliance that was ‘OFF’ 
(1847.6ms) compared to ‘ON’ (1624.2ms) in the encoded set.  
 
Figure 23. Probe-2 response latencies: High checkers (1898.4ms) were significantly 
slower overall than low checkers (1573.4ms) in making their probe-2 responses 
(p<0.05). Vertical bars denote standard errors. 
 
 
Probe-2 Accuracy 
The MANOVA (2 x 3 x 2) for probe-2 accuracy revealed a main effect of group 
(F(1,38) = 4.27, p<0.05), with high checkers (87.3%) significantly less 
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accurate than the low group (94.1%) (see fig. 24). Importantly, as high 
checkers were significantly slower in making their responses, we can rule out 
a speed-accuracy trade-off as an explanation for their poorer accuracy. A 
main effect for trial type (F(2,76) = 4.08, p<0.05), reflected no-probe-1 trials 
were more accurate than resolvable (F(1,38) = 5.93, p<0.02) or misleading 
trials (F(1,38) = 6.70, p<0.05). Therefore, for all participants an intermediate 
probe resulted in poorer probe-2 state accuracy compared to trials with no 
intermediate probe.  
 
Figure 24. Probe-2 accuracy (ACC%) for group: High checkers (87.3%) were 
significantly less accurate overall in making their probe-2 responses than low 
checkers (94.1%) (p<0.05). Vertical bars denote standard errors. 
 
 
Confidence Responses   
The MANOVA (2 x 3 x 2) for confidence responses concentrated upon the 
total ‘not-confident’ responses of each participant in each condition. A main 
effect for trial type (F(2,76) = 7.99, p<0.003) reflected lower confidence for all 
participants for misleading trials compared to resolvable (F(1,38) = 4.60, 
p<0.04) and no-probe-1 trials (F(1,38) = 10.27, p<0.003). Also a main effect of 
probe-2 state (F(1,38) = 26.68, p<0.001) indicated that all participants had 
less confidence for an electrical appliance that had been ‘OFF’ than ‘ON’. No 
effects involving group reached significance.  
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To sum up, we found a general accuracy deficit for high checkers that could 
reflect general capacity issues. However, based on our previous research 
(Harkin & Kessler, 2009; 2011 and research reported by others (Ciesielski et 
al., 2007; Henseler et al., 2008), we did not believe this to be the case. In 
contrast, we hypothesised that the employed probe-2 may have focused 
checkers’ attention too strongly on the threatening aspect of the stimuli 
(electric on/off status), hence introducing a generally higher level of 
interference during encoding, maintenance, and/or retrieval fuelled by anxiety.  
 
Hence, we devised a second Experiment that differed from Experiment 8 
regarding the feature dimension of the memory test (probe-2). Instead of 
probing the state of an appliance (on vs. off) we probed its location (correct 
vs. incorrect). We expected a more differentiated pattern across conditions 
with a special role for misleading trials. 
 
 
5.10. Experiment 9 
5.10.1. Method 
Participants 
40 Participants (mean 21.85 years: 13 males, 27 females) from the University 
of Glasgow gave written informed consents. British Psychological Society 
ethical requirements were met, including that of participant debriefing. As 
before, the checking subscale was used to obtain two groups: 20 low (mean: 
0.0, SD: 0.0) and high (mean: 13.75, SD: 6.16) ‘‘checkers’’. Further, no 
statistical differences between the low and high groups were revealed in 
gender distribution (p=0.31) or age (p=0.58).  
 
Procedure 
Experiment 8 was identical to Experiment 9 with two exceptions. (1) Probe-2: 
We presented an electrical appliance either at the correct (50%) or incorrect 
(50%) location with respect to the encoding set and asked participants to 
indicate if it was correctly or incorrectly located (see fig. 22). (2) Confidence: 
We asked participants to indicate their confidence on a sliding scale from 0 
(no confidence at all) to 100 (complete confidence). We expected this scale to 
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be more sensitive in detecting between-group differences in meta-cognition 
than the binary response option employed in Experiment 8. 
 
There were 156 practice trials in total, 12 of which were practice trials 
including resolvable and no-probe-1 trials only. The main experiment was 
then done in two blocks (with 5min rest period between), each comprising of 
24 resolvable, 24 misleading and 24 no-probe-1 trials presented in random 
order. As in Experiment 7 an equal ratio of misleading, resolvable and no-
probe-1 trials were used. 
 
Design 
A two (Group: low vs. high checkers) by three (Probe-1: resolvable, 
misleading, no-probe-1) by two (Probe-2 Location: Correct, Incorrect) mixed 
design was employed with group as the between- and probe-1 and probe-2 
location as the within-subjects factors.  
 
5.11. Results and Discussion of Experiment 9 
MANOVAs for a 2 x 3 x 2 design were carried out for reaction times, accuracy 
and confidence on probe-2 responses due to violations of the sphericity 
assumption (Mauchley’s tests). 
 
Probe-2 Response Latencies 
A main effect of trial type (F(2,76) = 4.01, p<0.023) reflected the linear 
increase in RTs across resolvable (1847.4ms), misleading (1943.9ms) and 
no-probe-1 trials (2019.9ms). We suggest that the presence of an 
intermediate probe (resolvable or misleading) may focus the attention of 
checkers to responding which primes them to subsequent responding, leading 
to faster responding in these conditions compared to when no intermediate 
probe (i.e., no response priming) is presented. This pattern was previously 
observed in our original experiments, which when considered in relation to the 
different probe-1 RTs of Experiment 1 (Misleading > Resolvable = No-Probe-
1) indicates that the relationship between probe-1 and the specificity of probe-
2 is sufficient to influence RTs. A main effect of probe-2 location (F(1,38) = 
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39.31, p<0.001) showed that participants responded slower to an appliance 
that was correctly located (2067.8ms) with respect to the encoded set 
compared to one that was incorrectly located (1806.4ms). 
 
Probe-2 Accuracy 
The main effect of probe-2 location reached significance (F(1,38) = 42.86, 
p<0.001), which reflected poorer accuracy for correctly (79.4%) compared to 
incorrectly located appliances (94.5%). When considered alongside the RT 
main effect for probe-2 this suggests that correctly located appliances are 
more difficult to resolve which is reflected in slower RTs. In explanation, an 
incorrect location can be disproved by at least two partial representations 
such as remembering which object actually had been in the probe location or 
by remembering the correct location of the probe object. This is not the case 
for correct probes where this particular object-location binding has to be 
received veridically. The group x trial type interaction was significant (F(1,38) 
= 3.42, p<0.04). Analysis of the simple main effects for group at each level of 
trial-type revealed a significant group difference (low=90.5% vs. high=82.3%) 
for misleading trials (F(1,38) = 7.52, p=0.009) (see fig. 25), whereas, for 
resolvable and no-probe-1 trials no statistically significant group difference 
was observed (p=0.084 and p=0.366, respectively). However, we are aware 
that the lack of significant differences does not necessarily equate to a 
demonstration of similarity but rather could be explained by a lack of 
sensitivity. We further analysed the simple main effects within each group to 
determine the locus of between-condition performance differences. For the 
low group, no differences were reported between resolvable, misleading or 
no-probe-1 trials (i.e., all p>0.3). On the other hand, for high checkers, 
responses were less accurate for misleading trials than no-probe-1 trials 
(F(1,38) = 5.99, p<0.02), but responses for resolvable and no-probe-1 trials 
were similarly accurate (p=0.361). Thus, despite the visually attenuated 
performance of high checkers across trials, the significant group x trial 
interaction is due to the special role of misleading trials which is then reflected 
with a significant group difference specific to this condition. 
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Figure 25. Probe-2 accuracy (ACC%) for group (low vs. high) at each level of trial 
type (resolvable, misleading, no-probe-1). * Denotes significance at p<0.01 level. 
Vertical bars denote standard errors. 
 
Confidence Ratings  
A main effect of group revealed (F(1,38) = 5.30, p<0.028) that high checkers 
(70.67) had poorer confidence overall compared to low checkers (80.71) (see 
fig. 26). Trial-type reached significance (F(2,76) = 5.87, p<0.005), which was 
driven by poorer confidence on misleading trials compared to resolvable 
(F(1,38) = 4.67, p=0.037) and no-probe-1 trials (F(1,38) = 8.15, p<0.008). This 
suggests that a misleading intermediate probe was sufficient to reduce 
confidence in all participants. Probe-2 location reached significance (F(1,38) = 
20.51, p<0.001) and reflected less confidence for correctly compared to 
incorrectly located appliances. Poorer confidence for a correctly located 
appliance reflected the poorer accuracy that all participants had in this 
condition. The group x probe-2 location interaction approached significance 
(F(1,38) = 3.65, p=0.064), with group differences observed for incorrectly 
(F(1,38) = 8.31, p=0.006) but not correctly located appliances (F(1,38) = 2.23, 
p=0.144). Thus, the low checkers mirrored the general trend of the probe-2 
location main effect (i.e., poorer performance for correct than incorrect), 
whereas the high group had poorer confidence across both conditions.  
ACC 
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Figure 26. Confidence (0-100) for group: High checkers (70.7) had significantly less 
confidence overall than low checkers (80.7) (p<0.05). Vertical bars denote standard 
errors. 
 
Correlations between accuracy and confidence were conducted for each 
group and both groups showed significant relationships (low group: r=0.56, 
n=20, p=0.01; high group: r=0.71, n=20, p=0.000) indicating that for all 
participants confidence mirrors accuracy. In a further analysis we subtracted 
confidence scores from accuracy scores for each participant in each 
condition, which produced what we termed a discrepancy score. A 
discrepancy score of zero indicates that accuracy and confidence mirror each 
other, whereas an increasing discrepancy score indicates that confidence is 
numerically less than preceding accuracy. We were primarily interested in 
group differences in discrepancy scores across trial-types, as this could 
indicate conditions, where confidence and accuracy might only diverge in high 
checkers, revealing a metacognitive deficit. 
 
In a MANOVA analysis of the discrepancy scores the interaction between 
group x trial-type reached significance (F(1,38) = 3.14, p=0.049, η2p=.076). 
Analysis of the simple main effects for group at each level of trial-type 
revealed a significant group difference (LC=6.42 vs. HC=14.18) for no-probe-
1 trials (F(1,38) = 5.42, p=0.025) but not for resolvable (F(1,38) = 0.60, 
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p=0.442) or misleading trials (F(1,38) = 0.76, p=0.389). This indicates that low 
and high checkers confidence-accuracy discrepancy is similarly inflated in 
trials when there is an intermediate probe: accuracy is greater than 
confidence. However, in no-probe-1 trials low checkers accuracy-confidence 
is more concordant (6.42) compared to high checkers whose discrepancy 
score (14.18) is similar to that observed in resolvable (12.47) and misleading 
trials (14.04). We interpret that high checkers suffer a task independent 
impairment in their metacognitive functioning which is expressed here as less 
confidence in their accuracy on no-probe-1 trials.  
 
5.12. General Discussion 
The present experiments used electrical kitchen appliances that were 
concordant with the symptomatology of those afflicted with obsessive-
compulsive checking (Rachman, 2002; Thordarson et al., 2004). We did this 
in an attempt to address a primary criticism of our previous research (Harkin & 
Kessler, 2009, 2011a) that letters in locations do not resonate with the primary 
concerns of checkers. We predicted that for high checkers using episodically 
rich stimuli and questioning a threatening aspect of them (i.e., ‘ON/OFF’ state 
of probe-1) would provide a greater challenge to the attention-dependent 
bindings required for accurate memory recall.  
 
We observed that group effects differed between experiments, a finding we 
attribute to employing ecologically valid stimuli and probing different features 
of the memory in Experiment 8 (electric state on/off) compared to Experiment 
8 (location). Experiment 8 supported our claim that our stimuli were 
compatible with OCD/checking symptomatology by revealing a main group 
effect in reaction times and accuracy. However, reaction times and accuracy 
data also indicated that the particular manipulations in Experiment 8 may 
have resulted in a degree of interference in all participants. Specifically, 
probe-2 reaction times were slower after a misleading intermediate probe, 
suggesting that this experiment encouraged all participants to access the 
‘ON/OFF’ states of the appliances which then slowed subsequent responding 
to a state-based probe-2 question. Memory decisions regarding appliances’ 
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‘ON’ or ‘OFF’ states (probe-2) were significantly slower for all participants in 
misleading compared to resolvable or no-probe-1 trials. Memory accuracy 
was significantly poorer after resolvable and misleading trials compared to no-
probe-1 trials. So for all participants continually focusing on ON/OFF states 
appears to have come at the cost to their performance. Together, the 
strengths of these general effects could have been sufficient to obscure group 
effects but this proved not to be the case: High checkers were generally 
slower and poorer at recalling the state of an electric appliance compared to 
low checkers (weak hypothesis). 
 
As we did not include an independent cognitive index of WM functioning, high 
checkers’ poorer accuracy overall (compared to low scoring checkers) could 
be interpreted as impaired WM capacity. However, we argue against this for a 
number of reasons (for a review see Harkin & Kessler, 2011b). Firstly, if 
checkers have a general WM capacity impairment then this would have 
influenced our previous results (Harkin & Kessler, 2009, 2011a). A general 
impairment would negatively affect WM performance irrespective of the 
content of the encoded set, i.e., similar no-probe-1 impairment for letters and 
electrical appliances. Secondly, if checkers suffered from basic capacity 
impairment, then memory would not be influenced by the specificity of the 
probe-2 question, whereby they would necessarily have impaired appliance-
location (Exp. 9) memory in the no-probe-1 condition. Thirdly, there is a 
convergence of evidence showing that basic WM capacity is intact (Ciesielski 
et al., 2007; Henseler et al., 2008) with impairment only observed at high load 
levels when tasks stress dysfunctional components of executive control in 
OCD patients (Boldrini et al., 2005; Morein-Zamir et al., 2010; Moritz et al., 
2003; Purcell et al., 1998a, , 1998b; van der Wee et al., 2003; Zielinski, 
Taylor, & Juzwin, 1991; Zitterl et al., 2001). Finally, considering that in simple 
memory tasks subclinical checkers have outperformed OCD patients (Tuna, 
Tekcan, & Topcuoglu, 2005) and controls (Irak & Flament, 2009), it is unlikely 
that our group of subclinical checkers had anomalous capacity issues. Rather, 
it is likely that they have executive impairments analogous to those observed 
in clinical OCD (Mataix-Cols et al., 1999a; Mataix-Cols et al., 1997; Omori et 
al., 2007), which interferes with efficient state-appliance-location bindings 
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during encoding and/or maintenance. This is in agreement with the 
perspective that memory impairments in OCD are secondary to executive 
dysfunction (Greisberg & McKay, 2003) and it is further in agreement with the 
metacognitive deficit revealed in Experiment 9. 
 
The differences between low and high checkers were somewhat more subtle, 
yet even more revealing in Experiment 9: (1) Performance of high checkers 
was significantly affected on misleading trials compared to baseline (no-
probe1 trials). (2) The misleading condition revealed the strongest group 
difference with the best performance for low- and the worst performance for 
high checkers across all trial conditions. (3) In contrast to Experiment 8, high 
checkers’ performance on no-probe-1 trials did not significantly differ from the 
performance of low checkers. Finally, there was a statistical trend for a group 
difference on the resolvable trials that was reminiscent of the significant 
differences we had observed before with a spatial probe and abstract stimuli 
(letters in locations, Expt. 4 in Harkin and Kessler, 2011a). There, a spatial 
probe had been generally distracting for high checkers. Here however, when 
the stimuli were relevant to checkers’ symptoms (electric appliances with 
switches) a misleading probe provides additional impairment to that caused 
by an intermediate spatial probe resulting in the main, statistically reliable 
difference. This is corroborated by the significant interaction between group 
and trial type and further detailed analysis which revealed that high checkers 
performed significantly worse on misleading compared to baseline trials while 
performance on resolvable compared to baseline trials did not significantly 
differ (supporting the strong hypothesis). In contrast, the performance of low 
checkers did not significantly differ for any trial-type comparison.  
 
In explanation, based on the findings from Task 6 we argue that checkers’ 
attention is generally biased toward the threatening aspects of the appliances. 
In Experiment 9 this is moderated by the emphasis on spatial locations of 
probe-2, but may still provide high checkers with a slight advantage in 
accessing the state of an appliance at a resolvable compared to a misleading 
location during probe-1. This may explain why the group difference for 
resolvable trials did not reach significance while it did for misleading trials. We 
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argue that our explanation in terms of attention biased by the threatening 
aspects of the stimuli may be particularly true when locations are being 
challenged during probe 2 (cf. Exp. 9) rather than if stimuli identities are 
challenged. This proposal is supported by our previous findings (Exp. 1-4) 
which showed that high checkers exhibited memory impairments when 
questioned about the location of a certain stimulus, but not when questioned 
about the identity of a stimulus at a certain location. That is, maintaining the 
correct location of an appliance in WM depends more strongly on sustained 
attention than maintaining the identity of the appliance. Indeed, identity 
representations may be harder to disrupt than location representations 
because the identity of a stimulus is based on concepts stored in long-term 
memory (LTM), whereas the location of a stimulus is arbitrary and specific to 
the experimental context. Also as we proposed in relation to the findings of 
Experiment 4 (Harkin & Kesssler, 2011a), cross-modal stimuli (i.e., binding 
across the ventral and dorsal streams) require greater attentional resources 
than those processed within one stream (i.e., contrast: impaired object-
location binding; Elsley & Parmentier, 2009 versus intact object-feature 
binding; Allen, Baddeley, & Hitch, 2006). As a result, location-identity bindings 
are particularly vulnerable to interference as sustained attention is necessary 
to their veridicality in WM. In contrast to our previous studies, however, we 
employed an equal ratio of misleading, resolvable and no-probe-1 trials 
throughout our two experiments (in contrast to counter-balanced ratios across 
two blocks in Harkin & Kessler, 2009, 2011a) which further underpins the 
robustness of our findings with ecologically valid scenarios.  
 
Finally, we suggest that high checkers’ intact no-probe-1 performance in 
Experiment 9, in contrast to generally impaired performance in Experiment 8, 
is due to task differences regarding the memory probe (probe 2). Specifically, 
Experiment 8 required the accurate recall of the appliances’ ‘ON/OFF’ status 
while Experiment 9 probed the correct location of an appliance. As this no-
probe-1 impairment was neither previously reported (Exp 1 to 4; Harkin & 
Kessler, 2009, 2011a) nor was it observed in Experiment 9, the locus of the 
difference must be specific to the probe-2 task in Experiment 8 where 
attention was again focused on the threatening aspects of the stimuli (electric 
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on/off status). We propose that this may have in turn affected the encoding, 
maintenance and/or retrieval of multimodal bindings in Experiment 8 in form of 
interference fuelled by anxiety. In fact we regard the group main effect in 
Experiment 8 as confirmation of the ecological validity of our stimuli.  
 
Specifically, our findings from Experiment 8 are not only supported by 
checkers specific attenuations of normal IOR functioning (Task 6) for 
threatening aspects (Task 7) of stimuli but are also in agreement with 
Attentional Control Theory of Eysenck et al. (2007; Eysenck & Derakshan, 
2011). This theory proposed that stimuli which evoke anxiety (i.e., those 
relevant to checkers symptoms) divert attention from the goal-directed (i.e., 
maintenance of bindings in EB) to the stimulus-specific (i.e., ‘ON/OFF’ states) 
attentional system. This theory explains why anxiety is particularly interfering 
to memory that is reliant upon bindings of features to locations. For example, 
Lavric, Rippon, and Gray (2003) observed that threat-evoked anxiety impaired 
performance in a spatial but not a verbal n-back WM task. The authors 
proposed that anxiety interfered with executive functioning, which impaired 
spatial WM as it more reliant upon sustained attention than verbal WM (for 
review see Harkin & Kessler, 2011b).  This agrees with attenuated IOR effects 
we saw for high checkers when their attention was drawn to threatening ‘ON’ 
cues (Task 7). In short, this means that high scorers’ attention perseveres on 
a threatening stimulus once it was drawn to it, underpinning the ecological 
validity of our stimuli.  Thus, it is possible that as ‘ON/OFF’ states are salient 
to the symptoms of checkers they attend to them at the cost of their binding to 
the appliance. Thus, we provide tentative evidence which concurs with Omori 
et al. (2007) that checkers likely have executive impairments of inhibition 
which interferes with the veridicality of bindings maintained within the EB.    
 
While group differences in confidence were not observed in Experiment 8, 
Experiment 9 revealed a group main effect for a lack of confidence in high 
scorers. This highlights that a continuous confidence scale (Exp. 9) is not only 
more sensitive for detecting group effects but it also lends itself to a wider 
range of statistical analyses compared to the binary forced-choice (Exp. 8). 
The main effect in Experiment 9 indicates that high checkers have a global 
   109 
(trial-type independent) impairment in confidence compared to low checkers. 
That is, although correlations where high between accuracy and confidence 
for both groups, only high checkers showed a significant discrepancy for the 
no-probe1 trials. This dissociation between performance and confidence in 
the baseline condition in particular, suggests a metacognitive deficit in form of 
impaired performance monitoring that is present in high- but absent in low 
checkers.   
 
5.12.1. Conclusions 
The current findings confirm that checkers’ memory impairments are 
secondary to executive dysfunction, especially when ecologically valid stimuli 
are employed. The different accuracy patterns of high compared to low 
checkers between Experiment 8 and 9 allow us to make the following 
conclusions. In Experiment 8, we observed a novel finding with high checkers 
showing a robust impairment in their ability to accurately recall the state (‘ON’ 
or ‘OFF’) of an electrical appliance (weak hypothesis). A group effect which 
was surprisingly not influenced by trial type (resolvable, misleading, no-
probe). While superficially this appears to indicate a general impairment in 
WM capacity, we have highlighted a number of reasons why this is an 
unsatisfactory explanation. We conclude that this novel, general impairment is 
rather specific to the memory task (probe-2) in Experiment 8 that biased 
subclinical checkers towards the threatening electric on/off status of the 
appliances (Harkin & Kessler, in press), which in turn generally interfered with 
multimodal bindings in the EB. In contrast, Experiment 9 revealed the 
expected, more differentiated pattern with a special status for misleading 
trials: Performance of high checkers was significantly affected on misleading 
trials compared to baseline trials and the strongest group difference was 
observed in the misleading condition (strong hypothesis).  
 
In Experiment 9 we successfully employed a continuous confidence scale that 
allowed us to calculate discrepancy scores between accuracy and confidence 
for each participant in each condition. The main result was that while there 
overall strong correlations between accuracy and confidence in both groups, 
only the high checkers revealed a significant discrepancy in the baseline 
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condition. Although they reached their highest performance levels in this 
condition, their confidence did not improve, which we interpret as supporting a 
metacognitive deficit that is absent in low checkers. The importance of 
memory and metacognitive impairments in OCD is corroborated by reports 
that poor memory and checking influences the severity of obsessional thinking 
(Park et al., 2006; Purcell et al., 1998a). 
 
5.12.2. Limitations 
The following limitations of our study have to be considered. Firstly, using a 
subclinical group always raises the issue of their relevance as an analogue to 
a clinical group. We agree, however, with Mataix-Cols et al. (1997; 1999a) 
that subclinical OCD groups are a valid means of determining which cognitive 
factors play a role in clinically defined OCD, particularly considering their 
reduced medication and potential for co-morbidities. We therefore expect that 
the pattern observed here with subclinical checkers could be more 
pronounced using clinical OCD patients, yet, also more variable. Secondly, 
despite the claim that a subclinical group provides a ‘purer’ indication of the 
cognitive impairments specific to this subtype; we did not control for anxiety or 
depression nor did we provide an independent cognitive index of WM 
functioning and so cannot exclude possible group differences. Thirdly, 
subjects were not explicitly matched for education; however, they were 
selected from an undergraduate population, thus, ensuring a homogenous 
educational background for all participants, which is yet another advantage of 
a subclinical sample. However, future research with clinical patients could 
examine in more detail the relationship between severity of symptoms and 
completion of formative school which may then influence general intelligence. 
Fourthly, we did not counterbalance the keys for the forced-choice confidence 
responses in Experiment 7 and so cannot determine if a lateralization bias 
influenced participants’ responding and possibly masking existing group 
differences.  
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6. The role of working memory in compulsive checking and OCD: A 
systematic classification of 58 experimental findings 
The importance of memory in checking/OCD is not only evident in the present 
thesis but is also reflected in a number of reviews covering the topic, for 
example, Coles and Heimberg (2002), Woods et al. (2002), Kuelz et al. 
(2004), Muller and Roberts (2005) and Cuttler and Graf (2009). However, 
despite this large body of research the evidence for memory impairments in 
OCD is described as mixed at best (Hermans et al., 2008). For example, there 
are inconsistent findings regarding a general mnestic deficit (e.g. Tallis, 1997 
vs. MacDonald et al., 1997; McNally & Kohlbeck, 1993), verbal memory (e.g., 
intact: Henseler et al., 2008 versus deficit: Tuna, Tekcan, & Topcuoglu, 2005) 
and generally affected visuospatial memory (Hermans et al., 2008; Mataix-
Cols et al., 1999a; Muller & Roberts, 2005). 
 
We attribute this to the traditional pursuit of OCD memory impairment as one 
of the general capacity and/or domain specific deficits (visuospatial vs. 
verbal). In contrast, a body of research indicates a more subtle relationship, 
with memory impairments secondary to executive dysfunction (Greisberg & 
McKay, 2003). If a memory task taps into a dysfunctional component of 
executive functioning (see Table 5), attenuated memory impairment will 
follow. In this understanding, it is executive deficits in conjunction with task 
requirements that differentiate memory functioning in OCD from controls 
(Olley, Malhi, & Sachdev, 2007). This review provides a more precise level of 
explanation: EB functionality (binding) is vulnerable to interference through 
executive dysfunction.  In other words, interference from executive 
dysfunction reduces the veridicality of multimodal bindings within the EB, 
attenuating OCD memory performance. Irrespective of the exact mechanism 
for binding multimodal features together into a representation, researchers 
tend to agree that attentional effort is required for their generation and 
maintenance (i.e., Hyun, Woodman, & Luck, 2009). Therefore, memory 
impairments occur if distraction is sufficient to interfere with attention-
dependent bindings. For example, Fougnie and Marois (2009) hypothesized 
that attention iteratively refreshes multimodal representations in WM: it is only 
when a distractor sufficiently interferes with attention that there is a failure to 
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maintain features in a bound manner (e.g., Harkin & Kessler, 2009, 2011a; 
Harkin, Rutherford, & Kessler, 2011; Kessler & Kiefer, 2005). This dove-tails 
nicely with findings showing that the more emotionally engaging a given 
distractor is to an individual (or group) the more it interferes with attention-
dependent bindings (Mather et al., 2006).  
 
The present review therefore concentrates on identifying the mechanisms and 
parameters underlying executive-memory impairment in OCD, i.e., disrupted 
attention-dependent bindings in the EB. To this end, we provide a synthesis of 
our research which has concentrated on checking in WM performance (Harkin 
& Kessler, 2009, 2011b; Harkin, Rutherford, & Kessler, 2011). Basically, our 
novel paradigm aimed at the ‘EB’ component of WM (Baddeley, 2000). During 
the delay period of a WM task (i.e., between memory-set: letters in locations & 
memory task: “Where was letter?”) participants were presented with 
misleading information which was detrimental to high checkers’ memory more 
than for low. Checkers, it appears, are poorer at inhibiting irrelevant and 
misleading information (i.e., executive dysfunction) which interfered with the 
maintenance of bindings (letter in locations) in the EB. From this, we identify 
three common factors (EBL: Executive-functioning efficiency, Binding 
complexity, and memory Load) that we generalise to 58 experimental findings 
from 46 OCD memory studies and explain otherwise inconsistent research, 
e.g., intact versus deficient verbal memory.   
 
Table 5. Studies reporting executive deficits in OCD. 
Study Test/Task Executive Function OCD Impairment 
Head et al. (1989) 
Roh et al . (2005) 
Sanz et al. (2001) 
Wisconsin Card 
Sorting Test 
(WCST) 
Set-Shifting More perseverative 
errors 
Bohne et al. (2005) WCST -- Poorer at learning from feedback 
Goodwin & Sher (1992) 
Harvey(1987) 
Head et al. (1989) 
Hymas et al. (1991) 
Sanz et al. (2001) 
WCST -- Completed less 
categories 
Chamberlain et al. 
(2006) 
Purcell et al. (1998a)  
Veale et al. (1996)  
Watkins et al. (2005)  
Intra-Dimensional/ 
Extra-Dimensional 
(ID/ED) Task 
Selective attention 
and set-shifting 
Stuck in previous 
attentional 
set/impaired in 
switching cognitive 
set 
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Elliot et al. (1995) 
Fenger et al. (2005) 
Veale et al. (1996) 
Enright & Beech (1993) 
Enright et al. (1995) 
Hoenig et al. (2002) 
Negative Priming Inhibition 
Preattentive deficit 
in cognitive 
inhibition 
Moritz et al. (2009) Inhibition of Return (IOR) Inhibition 
Slower RTs when 
targets preceded 
with threat stimuli 
Harkin & Kessler (in 
press) IOR -- 
Normal inhibition 
overcome by 
attention to threat 
Omori et al. (2007) 
Stroop Test, Trail 
Making Test, 
Go/No Go Task 
Category Fluency 
Inhibition, cognitive 
flexibility, and multi-
tasking 
Only checkers (not 
washers) was 
inhibition 
impairments 
correlated with poor 
episodic memory 
Bannon et al. (2006) 
Bannon et al. (2008)  
Go/No Go Task 
Stroop Selective attention 
Deficit (while OCD 
symptoms were 
reduced) 
Kim et al. (2002) 
Penades et al. (2005) 
Roh et al. (2005) 
Trail-Making Task 
(TMT) Organization 
Consistently slower 
on Part 
A(organization 
impairment) and B 
(set-shifting) 
Fenger et al. (2005) Figural Fluency Task (FFT) -- 
Impaired in 
organizing spatial 
information 
 
6.1. A working-memory explanation 
Baddeley’s original model (1986) included a central executive, phonological 
loop and visuospatial sketchpad and was deemed separate from long-term 
memory (LTM). While this simple model explained a range of data (e.g., 
phonological similarity, word-length effect), it could not account for all 
experimental phenomena. For example, the visuospatial sketchpad, a 
capacity limit of 4 units was observed for the maintenance of individual 
features (colors or orientations) as well as for integrated objects with colors 
and orientations (Luck & Vogel, 1997). The so-called “binding problem” (e.g., 
Treisman, 1996) refers to the fact that information presented in visual scenes 
rarely consists of isolated features. Rather, features pertain to objects, objects 
to locations, and objects are further embedded into episodes together with a 
plethora of contextual information. A parallel processing architecture like the 
human brain needs mechanisms for tracking “what goes with what” in order to 
generate and maintain bindings between multiple features (Hinton, 
McClelland, & Rumelhart, 1986). Therefore, accurate memory (WM and LTM) 
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requires the encoding, maintenance and retrieval of bindings between various 
aspects of a multimodal episode (Allen, Baddeley, & Hitch, 2006). Baddeley 
(2000), therefore, extended his classic 1986 WM model to include an “EB” 
that allowed for multimodal, temporarily integrated representations and served 
as an interface with episodic LTM. Based on this development, we proposed 
(Harkin & Kessler, 2009) that an executive dysfunction (e.g., unsuppressed 
intrusive thoughts/stimuli) interferes with fragile multimodal bindings in the EB, 
resulting in the consolidation of affected episodes into WM and LTM.  
 
6.2. Empirical evidence from high checkers’ memory performance 
With these points in mind, our recent experiments (Harkin & Kessler, 2009, 
2011b; Harkin, Rutherford & Kessler, 2011) set out to: (1) engage the EB 
using stimuli that required multimodal conjunctions between various object 
features and spatial locations and to (2) hamper EB functionality by 
confronting high and low checkers with misleading/irresolvable information 
during the WM retention interval. In Harkin and Kessler (2009), we employed 
this novel paradigm for the first time. We presented 4 letters (see fig. 2) 
randomly in 6 possible locations and asked participants to indicate 4 seconds 
later if a test letter was in the correct (50%) or incorrect (50%) location. The 
novel manipulation that was meant to induce checking was presented as an 
additional probe between the encoding-set and the actual test letter. This 
intermediate probe (probe-1) was either resolvable (e.g., “Where was T”) or 
misleading (e.g., “Where was K”) referring to its presence or absence in the 
encoding-set, respectively (see fig. 2). Misleading trials were hypothesized to 
induce frustrating and unnecessary checking in those with such a 
predisposition as no correct answer was possible but in order to proceed, 
suppression of the misleading information and of the urge to check was 
required.  
 
Conforming to our expectations, high scoring checkers’ memory performance 
was attenuated compared to low checkers when interfered with by misleading 
information, yet, performance was not statistically different when the 
distracting intermediate probe was resolvable or absent. Importantly and in 
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agreement with previous findings (e.g., Ciesielski et al., 2007; Henseler et al., 
2008), this further underpins that there is no general difference in WM 
capacity per se between high and low checkers.  
 
We extended these experiments in Harkin and Kessler (Harkin & Kessler, 
2011a) to include the same 4 letters in 6 locations but with an additional 
feature dimension (color) in one experiment and a different distractor probe 
(spatial) in another. Adding color enhanced the memory load in the EB and 
resulted in overall reduced performance but not in a specifically enhanced 
deficit for checkers. Thus, we may have induced a greater degree of 
checking/uncertainty in all participants. This further emphasises how careful 
one must consider the requirements of a task in order to obtain a checker-
specific performance deficit. Employing a spatial probe as the intermediate 
distractor, however, had the desired effect regarding a checker-specific deficit, 
although WM load per se was not increased. We asked which letter had been 
presented at a particular location where there either had (resolvable) or had 
not been a letter (misleading). This spatial distractor manipulation boosted 
group differences, as it tapped into more specific executive deficits of high 
checkers (i.e., suppression of distraction) while low checkers were not 
challenged by this modification. Furthermore, the use of eye tracking 
measures in our WM task revealed that high checkers made more fixations 
during misleading trials to primarily empty encoded set locations (Exp. 5). 
Indicating that impairments in their ability to inhibit misleading stimuli induced 
a degree of uncertainty which motivated checkers to search the contents of 
WM at empty locations where no additional task-relevant information was 
present (Harkin, Miellet, & Kessler, subm). 
 
While we reported robust and replicable effects in the aforementioned studies 
we were aware of the limitations of using letters in locations, as it is unlikely 
that they evoke a strong emotional response in checkers (see Moritz et al., 
2008). Our third series of experiments, therefore, used ecologically valid 
stimuli in the form of electrical kitchen appliances (Harkin, Rutherford & 
Kessler, 2011). We presented 4 kitchen appliances in 6 possible locations on 
a kitchen countertop: two appliances were ‘ON’ and two were ‘OFF.’ Again, 
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we used an intermediate spatial probe asking if the appliance at a cued 
location had been ‘ON’ or ‘OFF’ (an appliance had either been there = 
resolvable, or not = misleading). When the primary WM task required 
remembering the correct location of an appliance we found a very similar 
pattern of group differences as we previously had with letters, yet, statistically 
and experimentally more robust (stronger effect sizes with fewer trials) and, 
most importantly, accompanied by a metacognitive deficit in high checkers, 
reflected in reduced confidence even when performance was at ceiling and 
did not differ statistically from the low checking group, i.e., in the baseline 
condition without a distracting probe. 
 
6.3. The EBL (Executive-Functioning, Binding Complexity, Memory 
Load) classification system 
Our synthesis so far leads us to conclude that checkers’ memory impairment 
results from a complex interaction between (1) executive dysfunction in 
encoding organization, multimodal integration, selective attention (inhibition), 
maintenance control, and set-shifting and (2) the task components of load 
(e.g., high load, requiring chunking), multimodality (e.g., 
location+identity+color), distraction (e.g., dual task paradigm), retrieval 
dimension (e.g., location), and stimulus salience (e.g. electric switches). We 
proposed that the likely locus where these deficits interact and potentially 
augment each other is the EB and we have reviewed supporting findings and 
arguments. In conclusion, we further propose that there are etiological and 
explanatory factors common to OCD, which can be summarised along the 
following three dimensions that serve as our basis for predicting and 
classifying WM deficits in compulsive checking and OCD:  
 
(1) Executive Function Efficiency (E): Checking (Cha et al., 2008), 
rumination (Exner, Martin, & Rief, 2009), and disinhibition (Omori et al., 2007) 
are all associated with poorer memory in OCD, implying that if these 
impairments of executive function are present or induced by a task then OCD 
patients will experience a detriment in memory functioning relative to controls. 
We follow Wolters and Raffone’s (2008) tri-partite definition of executive 
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functioning consisting of (1) Attentional Control: top-down selective activation 
of task-relevant representations and suppression of task-irrelevant stimuli and 
responses, (2) Maintenance: holding task-relevant information in an active 
state, and (3) Integration: flexibly bind and manipulate information from 
multimodal sources, in the service of controlling task execution. Efficient 
executive functioning can improve performance by reducing outside 
interference and by selecting mnemonic strategies such as chunking of 
information based on long-term-memory knowledge (Miller, 1956). In this 
understanding, OCD memory impairment occurs when: (1) Experimental 
manipulations aggravate existing impairments in executive functioning which 
interfere with attention-dependent bindings. For example, when the encoding-
set is concordant with OCD symptomatology it may divide attention between 
threat and encoding (Coles & Heimberg, 2002), which reduces quality of 
attention to bindings, impairing memory performance. (2) Inappropriate use of 
executive strategies decreases binding efficiency and/or the overall load of a 
given memory representation. We will discuss that an inability to appropriately 
structure and organize stimulus input is typical of OCD (Kuelz, Hohagen, & 
Voderholzer, 2004). 
 
(2) Binding Complexity (B): Binding different (multimodal) features 
together and maintaining these representations over time impose a challenge 
that increases with the number of features and their multimodality. We 
propose that the executive function deficit ‘allows’ distracting information to 
affect the fragile complex bindings in OCD. The inherently greater binding 
complexities of visuospatial tasks (e.g., multiple objects-to-location bindings) 
are more likely to reveal OCD impairments than verbal tasks. Complex 
bindings are susceptible to interference and place greater strain upon correct 
executive control – especially when multimodal bindings are involved (Harkin 
& Kessler, 2009, 2011b; Harkin, Rutherford & Kessler, 2011; Olley, Malhi, & 
Sachdev, 2007). Verbal deficits, however, will occur if the task relies to a 
similar extent upon the maintenance of complex bindings (e.g. position of 
letters in space or sequence). This places memory impairment primarily as an 
outcome of disrupted multimodal bindings and secondarily as one of memory 
domain. It just so happens that linguistic/verbal material is usually more 
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strongly subserved by LTM concepts (if not artificially scrambled, e.g. non-
words), thus, providing semantic/lexical knowledge that facilitates complex 
bindings. We expect Binding Complexity to play a predominant role during 
maintenance, when attention is required to ensure veridicality of WM 
representations over time.  
 
(3) Memory Load (L): Assuming that there is no basic capacity issue 
involved in OCD (e.g., Ciesielski et al., 2007; Henseler et al., 2008; Harkin & 
Kessler, 2009, 2011a; Harkin, Rutherford & Kessler, 2011), performance 
deficits under high load would crucially depend on executive strategies (van 
der Wee et al., 2003): An increase in load (i.e., number of chunks to retain) 
places greater stress upon the correct implementation of organization 
strategies (chunking), updating, and overall task-management (Smith & 
Jonides, 1999). Efficient executive control reduces the overall complexity 
and/or load of a representation that is subsequently maintained in WM. For 
example, when recalling a sequence of unrelated words, performance drops 
when the number of words exceeds five or six as it is beyond the functional 
capacity of the phonological loop. But, if the words create a sentence, then 
span can reach as high as sixteen, far exceeding loop capacity (Baddeley, 
1987). Hence, chunking improves efficiency as items are not individually 
maintained (Miller, 1956). Therefore, verbal tasks that benefit from semantic 
clustering could reveal OCD impairments as they fail to efficiently chunk and 
reduce the load of the encoding-set. Memory impairment in OCD is not an 
issue of basic WM capacity (e.g., Harkin & Kessler, 2009) but rather of 
creating appropriate mnemonic associations and hierarchical groupings using 
existing knowledge that alleviates the burden on WM (see Ericsson, Chase, & 
Faloon, 1980). So, while poorer performance is expected for ‘everyone’ at 
high loads, we provide an explanation for when and how people with OCD are 
particularly affected (e.g., van der Wee et al., 2003).  
 
6.3.1. The role of anxiety in executive function efficiency (E) 
In our model (Harkin & Kessler, 2009) as well as in our EBL classification 
system we focus on the cognitive mechanisms that mediate specific forms of 
information processing that have been found to be deficient in OCD. We 
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would like to emphasise that the emotional state associated with specific 
stimuli and situations may boost these deficiencies: Anxiety and lack of 
confidence in their ability to control a given situation (Rachman, 2002) may 
further attenuate existent cognitive deficiencies in OCD.  In other words, we 
are careful to state that anxiety/lack of confidence is sufficient but not 
necessary for executive-memory impairment to occur. For example, we report 
findings from two studies (Roh et al., 2005; Rao et al., 2008) where resolution 
of OCD symptoms (and anxiety; Rao et al., 2008) was not associated with 
improvements in WM functioning. While it could be that some executive 
deficiencies are part of the OCD endophenotype it is likely that cognitive 
functions may either become deficient as a consequence of a futile attempt to 
counteract anxiety by ‘over-using' specific executive functions - e.g., memory 
retrieval may turn into compulsive memory checking (Harkin & Kessler, 2009, 
2011a) – or cognitive functions may become progressively impeded due to 
constant insecurity fueled by anxiety, manifesting itself as hampered 
executive selection between stimuli, goals, and actions (Harkin, Rutherford, & 
Kessler, 2011). Thus, anxiety is likely to act in a manner similar to a dual-task 
paradigm (Baddeley, 1986) by reducing the amount of attention on the 
primary memory task (see Tasks 6 & 7; Harkin & Kessler, in press). In the 
following, we implicitly assume a 4th dimension as the level of induced 
anxiety/insecurity and we propose that this implicit dimension predominantly 
affects executive functioning and is therefore inherent to the E-dimension of 
the EBL system. Specifically, we assume that the more threatening the 
employed stimuli (e.g. switches, electric appliances) or procedures (e.g., 
pressure, distraction, misleading information) are in a given study, the more 
likely executive functioning will be modulated, with knock-on effects for 
memory performance. Paradoxically, memorized threatening items might 
even improve performance by biasing attention toward these items during 
encoding.  
 
6.4. Applying the EBL classification system to 58 experimental findings 
Figure 27 explains where we do and do not expect to observe OCD memory 
impairments relative to controls; this we suggest is influenced by the degree 
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of executive function efficiency (E), binding complexity (B) and memory load 
(L) within any given neuropsychological task. First, we do not expect memory 
performance to differ between OCD patients and controls for tasks that are 
low in executive demand, binding and load (see: white region in top-left 
quadrant of fig. 27). Second, likelihood for OCD-specific deficits increases as 
a combination of high load, binding complexity, and executive function 
requirements (increasingly black area in the bottom-right quadrant). But 
finally, as we move toward the extreme end of the EBL continuum, memory 
impairment reduces in magnitude and eventually disappears because due to 
a simple floor effect operating for OCD patients and controls alike. We 
suggest that task requirements must be sufficient to tap into executive 
dysfunction but at the same time not be so extreme to reduce all participants’ 
performance (i.e., controls and OCD) thus obscuring OCD impairments. 
 
Figure 27. The EBL Classification System.  
In light of this, we suggest that differences in the EBL scores of verbal and 
visuospatial tasks make OCD memory impairments more likely in the latter, 
especially if spatial locations are relevant to the task. We shall see that verbal 
tasks, generally, present verbal information in a format (stories, word lists) 
that is high in load but low in binding complexity. In this case, performance is 
benefited by efficient executive processes that utilize existing representations 
in LTM, i.e. chunking according to categories, that reduces load (see fig. 28A). 
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Thus, verbal impairments in OCD are due to poor executive functioning failing 
to reduce the load of verbal stimuli and so they operate primarily within the 
dimensions of E and L. In contrast, visuospatial tasks inherently have a 
greater binding demand, where successful performance depends on the 
veridical binding of multimodal features (spatial + visual). Generally, if 
visuospatial tasks employ multimodal stimuli that cannot be directly linked to a 
LTM concept (letters or words can) that could support the chunking of WM 
representations, then memory performance in OCD depends on the 
bidirectional relationship between executive organization strategies (E) and 
multimodal binding complexity (B) which strongly influences the actual load 
(L) of all representations in the EB. In certain instances, tasks that steadily 
increase load within a visuospatial domain (e.g., n-back, corsi-block) will see a 
detriment in OCD memory performance at higher levels, as it is at this point 
their executive inefficiencies fail to match task demands, impairing memory 
relative to controls. In sum, we expect that OCD visuospatial memory 
impairments will be more evenly distributed between the three EBL 
dimensions as depicted in Figure 28B. We propose that it is the EBL 
requirement (high scores – but not too high – on all three dimensions) of a 
task that determines if verbal or visuospatial memory impairments in OCD are 
observed rather than the domain per se.  
 
In the following we will examine studies that investigated OCD memory 
performance and locate each study’s methodology within the EBL 
classification system. It is important to stress that it is impossible to exactly 
quantify the ‘scores’ we allocate for a particular study on each dimension. We 
will explain to the best of our knowledge why there are good reasons to 
believe that a given study scores highly or lowly on the three EBL dimensions 
based on its task requirements and by comparing it to other studies. We 
believe that these virtual scores will help the research community to gain a 
clear overview of the major findings in the field and allow explaining and 
predicting under which circumstances memory deficits in OCD do occur and 
under which they do not. Our analysis will break down the literature into the 
classic distinction between verbal and visuospatial memory and will discuss 
for each domain separately why memory functioning remained intact in some 
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studies and then why and which studies did reveal deficits. 
 
6.5. Verbal Memory 
The literature paints an inconsistent picture with respect to OCD verbal 
memory performance. We argue that this is due to the manner in which tests 
of verbal memory differ in their executive-functioning, binding complexity and 
memory load scores.  
 
Figure 28. The contribution of EBL factors for verbal (A) and visuospatial (B) OCD memory 
performance and their respective locations of impairment within EBL dimensional space.   
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6.5.1. Intact verbal memory in OCD 
Studies (see Table 6) showing intact verbal memory invariably share the 
same characteristics: (1) low executive demands (minimal strategy and/or 
attention allocation necessary), (2) low binding complexity and (3) low 
memory load, i.e., within phonological loop capacity (6 items). On the other 
hand, an extremely difficult task that impairs all participants to the same 
extent is likely to mask any OCD-specific memory impairment. 
 
Table 6. Studies reporting no verbal memory deficits in OCD.  
Authors Method 
Task 
Requirement
s 
Groups Compared Behavioural Findings 
Henseler 
et al. 
(2008) 
Delayed Match to 
Sample (WM task) 
Encode 4 letters, 
identify if probe 
letter was in 4 
11 OCD patients 
(YBOCS; 21.0) vs. 11 
controls 
No differences 
Foa et al. 
(1997) 
Sentence 
Recognition 
Contamination vs. 
neutral sentences 
presented in 3 
levels of noise 
15 OCD patients (YBOC: 
24.7) vs. 15 controls (2.8) No differences 
Martin et 
al. (1995) 
Self-paced word 
selection task 
Always select a 
different word 
18 OCD patients (DSM-
III-R criteria) vs. 18 
controls 
No differences  
MacDonald 
et al. 
(1997) 
Verbal recall & 
recognition 
Memorize 48 
words presented 
for 1 sec each 
10 OCD checkers (≥ 4 on 
checking MOCI) & 10 OCD 
non-checkers  (<4 on 
checking MOCI) vs. 10 
controls 
No differences 
Rubenstein 
et al. 
(1993; 
Exp. 2) 
Verbal recall 
Memorize 50 
words presented 
for 4 seconds 
each 
20 subclinical checkers (≥ 
4 checking MOCI) vs. 
controls (≤2) 
No differences 
 
In a simple (encode: 4 letters and memory task: same/different single letter) 
delayed-match-to-sample task (DMTS), Henseler et al. (2008) failed to report 
any significant group differences as OCD patients (92.6%) performed at a 
similar ceiling level to controls (93.5%). This task called minimally upon the 
EBL factors: there were no distractors to suppress, the stimuli were non-
threatening, and binding requirement was minimal as successful performance 
required the remembrance of 4 individual letters (within loop limits) not letter-
to-location bindings. On a self-paced test (recall and recognition) of verbal 
WM, Martin et al. (1995) presented participants with 16 words on a page, in a 
book of 16 pages. The only measure that revealed a significant group 
differences was total time taken, with OCD patients taking longer than 
controls to make 16 successive choices. As this task is predominantly 
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visuospatial in nature (locate different words in spatial locations), we argue 
(based on the findings reported in Chapter 3) that this is evidence of 
organizational impairments (i.e., ‘E’: executive functioning efficiency) slowing 
OCD patients’ processing of each page. If this is the case, we predict that if 
individuals with OCD require longer to process a piece of information to their 
satisfaction relative to controls, interrupting this mid-flow will interfere with 
their ability to efficiently encode words, thus, highlighting that an executive 
impairment must be sufficiently operant to impair memory. As another 
example, Foa et al. (1997) reported that checkers’ memory for contamination 
and neutral words was intact despite showing a concurrent perceptual 
distractibility (i.e., rated background noise as louder than controls). According 
to the EBL system we would not expect OCD memory impairments in this 
case as the disruption is not task-related and the task itself does not impose 
high EBL requirements.  
 
In a classic study, often cited as evidence for lack of verbal deficits in OCD, 
MacDonald et al. (1997) investigated verbal recall and recognition. The 
experiment consisted of the following phases: (i) Study Phase 1, (ii) 
Distraction Phase 1, (iii) Recall Test, (iv) Study Phase 2, (v) Distraction Phase 
2, and (vi) Recognition Memory Test. Specifically, (i) forty-eight words were 
presented, each for 1 second with 750 ms between each word, (ii) then a 7 
minute distractor task was administered between the 48th word and the (iii) 
beginning of the free recall period. Then, after (iv) study phase 2 (identical in 
format to the first but with different words), there was a (v) 10 minute 
distractor task followed by a (vi) recognition task which presented single 
words requiring participants to indicate if they had (old judgment) or had not 
(new judgment) been presented in study phase 2 (iv).  Considering this 
methodology in the EBL system presentation of a word for 1 second calls 
upon WM resources (i.e., executive-attention, phonological rehearsal) and 
LTM word representations (Cowan, 1999). Successful recall requires quick 
consolidation into verbal LTM, before presentation of the next word in 750 ms. 
An encoded word will experience primacy and recency interference from 
previous and subsequent words, respectively (Murdock, 1962), in addition to 
the substantial interference from the distractor tasks. This threatens 
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veridicality of a word within early encoding, which likely impairs subsequent 
recall and recognition. In sum, this very difficult task obscures group 
differences by inducing a floor effect in all participants, an assertion supported 
by the very low recall proportion for checkers, non-checkers and controls of 
0.179, 0.142, and 0.188, respectively. Furthermore, in a task of similar 
difficulty (Exp. 2; 50 words – 4secs each – from 5 categories), Rubenstein et 
al. (1993) failed to report any differences in memory of checkers (47%) 
compared to controls (49.6%). In these experiments, extant OCD/checkers’ 
executive-memory impairments would need to be extremely acute to impact 
memory performance and significantly differentiate them from controls. 
 
Summary: Intact verbal memory in OCD 
For the aforementioned studies, ceiling (e.g., Henseler et al., 2007) or floor 
effects (MacDonald et al., 1997; Exp. 2: Rubenstein et al., 1997) may underlie 
lack of verbal deficits. However, we are aware that the low group numbers of 
11, 15, and 10 of Henseler et al. (2008), Foa et al. (1997), and MacDonald et 
al. (1997), respectively, may have resulted in these studies being 
underpowered. However, we see below that studies with similar group sizes 
(e.g., van der Wee et al., 2003, 2007; Tallis et al., 1999; Simpson et al., 2006) 
reported significant group effects suggesting that OCD performance is better 
explained by scores on the EBL dimensions as opposed to group size (see fig 
27).  
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Figure 29. Location of intact verbal memory studies within the EBL Classification of 
OCD Memory Deficits. 
 
6.5.2. Deficient verbal memory in OCD 
Verbal memory impairment in OCD is invariably seen in studies that use 
words/sentences that benefit from organization according to implicit 
categories (see Table 7). Due to inefficiencies in their executive functioning, 
OCD patients fail to use mnemonic strategies (e.g., chunking according to 
categories) which reduces their memory performance relative to controls.  
 
Table 7. Studies reporting verbal memory deficits in OCD. 
Authors Method Task Requirements 
Groups 
Compared 
Behavioural 
Findings 
Sher et al. 
(1984) 
Logical 
Method 
subtest of 
WMS 
Listen to short story, 
recall & recognition 
requires semantic linking 
Frequent vs. 
occasional vs. 
infrequent checkers 
vs. controls (MOCI) 
Checkers deficit in 
recalling 
meaningfully linked 
sequences 
 
Tuna, 
Tekcan, and 
Topcuoglu 
(2005) 
 
Cued word 
recall and 
recognition 
Memorize 48 word pairs 
presented for 3 secs: 24 
neutral-neutral & 24 
neutral-threat 
17 OCD patients 
(YBOCS: 22.3) vs. 
16 subclinical 
checkers & 15 
controls (MOCI) 
OCD patients had 
poorer recall & 
recognition for all 
word pair types = 
general memory 
deficit 
Irak & 
Flament 
(2009) 
Focused, 
Divided & 
Passive 
Attention 
Attend to words (threat 
vs. neutral) in a range of 
conditions. Various recall 
& Recognition tasks at 
end. 
24 subclinical 
checkers (>4 
checking MOCI) vs. 
22 controls (0-1) 
Subclinical-
checkers had 
attentional bias and 
better recall & 
recognition for 
threat stimuli 
compared to 
controls. 
OCD 
Deficit in 
Memory 
No OCD 
Deficit in 
Memory 
Single Word Recall & 
Recognition 
Word 
Categorization 
DMTS – 
Simple 
Letters 
Complex Sentences 
& Background Noise 
Self Ordered 
Pointing Task – 
Self-Paced – Words 
HIGH 
EXECUTIVE 
ROLE 
(E) 
LOW 
EXECUTIVE 
ROLE 
(E) 
LOW 
LOAD 
(L) 
HIGH 
LOAD 
(L) 
LOW 
BINDING 
REQUIREMENT 
(B) 
HIGH 
BINDING 
REQUIREMENT 
(B) 
= Henseler et al. (2008) 
= Foa et al. (1997) 
= Martin et al. (1995) 
= Rubenstein et al. (Exp. 2: 1993) 
= MacDonald et al. (1997) 
INTACT VERBAL MEMORY STUDIES 
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Rubenstein 
et al. (Exp. 
3: 1993) 
Cued word 
recognition 
Memorize 60 word pairs 
presented for 5 secs. 
Identify study words 
among 60 lures 
20 subclinical 
checkers vs. 20 
controls 
Advantage for 
checkers 
De Geus et 
al. (2007) 
California 
Verbal 
Learning 
Task 
(CVLT) 
Recall (short & long 
term), recognition, 
semantic clustering, 
attention. 
39 Chronic therapy 
resistant OCD 
patients (YBOCS: 
27.3) vs. 26 controls 
OCD patients had 
poorer 1st trial recall 
& learned less 
words over 5 trials 
Savage et al. 
(2000) CVLT 
Recall (short & long 
term), recognition, 
semantic clustering, 
attention. 
33 OCD patients 
(YBOCS: 19.5) vs. 
30 controls 
OCD patients 
poorer recall, 
recognition, and 
semantic clustering 
Deckersbach 
et al. (2004) CVLT 
Recall (short & long 
term), recognition, 
semantic clustering, 
attention. 
30 OCD patients 
(YBOCS: 19.3) vs. 
30 Bipolar Disorder 
vs. 30 controls 
OCD patients were 
poorer organizing 
word lists. OCD’s 
long-delayed free 
recall mediated by 
semantic clustering 
during encoding 
Deckersbach 
et al. (2005) CVLT 
Recall (short & long 
term), recognition, 
semantic clustering, 
attention. 
20 OCD patients 
(YBOCS: 22.5) vs. 
20 Bipolar Disorder 
vs. 20 controls 
Improved semantic 
clustering when 
directed to group 
words to category 
Zielinski et 
al. (1991) CVLT 
Recall (short & long 
term), recognition, 
semantic clustering, 
attention. 
OCD patients 
(DSM-III-R/MOCI) 
vs. controls 
OCD patients 
poorer only on 
intrusions measure 
Segalas et 
al. (2008) 
Spain-
Compluten
ase Verbal 
Learning 
Task 
(modified 
CVLT) 
Recall (short & long 
term), recognition, 
semantic clustering, 
attention. 
50 OCD patients 
(YBOCS: 20.2) vs. 
50 controls 
OCD patients 
poorer recall, 
recognition not 
moderated by org 
strategies 
Cabrera et 
al. (2001) 
Complex 
sentences 
Content extraction and 
recognition 
21 OCD patients 
(DSM-IV) vs. 21 
controls 
OCD patients poor 
semantic integration 
no difference in 
recognition 
Sawamura 
et al. (2005) 
Modified 
version of 
Iddon et 
al’s (1998) 
verbal 
strategy 
task 
Recall of 20 words 
presented for 1 min. 
Recognize these 20 
words among 20 
distractors. Semantic 
categorization. 
16 OCD patients 
(YBOCS: 14.6) vs. 
16 controls (MOCI-
J) 
OCD patients had 
poorer recall & 
recognition. Slower 
to semantically 
categorise words. 
 
Sher, Mann, and Frost (1984) examined a range of verbal (and visuospatial) 
memory tests but only found verbal deficits for checkers in the Logical 
Memory subtest of the Wechsler Memory Scale (WMS; Wechsler & Stone, 
1945). A short story is read to the participant with recall occurring immediately 
and then after 30 min. This is one of the earliest studies to highlight the 
importance of encoding impairments (i.e., in organizing meaningful episodic 
information) which we propose would occur in the EB (failure of E to reduce B 
and L) and so explain checker’s poorer memory.  
 
Tuna, Tekcan, and Topcuoglu (2005) tested recall and recognition for neutral-
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neutral word pairs (e.g., “shirt”-“book”) and neutral-threat word pairs (e.g., 
“music”-“fire”). OCD patients had poorer recall and recognition than subclinical 
checkers and controls for both neutral and threat-relevant stimuli, which was 
taken as evidence of a general mnestic deficit not influenced by memory task 
(recall vs. recognition) or emotional valence (neutral vs. contamination vs. 
threat). The performance advantage of subclinical checkers for threatening 
words over neutral was also observed in a study that used three attentional 
tasks (focused, divided, and passive) that measured recall and recognition 
memory (Irak & Flament, 2009). The stability of this effect was further 
substantiated by Rubenstein et al. (Exp.3: 1993) who reported a similar 
advantage for checkers in word-pair recall and recognition. Revealingly, in the 
same study, checkers had impaired memory for actions (Exp. 1A; discussed 
below in deficient visuospatial memory section 6.6.3.), leading the authors to 
conclude that differences in schematic organization may have differentiated 
their memory performance from controls. We argue that word-pair and action 
tasks likely stressed different cognitive resources: simple rehearsal within the 
phonological loop vs. visuospatial maintenance involving executive 
organization, complex binding, and high load. Therefore, in these 
experiments, checkers’ perseveration/attentional biases may provide a 
memory advantage (vs. OCD patients; Tuna et al., 2005 or controls; Irak & 
Flament, 2009; Rubenstein et al., 1993) for stimuli that have a low 
classification score across the EBL dimensions, i.e., over-rehearsal increases 
the strength of words maintained and subsequently retrieved from memory. 
This is in agreement with the evolutionary basis of OCD, where OCD can be 
imagined on the extreme end of a continuum of fitness-promoting and/or 
avoidance strategies (Bruene, 2006). However, as observed in OCD generally 
and this EBL system this cognitive style may cause more harm than intended 
good. 
 
A frequent measure of verbal memory and learning in OCD is the California 
Verbal Learning Test (CVLT; Delis et al., 1988). The CVLT is usually 
administered in the following manner. First, 16 words are presented orally for 
5 trials with free recall occurring after each trial. An interference list is 
presented after the 5th trial. Second, a test of short- and long-delayed (20/30 
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min) free recall is administered. Third, a delayed recognition test requiring 
participants to identify previously presented words among distractors. As a 
result the CVLT measures: (1) attention and WM (recall after first trial), (2) 
short and long term free recall, (3) semantic clustering (ability to categorize 
words over trials 1-5), and (4) recognition. De Geus et al. (2007) reported 
reduced trial-1 recall accuracy for therapy resistant OCD patients relative to 
controls, no differences were observed for trials 2 through 5 indicating intact 
verbal memory capacity. Trial 1 is more a measure of attention (immediate 
span) than memory per se and as such, group differences are attributable to 
an inability to correctly attend to each word. The consistency of this 
impairment across studies (e.g., Deckersbach et al., 2004; Savage et al., 
2000; Segalas et al., 2008) indicates that poor initial attention is a stable 
deficit in OCD CVLT performance. Savage et al. (2000) reported that OCD 
patients: (1) memorized less information during encoding (trial 1), (2) used 
less efficient organizational strategies, and (3) had no deficit in capacity for 
verbal information over short and long delays. Indeed, when given category 
cues, OCD patients showed a disproportionate improvement in long-delayed 
recall where performance was now normal, a pattern also observed by 
Deckerbach et al. ( 2005). However, it is important to note that several CVLT 
studies (Deckersbach et al., 2004; Segalas et al., 2008; Zielinski, Taylor, & 
Juzwin, 1991) and two using complex verbal material (Cabrera, McNally, & 
Savage, 2001; Sawamura et al., 2005) have reported similar, additional, and 
different performance profiles for OCD (see Table 7 for more details). 
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Figure 30. Positioning of deficient verbal memory studies within the EBL 
Classification. The scale has been adjusted to allow clearer representation of verbal 
memory studies. Observe that verbal memory impairments cluster around inefficient 
executive functioning (E) and memory load (L) as proposed in the distinction we draw 
between verbal and visuospatial memory impairments in OCD (see fig. 28A vs. 28B). 
 
Summary: Deficient verbal memory in OCD 
Generally, OCD deficits in verbal memory occur when the task benefits from 
some form of input organization, which was evident in story recall (Sher et al., 
1984), word list categorisation (Sawamura et al., 2005), and CVLT 
performance (e.g., Savage et al., 2000). We saw that in the CVLT task 
impairment was influenced by the specific cognitive profile of each OCD 
group: Efficient or inefficient executive functioning (E) will increase or 
decrease memory load (L), respectively (see fig. 28A), which influences the 
DEFICIENT VERBAL OCD MEMORY 
= Sher et al. (1984) 
= Sawamura et al. (2005) 
= Tuna et al. (2005) 
= Savage et al. (2000) & Deckersbach et 
al. (2005) 
= Zelinski et al. (1991) & De Geus et al. (2007) 
= Cabrera et al. (2001) 
= Deckersbach et al. (2004); Segalas et al. 
(2004); Savage et al. (2000); Deckersbach et 
al. (2005) 
= Irak & Flament (2001) No 
Deficit 
in OCD 
Memory 
HIGH  
BINDING 
REQUIREMENT 
(B) 
LOW  
EXECUTIV
E ROLE 
(E) 
HIGH 
EXECUTIVE 
ROLE 
(E) 
HIGH 
LOAD 
(L) 
LOW  
LOAD 
(L) 
LOW 
BINDING 
REQUIREMENT 
(B) 
CVLT (Encoding 
Deficit) 
Complex 
Sentences 
CVLT: 
Organizational 
Strategy = 
Improved 
Performance 
CVLT: Encoding, 
Recall, Recognition 
Deficit 
Word 
Word Pairs: 
OCD Patients 
Logical 
subtest of 
Word Pairs: 
Advantage Sub-clinical 
Checkers vs. Controls & 
OCD Patients 
Threat Words: 
Advantage Sub-clinical 
Checkers vs. Controls  
Deficit in 
OCD 
Memory 
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magnitude and type (e.g., trial-1 vs. semantic clustering) of memory 
impairment observed. OCD patients compared to sub-clinical checkers 
showed impaired and enhanced word-pair memory performance, respectively 
(Tuna, Tekcan, & Topcuoglu, 2005; Irak & Flament, 2009), which leads us to 
propose that executive functioning differs between these two groups. For 
example, sub-clinical checkers may over-rehearse (e.g., Tuna, Tekcan, & 
Topcuoglu, 2005) and/or have attentional biases (e.g., Irak & Flament, 2009) 
which strengthen the representation of simple stimuli in memory (see fig. 30). 
In addition, co-morbidities in patients (e.g. depression) might amplify their 
executive deficits compared to subclinical checkers (cf. Moritz et al., 2003; 
Rampacher et al., 2010). 
 
6.6. Visuospatial Memory 
Visuospatial memory impairments are most commonly observed in OCD, 
however, when visuospatial tasks are low on all EBL dimensions then no 
impairments in memory should occur. In addition, we expect studies that 
varied load to report intact and deficient OCD memory for lower and higher 
load levels, respectively, which we attribute to executive functioning failing to 
meet increasing task demands.   
 
6.6.1. Intact visuospatial memory in OCD 
Studies that score low on the EBL dimensions invariably report intact 
visuospatial memory as they are: (1) within visuospatial sketchpad capacity 
(i.e., low memory load), (2) low executive requirements (successful 
maintenance requires low attention and/or organization if undisturbed (e.g., 
Kessler & Kiefer, 2005) and (3) low binding requirement (see Table 8).  
 
Table 8. Studies reporting intact non-verbal memory in OCD. 
Authors Method Task Requirements 
Groups 
Compared 
Behavioural 
Findings 
Henseler et 
al. (2008) 
Delayed Match 
to Sample 
(WM task) 
Encode 5 x 5 matrix with 4 
squares filled. Indicate if a 
probe is correctly located 
11 OCD patients 
(YBOCS: 21.0) 
vs. 11 controls 
No differences 
Ciesielski et 
al. (2007) 
Delayed Match 
to Sample 
(WM task) 
Encode 3 x 3 matrix with 2 
squares filled. Choose 
correct probe from 2 
choices  
8 OCD patients 
(YBOCS: 25.6) 
vs. 8 controls 
No difference for 
simple DMTS or 
distractor DMTS 
Roth et al. Self-Ordered Self-paced abstract 30 OCD patients No differences 
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(2004) Pointing Task selection task (YBOCS: 28.1) 
vs. 24 controls 
Martin et al. 
(1995) 
Self-paced 
selection of  
drawings of 
animals and 
nonsense 
objects  
Always select a different 
animal/object/word 
18 OCD patients 
(DCM-III-R) vs. 
18 controls 
No differences  
 
 
Two simple delayed-match-to-sample (DMTS) tasks failed to report any 
difference in OCD memory performance relative to controls (Henseler et al., 
2008; Ciesielski et al., 2007) due to low scores on all EBL dimensions. Roth et 
al. (2004) mainly used the Self-Ordered Pointing Task (SOPT; Petrides & 
Milner, 1982) as a measure for executive WM requiring the ability to generate 
and monitor a sequence of responses. On each page of a booklet with 12 
pages several abstract designs were presented. On page 1, participants were 
asked to select a design by pointing at it, then to turn to page 2 and point to a 
different design until they completed the full 12 page booklet. Participants 
were instructed not to choose the same design more than once and not to 
choose designs in the same spatial location on two consecutive pages 
(designs and locations were randmized across pages). There were no 
differences between OCD patients and controls in terms of errors, time taken, 
likelihood of using an organizational strategy, and specific organizational 
strategy used. One potential explanation for these null findings is the 
observation that on average all participants took approximately 20 seconds 
per page which may have been sufficient to allow OCD patients to 
compensate for extant executive dysfunction (see also Martin et al., 1995).  
 
Summary of intact visuospatial memory 
Low load tasks (e.g., Henseler et al., 2008; Ciesielski et al., 2007; Rotge et 
al., 2008) with minimal executive, binding and load requirements are unlikely 
to produce OCD memory deficits. In addition, self-pacing appears to prevent 
performance deficits in OCD patients (e.g., Martin et al., 1995; Roth et al., 
2004) by allowing individuals to attain higher threshold of certainty or to satisfy 
their obsessions and/or compulsions to some degree (see fig. 31). Following 
this logic, limiting decision-making time curtails some or all of these strategies 
which may put OCD patients’ central executive sufficiently under pressure to 
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impair their memory.  
 
Figure 31. Positioning of intact verbal memory studies within the EBL Classification. 
 
 
6.6.2. Intact and deficient visuospatial memory within the same study 
The following are examples of intact and deficient visuospatial memory within 
the same study (see Table 9) they highlight the delicate manner in which 
executive-functioning, binding complexity and load interact to negate or 
produce visuospatial memory deficits.  
 
Table 9. Studies reporting intact and deficient non-verbal memory in OCD. Please 
observe that we include a study by Morein-Zamir et al., (2010) * in this section which 
failed to show OCD spatial memory impairment in the SWM task (i.e., as used by 
Purcell et al. (1998a, 1998b), as they did report memory impairment in another spatial 
task (Paired Association Learning). 
Authors Method Task Requirements 
Groups 
Compared 
Behavioural 
Findings 
Van der Wee 
et al. (2003) 
n-back 
(0,1,2,3 load 
levels) 
Continual monitoring 
and updating of 
information in WM 
11 OCD patients 
(YBOCS: 25.8) vs. 
11 matched controls 
No diff at 0, 1, 2 n-
back.  
Diff for 3 n-back 
task 
Van der Wee 
et al. (2007) 
n-back 
(0,1,2,3 load 
levels). 
Before & 
Continual monitoring 
and updating of 
information in WM 
14 psychotropic free 
OCD patients. 7 
Responders 
(YBOCS: 24.4) vs. 
Improvement at 3-
back level only for 
responders 
LOW  
BINDING 
REQUIREMENT 
(B) 
Deficit in 
OCD 
Memory 
No Deficit 
in OCD 
Memory 
= Henseler et al. (2008) & Rotge et 
al. (2008) 
= Martin et al. (1995) & Roth 
et al. (2004) DMTS – Simple 
Visuospatial 
INTACT VISUOSPATIAL OCD MEMORY 
STUDIES 
Self-Ordered 
Pointing Task – 
Self-Paced HIGH 
BINDING 
REQUIREMENT 
(B) 
LOW 
LOAD 
(L) 
HIGH 
LOAD 
(L) 
LOW 
EXECUTIVE 
ROLE 
(E) 
HIGH 
EXECUTIVE 
ROLE 
(E) 
DMTS – Simple 
Visuospatial & 
Distractor 
= Ciesielski et al. (2007 
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after 
pharmacolog
ical 
intervention 
7 Non-Responders 
(24.7) 
Purcell et al. 
(1998a) Spatial WM 
Spatial search task in 
spatial locations. 
23 OCD patients 
(YBOCS: 22.4) vs. 
23 matched controls 
No diff for 2, 3, 4 
(low difficulty).  
Diff for 6 & 8 (high 
difficulty)  
Purcell et al. 
(1998b) Spatial WM 
Spatial search task in 
spatial locations. 
30 OCD patients 
(YBOCS: 24.1) vs. 
30 matched controls 
No diff for 2, 3, 4 
(low difficulty).  
Diff for 6 & 8 (high 
difficulty) 
Morein-Zamir 
et al. (2010) * Spatial WM 
Spatial search task in 
spatial locations. 
18 OCD patients 
(DSM-IV-TR) vs. 18 
matched controls 
No diff on between-
search errors or 
strategy scores  
Morein-Zamir 
et al. (2010) * 
Paired 
Association 
learning 
Learning associations 
between geometric 
patterns and spatial 
locations 
18 OCD patients 
(DSM-IV-TR) vs. 18 
matched controls 
No diff level 3 (low 
difficulty) Diff for 6 & 
8 (high difficulty) 
Zielinski et al. 
(1991) 
Corsi Block-
Tapping Test 
Spatial span & 
number of correct 
repeated sequences 
OCD patients 
(DSM-III-R/MOCI) 
vs. controls 
OCD patients 
poorer span & 
correct sequences 
Zitterl et al. 
(2001) 
intermediate 
(Lern- und 
Gedachtnist
est; LGT-3) 
and 
immediate 
(Corsi Block-
Tapping 
Test)  
Spatial span & 
number of correct 
repeated sequences 
27 non-depressed 
OCD patients 
(YBOCS: >16) vs. 
27 controls 
OCD patients 
poorer on 
intermediate and 
immediate 
measures 
Moritz et al. 
(2003) 
Corsi Block-
Tapping Test 
Spatial span & 
number of correct 
repeated sequences 
32 OCD patients 
(YBOCS: 23.52) vs. 
20 controls. 
OCD patients 
poorer at corsi block 
tapping 
Boldrini et al. 
(2005) 
Corsi Block-
Tapping Test Span and Supraspan 
25 OCD patients 
(YBOCS: 22.7) vs. 
15 Panic vs. 15 
Controls 
OCD patients 
impaired on Span 
and Supra span 
 
Van der Wee et al. (2003) used a spatial variant of the n-back WM task with 
four levels of load. OCD individuals and controls had equivalent performance 
for 0-, 1-, and 2-back indicating that OCD spatial WM capacity was intact. It 
was only at the 3-back load level that patients with OCD significantly differed 
from controls with errors of 48% versus 25%, respectively. Further, van der 
Wee et al. (2007) reported that OCD patients which responded favourably to 
pharmacological treatment showed improvement only in their 3-back 
performance. Thus, poor OCD 3-back performance is attributable to 
dysfunctional executive control (E) failing to provide efficient strategies in the 
face of attention-dependent multimodal bindings (B) and increased memory 
load (L) (see fig. 28B), with improvements in memory likely attributable to 
improvements in executive functioning at the level of organization and/or 
suppression. 
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Stability of OCD impairment at higher load levels is supported across a range 
of tasks. For example, the Paired Association Learning task (PAL; Sahakian 
et al., 1988) which required the binding and maintenance of shapes to spatial 
locations in memory across increasing levels of load and so scored highly in 
the EBL classification system. Morein-Zamir et al. (2010) attributed the 
impairment of the OCD group (at more demanding load levels 6 and 8) to a 
dysfunction in nonspatial associative learning. However, they did report intact 
performance in a test of spatial WM (SWM) at low and high load levels, which 
was interesting as another group reported impaired OCD performance at 
higher load levels (see Purcell et al., 1998a, 1998b). Purcell and colleagues 
observed that OCD patients were more likely to return to a previously 
searched box at higher load levels (i.e., 6 and 8 boxes), which was indicative 
of impairment in adopting a systematic search strategy (E: organization) and 
inability to correctly manipulate internal WM representations. Critically we 
suggest that absence (Morein-Zamir et al., 2010) and presence (Purcell et al., 
1998a, 1998b) of OCD memory impairment in this SWM task suggest that the 
specificity of executive dysfunction (E) between OCD-groups may differ 
between studies. Further evidence for OCD memory impairment at higher (not 
lower) load levels is supported by their performance on the Corsi block-
tapping test (see Table 5: Boldrini et al., 2005; Moritz et al., 2003; Zielinski, 
Taylor, & Juzwin, 1991; Zitterl et al., 2001).  
 
Summary of intact and deficient visuospatial memory within the same study 
In all these tasks (n-back, SWM, PAL, Corsi-block) we saw that increasing 
load in the SWM domain differentiates OCD patients from controls; it is only 
when executive functioning is stressed at high loads that the contents of 
memory become unmanageable, i.e., inefficient executive functioning (E) fails 
to reduce memory load (L) (see fig. 32). Van der Wee et al. (2007) proposed 
that OCD performance on the n-back was state dependent, as treatment 
responders showed significantly less errors in 3-back performance compared 
to non-responders.  
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Figure 32. Positioning of intact and deficient visuospatial memory studies within the 
EBL Classification.  
 
6.6.3. Deficient visuospatial memory 
Studies that show deficits in visuospatial memory invariably share the 
following characteristics: (1) they exceed visuospatial sketchpad capacity (>6 
items), (2) have high executive requirements, and (3) are high in binding 
complexity (see Table 10). In essence these are the same characteristics as 
for the high load conditions in the studies reviewed in the previous section 
(see fig. 32).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
= Purcell et al. (1998a) 
AUGMENTATION TASKS: Intact & Deficient Memory 
= Van der Wee et al. (2003) 
= Van der Wee et al. (2007) 
= Zelinski et al. (1991), Zitterl et al. (2001), Boldrini et al. (2005), 
Moritz et al., (2003) 
No Deficit 
in OCD 
Memory 
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BINDING 
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3 
4 
6 
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LOW  
EXECUTIVE 
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(E) 
HIGH 
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(E) 
HIGH 
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(L) 
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LOAD 
(L) 
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BINDING 
REQUIREMENT 
(B) Low 
High n-
Task 
Low 
High 
Corsi  
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Block  
WM 
Spatial  
 Task 
n-3 
= Morein-Zamir et al. (2010) (PAL = Paired Associative Learning) 
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Table 10. Studies reporting deficient non-verbal memory in OCD 
Author
s 
Method Task Requirements 
Groups 
Compared 
Behavioural 
Findings 
OCD MEMORY IMPAIRMENTS IN SINGLE METHODOLOGIES 
Rubenstein 
et al. (Exp. 
1A: 1993) 
Write, 
observe, or 
perform 90 
actions 
After completing 90 actions 
write down all actions they 
could remember  
20 subclinical 
checkers (MOCI- 
checking: 
unknown) vs. 20 
controls (MOCI-
checking: ≤ 2) 
Checkers 
remembered fewer 
actions and greater 
errors vs. controls 
Purcell et 
al. (1998a) DMTS 
Maintain complex 
visuospatial stimulus and 
select it from 3 close 
alternatives 
23 OCD patients 
(YBOCS: 22.39) 
vs. 23 matched 
controls 
OCD patients 
poorer DMTS 
selection vs. 
controls 
Tallis et al. 
(1999) 
Recurring 
Figures Task 
Maintain previously copied 
abstract figure and recall 
immediately & after 30 
mins 
12 OCD patients 
(primarily 
checkers: Pauda: 
72.6) vs. 12 
matched controls 
OCD patients 
poorer than controls 
on RFT  
Zielinski et 
al. (1991) 
Recurring 
Figures Task 
Maintain previously copied 
abstract figure and recall 
immediately & after 30 
mins 
OCD patients 
(DSM-III-R/MOCI) 
vs. controls 
OCD patients 
impaired on 
immediate and 
delayed 
components of RFT 
Simpson et 
al. (2006) 
Benton 
Visuospatial 
Retention 
Test 
View abstract design then 
recall from memory 
15 Comorbid OCD 
(YBOCS: 26) vs. 
Current OCD 
(19.5) vs. History-
of-OCD (9.8) vs. 
Controls (0.34) 
OCD patients less 
correct responses 
 
OCD RCFT PERFORMANCE IMPAIRMENT STUDIES 
Martionot 
et al. 
(1990) 
Rey 
Complex 
Figure Task 
(RCFT) 
Overall memory score and 
completion time 
16 nondepressed 
OCD patients 
(MOCI:16.9) vs. 8 
controls 
OCD patients 
impaired in memory 
score and slower 
Savage et 
al. (1999) RCFT 
Copying of abstract figure, 
immediate, delayed recall, 
recognition, and 
organization 
20 OCD patients 
(YBOCS: 20.9) vs. 
20 Controls (0.4) 
OCD patients 
impaired immediate 
and delayed recall. 
Immediate recall 
mediated by org 
strat during copy. 
Savage et 
al. (2000) RCFT 
Copying of abstract figure, 
immediate, delayed recall, 
recognition, and 
organization 
33 OCD patients 
(YBOCS: 19.5) vs. 
30 Controls 
OCD patients 
impaired immediate 
recall, copy to 
immediate recall 
and copy 
organization 
Deckersba
ch et al. 
(2000) 
RCFT 
(Reliability 
and Validity 
of Scoring) 
Copying of abstract figure, 
immediate, delayed recall, 
recognition, and 
organization 
71 OCD Patients 
(YBOCS: 21.2) vs. 
55 Controls 
OCD patients 
impaired in 
organization, copy 
accuracy, copy 
organization. 
Segalas et 
al. (2008) RCFT 
Copying of abstract figure, 
immediate, delayed recall, 
recognition, and 
organization 
50 OCD patients 
(YBOCS: 20.2) vs. 
50 Controls 
OCD patients 
impaired on 
immediate, delayed 
recall and 
recognition 
Boldrini et 
al. (2005) RCFT 
Copying of abstract figure 
and recall 
25 OCD patients 
(YBOCS: 22.7) vs. 
15 Panic vs. 15 
Controls 
OCD patients 
impaired on copy 
and overall recall 
Penades et 
al. (2005) RCFT 
Copying of abstract figure, 
immediate, delayed recall, 
recognition, and 
35 OCD patients 
(YBOCS: 29.3) vs. 
33 Controls 
OCD patients 
impaired immediate 
recall and copy 
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organization organization 
Shin et al. 
(2004) RCFT 
Qualitative analysis of 
copy, immediate, delayed, 
recognition and 
organization 
30 OCD patients 
(MOCI: 14.5) vs. 
30 Controls (3.5) 
OCD patients 
impaired immediate 
recall and copy 
organization. 
Qualitative analysis: 
copy = poorer 
planning & 
fragmentation 
Rampache
r et al. 
(2010) 
RCFT 
Copying of abstract figure, 
delayed recall, and 
organization 
40 OCD patients 
(YBOCS: 20.9; 
BDI: 15) vs. 20 
Major 
Depressives 
(YBOCS: 0; BDI; 
16.3) vs. 40 
Controls 
OCD patients 
impaired on copy 
but not organization 
compared to MDD 
patients. Only OCD 
severity correlated 
with visuospatial 
organization. 
Jang et al. 
(2010) RCFT 
Copying of abstract figure, 
delayed recall, and 
organization 
144 OCD patients 
(YBOCS: 23.1; 
BDI 17.95; BAI: 
19.67) vs. 144 
Controls 
OCD patients 
impaired in recall 
and organization 
which correlated 
with 
obsession/checking 
and 
symmetry/ordering 
dimensions 
 
SPLIT OCD GROUP BY AGE OF ONSET OR PRIMARY SYMPTOM 
Hwang et 
al. (2007) RCFT 
Copying of abstract figure, 
immediate, delayed recall, 
recognition, and 
organization 
24 early-onset (≤ 
17 years: YBOCS: 
22.2) OCD vs. 24 
late-onset (≥ 21: 
YBOCS: 23.4) vs. 
24 controls 
 Late-onset 
impaired on 
immediate and 
delayed recall 
Roth et al. 
(2005) RCFT 
Copying of abstract figure, 
immediate, delayed recall, 
recognition, and 
organization 
21 early-onset (≤ 
12 years: YBOCS: 
23.4) OCD vs. 13 
late-onset (≥ 24.8: 
YBOCS: 23.4) vs. 
24 controls 
Late-onset impaired 
on delayed recall 
Cha et al. 
(2008) RCFT 
Copying of abstract figure, 
immediate, delayed recall, 
recognition, and 
organization 
24 checking-OCD 
(25.4) vs. 23 
cleaning-OCD 
(24.7) vs. 20 
controls 
Checkers 
significantly 
impaired in 
immediate and 
delayed recall vs. 
cleaners and 
controls. No 
difference in copy 
accuracy. 
 
NO OCD RCFT IMPAIRMENTS FOUND 
Simpson et 
al. (2006) RCFT 
Copying of abstract figure, 
immediate, delayed recall, 
recognition, and 
organization 
15 Comorbid OCD 
(YBOCS: 26) vs. 
Current OCD 
(19.5) vs. History-
of-OCD (9.8) vs. 
Controls (0.34) 
OCD patients did 
not differ from 
controls on any 
RCFT measure 
Bohne et 
al. (2005) RCFT 
Copying of abstract figure, 
immediate, delayed recall, 
recognition, and 
organization 
21 OCD patients 
(YBOCS: 16.9) vs. 
23 trichotillomania 
vs. 26 controls  
OCD and TTM did 
not differ from 
controls 
Moritz et 
al. (2003) RCFT 
Copying of abstract figure, 
immediate, delayed recall, 
recognition, and 
organization – Controlling 
for depression 
32 OCD patients 
(YBOCS: 23.52) 
vs. 20 controls. 
OCD patients did 
not differ from 
controls on any 
RCFT measure 
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RECOVERED OCD PATIENTS – RCFT IMPAIRMENTS REMAIN 
Rao et al. 
(2008) RCFT 
Copying of abstract figure, 
immediate, delayed recall, 
recognition, and 
organization  
30 Recovered 
OCD patients 
(YBOCS: 2.57) vs. 
30 controls (2) 
Recovered OCD 
patients remained 
impaired on 
Immediate and 
Delayed Recall 
 
OCD RCFT THERAPY STUDIES 
Kim et al. 
(2002) 
RCFT- 
Pharmacolo
gical 
Intervention 
Baseline vs. 4 month 
comparison. 
Pharmacological 
intervention. 
39 OCD patients 
(YBOCS at 
baseline: 25.4) vs. 
31 Controls (0.2) 
OCD patients 
immediate and 
delayed 
impairments still 
after 4 months 
Roh et al. 
(2005) 
RCFT- 
Pharmacolo
gical 
Intervention 
Baseline vs. 4 month vs. 1 
year follow up. 
Pharmacological 
intervention. 
21 OCD patients 
(YBOCS at 
baseline: 26.9) vs. 
20 Controls 
OCD patients 
immediate and 
delayed 
impairments still 
after 1 year 
Kuelz et al. 
(2006) 
RCFT-
Cognitive 
Behavioral 
Therapy 
Baseline vs. 3 month 
follow-up. Cognitive-
Behavioral Treatment 
30 OCD patients 
(YBOCS at 
baseline: 24.2) vs. 
39 Controls (0.5) 
OCD patients 
immediate and 
delayed 
improvements, 
specific to major 
responders 
Buhlmann 
et al. 
(2006) 
RCFT- 
Cognitive 
Training 
Organization training vs. no 
training 
35 OCD patients 
(YBOCS at 
baseline: 20.1) vs. 
36 Controls  
Training improved 
organization during 
encoding. 
Immediate and 
delayed recall still 
impaired 
Park et al. 
(2006) 
RCFT-
Cognitive 
Training 
Before vs. After: Cognitive 
Training for 5 weeks 
Baseline: 15 
Treatment OCD 
patients 
(YBOCS:21.1) vs. 
15 No-treatment 
OCD (18.7) 
Treatment group 
improved: copy, 
immediate, delayed, 
organization and 
symptoms 
 
Rubenstein et al. (Exp. 1a: 1993) examined sub-clinical checkers’ ability to 
recall if they had written, observed, or performed an action they had heard. 
They had unlimited time to complete the memory tasks. Subclinical checkers 
remembered fewer actions (56.2 vs. 66.1), were more likely to confuse 
whether they had written, observed or performed a given action (1.2 vs. 0.4) 
and made more errors of commission compared to controls (0.5 vs. 0.1). This 
shows that checkers are poorer at recalling their own actions in general and 
deficient in recalling details of their actions specifically. No group differences 
in a control condition (memory for cartoons) suggests that impairments are a 
property of actions not memory capacity per se. Remembering actions in their 
situational context taps into the EB deficits in terms of attention-demanding 
multimodal bindings described in Section 6.4. 
 
In a DMTS task, Purcell et al. (1998b) presented a complex target stimulus 
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(rectangle with different internal arrangements of color and shape) for 4 
seconds. The participant then had to select the correct target from three 
distractors. OCD patients were significantly less accurate than controls 
(85.11% vs. 90.43%), which is interesting as the DMTS tasks of Henseler et 
al. (2007) and Ciesielski et al. (2007) failed to report group differences. 
Overall, accuracy was high for all three studies suggesting low overall load 
(all>85%). However there are two features of the particular methodology 
employed by Purcell et al (1998b) that may explain the memory impairment in 
OCD patients. First, binding requirements were much higher as an arbitrary 
shape, color and location had to be integrated requiring more executive 
control during encoding and maintenance than the other two studies. Second, 
the employed recall probe was more complex with 4 options being presented 
and where two of these were partially correct (in shape or colour). Thus, the 4 
options at recall may have been particularly distracting for OCD patients’ 
already challenged executive control, hence, interfering with correct retrieval. 
Taken together, executive control was much more challenged during 
encoding, maintenance and retrieval in the Purcell et al. task, leading to the 
observed group differences.  
 
Figures Recall, Recurring Figures Task and Benton Visual Retention Task 
Tallis, Pratt, and Jamani (1999) reported impaired performance of OCD 
(primary symptom was checking) patients on two tests of visuospatial 
memory. First, in the Figures Recall task (Coughlan & Hollows, 1985), where 
the participant has to copy an abstract line drawing and then recall it 
immediately and after a delay. Second, in the Recurring Figures Task (RFT; 
Kimura, 1963), where 20 geometric or irregular nonsense figures are 
presented for 3 seconds each. After this the participant must identify those 20 
cards from 140 in total by classifying each card as ‘old’ or ‘new.’ In this latter 
task performance for OCD patients was poorer overall and they were more 
likely to identify new stimuli as old (i.e., false positives; see also Zielinski et 
al., 1991). Increasing symptom severity was associated with poorer overall 
score and more false positives. In the task similar to the RFT, Simpson et al. 
(2006) reported attenuated OCD performance on the Benton Visual Retention 
Task (BVRT; Benton, 1974). We suggest that executive impairments of 
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organization as observed in the Figural Fluency (e.g., Fenger et al., 2005) and 
Trail Making Tasks (Penades et al., 2005; Roh et al., 2005, Kim et al., 2002) 
(see Table 5) explain OCD RFT and BVRT performance: poor executive 
organization (E) during encoding reduces the veridicality of memory traces 
that are maintained in WM and passed into LTM which in turn play a role in 
symptom severity. 
 
Summary of deficient visuospatial memory 
All the aforementioned tasks require extensive executive control within the 
visuospatial domain which manifested itself in a number of OCD memory 
impairments. First, checkers were poorer at remembering actions, which by 
their nature are episodically rich requiring the integration of information from a 
number of domains, such as, temporal order and spatial location of actions 
(e.g., Rubenstein et al., Exp 1a: 1993). Second, Purcell and colleagues 
highlighted that OCD patients were poorer at remembering abstract shapes, 
their colours and their locations, a task requiring focused attention of (1) 
shape-colour-location bindings and (2) suppression of distractors that shared 
features with the target during recall. Third, OCD performance on the FR and 
RF tasks (Tallis et al., 1999; Zielinski et al., 1991) and BVR (Simpson et al., 
2006) tasks indicates that OCD patients have consistent executive deficits 
which impair their ability to efficiently attend, organize, and actively retain 
visuospatial information (see fig. 33 and Table 5: Executive Impairments).  
 
Rey Complex Figure Task 
The most common measure of visuospatial memory performance in OCD is 
the Rey Complex Figure Test (RCFT: Osterrieth, 1944). First, participants are 
presented with the Rey Complex Figure (RCF) that they draw immediately 
without distraction revealing their ability to copy/encode. Then, distractor tasks 
are completed and after 3 min they recall the RCF, which provides a measure 
of immediate recall. Next, more distractor tasks are completed and after 30 
min they again re-draw the RCF as a measure of delayed recall. Finally, 
twenty-four figures are presented and the participant has to identify twelve 
that belong to the RCF from twelve that do not, serving as a measure of 
recognition (Segalas et al., 2008). Chiulli et al. (1995) highlighted the 
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functional distinctions of the RCFT: (1) Copy: perceptual, visuospatial, and 
organizational, (2) Immediate recall: amount and quality of information 
encoding, and (3) Delayed recall: amount and quality of information stored 
and retrieved from episodic memory.  
 
Savage et al. (1999; and Deckersbach et al., 2000; Penades et al., 2005; 
Savage et al., 2000; Segalas et al., 2008; see also Martinot et al., 1990) 
reported intact copy but impaired immediate and delayed performance in 
OCD patients. Preserved copy performance and no additional loss of 
information between the immediate and delayed conditions indicated that 
memory capacity (see also Penades et al., 2005 who reported intact memory 
for faces) did not moderate memory performance. Rather, Savage et al. 
(1999; and Savage et al., 2000; Penades et al., 2005) suggested that poor 
use of organizational strategies during the copy condition mediated 
performance in the immediate recall condition. A point supported by  Savage 
et al. (1999) who observed that OCD patients are more likely to attend to 
details and less likely to shift their attention to larger RCFT components 
compared to controls (see also Shin et al., 2004). Furthermore, Penades et al. 
(2005) highlighted that obsessional severity was associated with greater 
impairments in organizational strategies and immediate recall. This suggests 
that unnecessary attention to detail (E: organization, set-shifting = longer copy 
times on RCFT; focusing on details over whole) interferes with early encoding 
(i.e., fragmentation in EB) which impairs memory (B and L) and possibly plays 
a role in obsessional symptoms. 
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Figure 34. Positioning of deficient visuospatial (light gray text) RCFT (black text) 
studies within the EBL Classification. The scale has been adjusted to allow clearer 
representation of visuospatial memory studies. To minimise cluttering we have used 
a shaded area to indicate the dimensional location of the RCFT studies that reported 
OCD impairments at the level of encoding and/or recall and/or recognition.  
No Group Differences in RCFT Performance 
Simpson et al. (2006) proposed that depression and/or between study ratio 
differences in executive dysfunction may explain a failure to report OCD 
RCFT memory impairments. Both of these fit the current EBL explanation in 
that performance differences between studies are attributable to the 
respective executive deficits of the OCD group tested: (1) Depression: Moritz 
et al. (2003) reported that OCD patients with higher comorbid depression 
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forgot more RCFT information between copying and delayed recall compared 
to those with lower depression scores. They concluded that memory 
dysfunctions in OCD are moderated by comorbid depression a finding also 
supported by Segalas et al. (2008). However, Rampacher et al. (2010) 
proposed that organizational impairments were specific to OCD and not to 
major depressive disorders but did concede that depression may aggravate 
existing deficits in OCD. (2) Sub-group Ratios: Cha et al. (2008) found that a 
predominantly checking OCD subgroup had poorer immediate and delayed 
recall compared to cleaners and controls (also observed by Jang et al., 2010), 
which conforms to our notion of checking compulsions as the primary source 
of executive deficits. In sum, a specific type of executive dysfunction is 
required to observe a memory impairment, one that is predominant in one 
OCD sub-group (checkers) but generally absent in another (cleaners), which 
may be aggravated by comorbid depression, and possibly influenced by age 
of onset (Hwang et al., 2007; Roth et al., 2005). 
 
RCFT and Pharmacological and Psychological Interventions 
Kim et al. (2002) examined OCD patients on the RCFT (among other tests) 
before and after a 4-month period of pharmacological treatment. At baseline 
OCD patients had similar copy- but impaired immediate and delayed recall 
compared to controls. Despite a significant improvement of immediate recall 
from baseline to follow-up, they remained significantly impaired compared to 
controls (see also Rao et al., 2008; Roh et al., 2005). These studies indicate 
that certain executive and non-verbal deficits are stable and possibly 
candidate endophenotype markers for OCD (see Bannon et al., 2006; 
Chamberlain et al., 2005; Rao et al., 2008) resisting pharmacological 
treatment. Psychological interventions which either implicitly (i.e., cognitive-
behavior therapy; Kuelz et al., 2006) or explicitly (i.e., cognitive retraining; 
Buhlmann et al., 2006; Park et al., 2006) targeted organizational strategies 
have been associated with improvements on RCFT memory performance and 
obsessional severity in OCD (i.e., Park et al., 2006). This highlights that not 
only is executive efficiency (E) malleable to intervention by improving how 
patients encode (integrated B = low L) information in memory (see fig. 28B) 
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(see also Buhlmann et al., 2006) but it can also attenuate symptom severity. 
 
Summary of RCFT OCD performance 
The RCFT is a task with the following EBL requirements that make OCD 
deficits very likely: (1) Executive-Functioning: For the RCFT, OCD patients 
show consistent executive impairments (E) in: (1) organization during early 
encoding, (2) attention to details over the whole and (3) shifting cognitive set 
from details to the whole. A failure to reveal OCD impairments on the RCFT is 
likely due to the tested OCD group not having a sufficient number of executive 
impaired patients, e.g., more cleaners than checkers (see Cha et al., 2008). 
(2) Binding Complexity: successful memory of multiple geometric shapes 
relies on binding. This occurs at the level of within-object binding (i.e., sides of 
triangle in bottom left corner) and between-object binding, where veridicality 
depends on the correct binding of parts in space relative to other parts (i.e., 
position of circle with 3 dots within triangle). Thus, poor executive functioning 
interferes with the veridicality of multiple RCF bindings (B) in encoding, WM 
maintenance and LTM. (3) Load: load in the RCFT depends on the executive 
efficiency and binding complexity, in other words, the ability to chunk the 
complex figure into manageable sub-parts. For OCD patients, executive 
impairments (E) increase the load (L) and the binding complexity (B) of the 
RCF in memory (see fig. 28B). 
 
6.7. Comparing EBL system to other models in the OCD literature 
The EBL classification system allowed us to explain, in a unified manner, how 
executive impairments observed in OCD/checking tend to impair memory 
when the EB is extensively relied upon. However, we are aware that our EBL 
classification system is primarily cognitive in nature, which poses the 
question: How does it relate to alternative and more phenomenogical 
explanations of OCD symptoms in general and of memory impairments in 
particular? 
 
Salkovskis (1999) provided one of the most influential models of OCD 
suggesting an integrated relationship between a number of variables. In the 
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most general sense, this model saw early experiences and critical incidents 
as primers for the development of faulty assumptions and general beliefs. In 
turn, this motivates intrusive thoughts, images, urges and doubt which induce 
a misinterpretation of the personal significance of these intrusions. This 
misinterpretation is then maintained by an array of factors such as attention 
and reasoning biases, mood changes, counterproductive safety strategies, 
and neutralising actions. These then feed back into the maintenance and 
shaping of existent and future intrusive thoughts. Within this 
phenomenological model of OCD the cognitive EBL factors we propose fall 
into the category of ‘attention and reasoning biases’, while our account exactly 
specifies the executive mechanisms that have distractibility/biases as origin 
and memory impairment as effect. Compared to Salkovskis’ model, we argue 
for a more direct relationship between executive-memory impairments (as 
understood in the EBL system) and the content of obsessional thinking. The 
findings that executive functioning (i.e., ‘E’: organization) was associated with 
memory performance (for visuospatial stimuli high in ‘B’, see: Penades et al., 
2005; and ‘L’, see: van der Wee et al., 2007) and severity of symptoms in 
OCD supports this assertion (see Tallis et al., 1999; Park et al., 2006). We 
suggest that critical incidents/early experiences/personal dispositions likely 
prime executive/attentional impairments to become operant when faced with 
an internal and/or external stimulus/intrusion associated with the original 
incident. For example, a childhood incident of burning oneself with an iron 
may manifest subsequently as an attentional bias to irons and/or checking 
that they are ‘OFF.’ 
 
The role of inflated personal responsibility (i.e., preventing harms to others) 
has been identified as important in models of checking and impaired memory 
(Rachman, 2002; Rachman et al., 1995). In the simplest interpretation, 
Rachman (2002) proposed that responsibility influences perceptions of harm, 
increasing anxiety and neutralising checking attempts. However, checking 
only serves to increase responsibility and impair memory, which leads 
checkers to believe that their behaviours are out of control. A likely 
consequence would be increased attention to aspects of a memory 
representation which are deemed relevant or possibly neutralising to the 
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perceived responsibility/threat. However, as we saw in our work (Exp. 1 of 
Harkin, Rutherford, & Kessler, 2011) and others’ (e.g., Savage et al., 1999), 
this could result in a narrow focus on specific stimulus details or deficient 
suppression of distracting thoughts/stimuli, which in any case comes at a cost 
for memory accuracy.  
 
Van den Hout and Kindt (2003a) validated their OCD-memory model using 
the remember/know distinction. They showed that repetitively checking the 
same stimulus resulted in a shift in the nature of their memory recollections 
from being detailed and vivid (‘remember’ judgment) to being hazy, indefinite 
and unclear (‘know’ judgment). While the authors reported the outcome of 
checking, the exact mechanism of memory changes was not stated. A more 
specific indication of the mechanism underlying checking-related memory 
impairment was revealed by Radomsky and Alcolado (2010). They asked 
participants to mentally check (“…imagine your hand manipulating the knobs”; 
p.347) and then recall “Which three knobs did you check on the last trial?” 
(p.347). Those who engaged in mental checking were significantly less 
accurate than those who did not mentally check. The unnecessary mental 
manipulation and increased complexity (i.e., imagining your hand when it is 
not needed) caused by mental checking (E) likely interferes with the 
veridicality of knob-to-stove bindings (high in ‘B’) maintained in the EB.  
 
More specifically, Ferreri, Lapp, and Peretti (2011) proposed that cognitive 
dysfunction in OCD (and in anxiety disorders in general) could be classified 
into four domains: (1) executive functioning (primarily attention), (2) memory 
(WM, episodic, autobiographical), (3) maladaptive cognitions (thoughts and 
beliefs), and (4) metacognitions (thoughts and beliefs about thoughts and 
beliefs). We suggest that our EBL system helps integrate the first two 
domains: primary executive dysfunction results in secondary memory 
impairment. In turn, we have previously proposed (Harkin & Kessler, 2009) 
that self-awareness (metacognition) of repeated loss of accuracy may 
decrease confidence in memory and increase the likelihood and strength of 
misleading intrusive thoughts (maladaptive cognitions) which would then be 
harder to ignore. This was supported by a recent study (Harkin, Rutherford, & 
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Kessler, 2011), where we found a metacognitive deficit specific to high 
checkers (i.e., a dissociation between accuracy and confidence in a baseline 
condition). We do accept that the direction of causality between memory and 
metacognition is intricate and likely differs from patient to patients, i.e., poor 
memory results in reduced confidence in those memories or alternatively poor 
confidence motivates checking, which we have seen impairs memory. Thus, 
we argue that our EBL system not only complements the models of Salkoskis 
(1999), Rachman (2002; Rachman et al., 1995) and van den Hout and Kindt 
(2003a) and the classification proposed by Ferreri et al. (2011) but also 
provides a more specific and stringent cognitive framework for explaining and 
predicting executive-memory impairments in OCD.  
 
6.8. Limitations of the EBL classification system 
We highlight the following limitations to the EBL classification system. First, it 
is a good fit for OCD patients with prominent checking cognitions/behaviors, 
but appears not to describe symptoms such as cleaning or hoarding. We 
propose that if the EBL factors are sufficiently stressed (as discussed above) 
then memory impairment could be observed in symptoms other than 
checking. However, we do concur that due to the specific impairments (i.e., 
inhibition; Omori et al., 2007) and cognitive habits (i.e., iteratively checking the 
contents of memory, perseveration) associated with checking, this symptom is 
the most likely to affect executive functions that lie at the core of the EBL 
system. Second, we do not make many solid conclusions regarding the 
relationship between the EBL and confidence in memory. Whereby, poor 
confidence may be a general factor – tightly linked to anxiety – which 
increases the likelihood that executive dysfunction will impair memory for 
tasks which load high on B and/or L dimensions. Alternatively or in addition, 
executive-memory impairment may result in poorer memory confidence which 
then motivates detrimental checking and/or obsessional thinking. Third, we 
make no comment on the reviewed studies with respect to general cognitive 
abilities like intelligence. However, we agree with the extensive OCD literature 
review of Kuelz et al. (2004) – which covered many of the papers we 
examined – who stated that: “It is well established today that general 
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intelligence is not affected in OCD” (p. 223). Finally, these limitations highlight 
the necessity for future experimental research to see if the EBL system does 
accurately predict where memory impairment will and will not occur. 
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6.9. Conclusions 
This review reconciles inconsistent findings as to memory deficits in OCD by 
suggesting that the classic view in terms of modality-specific (verbal vs. 
visuospatial) deficits and/or general capacity issues might not be the optimal 
way of conceiving of the problem, while we propose to follow and extend the 
more recent argument that OCD memory impairments are secondary to 
executive dysfunction. Using our research as a basis, we argue that memory 
impairments occur when: (1) a task taps into executive deficits of 
OCD/checkers, and (2) accurate memory performance requires attention-
dependent maintenance of bindings and/or the task has high encoding load. 
Thus, executive dysfunction interferes with the accurate maintenance of 
complex bindings and/or fails to reduce load, impairing memory. From this we 
propose the EBL classification system, which comprises executive functioning 
(E), binding complexity (B) and memory load (L) as central dimensions for 
understanding and predicting OCD memory impairments. This challenges the 
importance of the modality-specific view, i.e., the visuospatial- vs. verbal-
memory distinction, in two important ways. First, impairments are thought to 
be determined primarily by poor executive functioning (E) and then by the 
content of the task. Second, visuospatial- compared to verbal stimulus content 
inherently possesses different resource requirements that are best conceived 
of as binding- and load-requirements. 
 
In support of this challenge, we reviewed 58 findings across 46 studies. First, 
we observed that for visuospatial as well as for verbal tasks with low EBL 
scores, no OCD memory impairments were observed compared to controls. 
Second, tasks that steadily increased load (visuospatial: n-back task) or 
employed a high inherent load (verbal: CVLT) revealed OCD memory 
impairment, as the patients’ executive deficits failed to match the task 
demands at higher load levels. Hence, across verbal and visuospatial tasks it 
is poor executive functioning that cannot cope with increasing cognitive 
demands that differentiates OCD memory performance from controls. 
However, we did suggest that default differences in EBL scores of verbal 
compared to visuospatial tasks make OCD memory impairments more likely 
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in the latter (see fig. 28A vs. 28B). Verbal tasks, generally, present verbal 
information in a format (stories, word lists that benefit from semantic 
clustering) that are high in load but low in binding complexity. In this case, 
performance is benefited by efficient executive processes that utilize existing 
representations in LTM, i.e., chunking according to categories reduces 
memory load. In contrast, basic visuospatial tasks, especially when random 
locations are employed, are usually less supported by LTM knowledge, so 
strategic executive organizing must cope with binding complexity and/or load 
even at low demands. This increases the number of dimensions (3 in 
visuospatial, i.e. EBL; vs. 2 in verbal, i.e. EL) where OCD memory 
impairments can occur, making visuospatial impairments more likely than 
verbal.  
 
For tasks that are high in binding complexity (memory for actions, Trail-
Making Task, Benton Visual Retention Task, Figural Fluency, Recurring 
Figures Test, Rey Complex Figure Task) consistent OCD impairments were 
observed across a range of measures. This can be simply surmised as an 
inability to organize complex visuospatial information in a manner to benefit 
early encoding, immediate and delayed recall and recognition. For example, 
in the case of RCFT performance in OCD, poor executive functioning (E) fails 
to reduce the load (L) by means of strategic organization, which in turn 
reduces the veridicality of multiple bindings (B) of the RCF representation in 
memory. Such a representation based on loosely interconnected feature 
assemblies is not only more difficult to accurately copy and recall than a 
tightly structured one, but it also places additional strain upon executive 
processes during maintenance, which are already operating sub-optimally. 
Further extrapolating these arguments to future studies, tasks that require 
complex binding of multiple and multimodal features (as in our recent studies) 
are also likely to tap into OCD-specific deficits due to sub-optimal executive 
organization of input and deficient ‘protection’ during maintenance. 
 
The central role of executive dysfunction was further supported by the finding 
that targeting executive processes in OCD patients with therapeutic 
intervention not only reduces obsessional symptoms but also improves 
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memory performance. We take this as evidence of a link between executive 
and memory impairments, anxiety, and the development of obsessions (e.g., 
doubt and uncertainty; “Did I turn the stove off?”) and neutralizing 
compulsions (e.g., checking to compensate for poor memory and high 
anxiety). Finally, we propose that our explanation complements existing OCD 
models by specifying essential cognitive mechanisms, which will hopefully 
help guiding future research. 
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7. Conclusion: Overview, clinical implications, limitations and future 
research, and contribution to OCD memory research  
A summary of the main findings for Experiments 1-9 is provided in Table 11. It 
highlights the primary experimental manipulations, how high checkers’ WM 
performance faired with respect to the strong (high checkers’ memory 
impaired in misleading trials) or weak hypothesis (high checkers’ memory 
impaired after misleading and resolvable trials), and the main confidence 
findings. We review the main findings from our experiments, followed by the 
possible role of executive-memory impairments in the development and the 
maintenance of obsessions and compulsions (see fig. 33). We then highlight 
the limitations of the research and the solutions to these through future 
research. 
 
7.1. Working memory and inhibitory performance of checkers 
The present WM tasks placed an emphasis on the veridical binding of letters-
to-locations (Exp. 1-5), ‘ON/OFF’ states-to-appliances (Exp. 8) and 
appliances-to-locations (Exp. 9). Accurate memory performance required that 
attention be allocated to such bindings in a cognitive resource which Baddeley 
(2000) referred to as the EB. This buffer provided a pragmatic solution to 
manner in which the cognitive system bound information from different 
modalities (i.e., a visual letter presented a location in space) into a coherent 
representation. However, it does come with a cost: Attention (automatic or 
controlled) is required for the veridical maintenance of bindings in the EB, 
which implies that interfering with this attention (i.e., away from bindings) will 
reduce the veridicality of those bindings and impair memory (see fig. 1). Due 
to differences in the content of the encoding set stimuli (Exp. 1-5: non-
threatening letters versus Exp. 8 & 9: electrical kitchen appliances) between 
experiments, we present the results separately for those which employed 
letters in locations (Exp. 1-5) and ecologically valid stimuli (Exp. 6-9). 
 
7.1.1. Letters in locations: Experiments 1-5 
In our original experiments 1, 2 and the extreme meta-comparison we 
provided support to the strong hypothesis as high checkers’ WM impairments
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Task Stimuli: Letters in Locations Ecologically Valid Stimuli 
Task Type: Working Memory Inhibition of Return Working Memory 
Key Task 
Elements: Simple 
Colour 
Added 
Visuospatial 
Distractor 
Eye-Tracker 
(Similar 
method to 
Exp. 1 & 2) 
Classic 
IOR Cue 
Novel ‘ON’ 
Cue ON/OFF P2 
Location 
P2 
Experiment 
Number/Type: Exp. 1 Exp. 2 
Extreme 
Comparison Exp. 3 Exp. 4 Exp. 5 Task 6 Task 7 Exp. 8 Exp. 9 
LC check score 
(mean/SD)  
1.11(1.10) 
[n=20] 
1.05(1.18) 
[n=20] 
0.5(0.71) 
[n=10] 
1.74(1.69) 
[n=20] 
0.89(1.15) 
[n=20] 
0.7(0.9) 
[n=17] 0.31(0.48) [n=50] 
0.5(0.61) 
[n=20] 
0.0(0.0) 
[n=20] 
HC check score 
(mean/SD): 
9.53(5.49) 
[n=20] 
8.65(3.7) 
[n=20] 
15.8(5.32) 
[n=10] 
12.57(5.96) 
[n=20] 
10.48(5.96) 
[n=20] 
12.7(5.8) 
[n=18] 13.78(5.55) [n=52] 
13.85(4.12) 
[n=20] 
13.75(6.16) 
[n=20] 
LC vs. HC: 
Primary 
Attention/Memory 
Finding: 
HC poorer 
memory in 
misleading 
trials vs. LC 
HC poorer 
memory in 
misleading 
trials vs. 
LC 
HC poorer 
memory in 
misleading 
trials vs. LC 
HC poorer 
memory in 
misleading for 
correct P2 vs. 
LC 
HC poorer 
memory for 
misleading & 
resolvable 
trials vs. LC 
HC make more 
fixations during 
misleading trials 
at empty 
locations 
HC (and 
LC) had 
normal IOR 
effects 
HC 
attenuated 
IOR for ON 
cues vs. LC 
HC poorer 
memory for 
ON/OFF 
states vs. LC 
HC poorer 
memory in 
misleading 
trials vs. LC 
Hypothesis 
Supported: Strong Strong Strong Strong Weak Strong Data N/A Data N/A Weak Strong 
LC vs. HC: 
Primary 
Confidence 
Finding: 
HC meta-
cognitive 
impairment 
vs. LC. 
Enhanced in 
misleading 
trials 
No group 
difference 
No group 
difference 
HC meta-
cognitive 
impairment vs. 
LC. Moderated 
by Inter P1 
Strong HC 
meta-cognitive 
impairment  
vs. LC 
No group 
difference Data N/A Data N/A 
HC meta-
cognitive 
impairment 
vs. LC 
Strong HC 
meta-
cognitive 
impairment 
vs. LC 
Table 11. Overview of the main results for experiments 1 to 9 as divided by the stimuli used (letters vs. ecologically valid stimuli), type of 
experiment (WM vs. IOR), and key task elements. The results concentrate on WM/IOR performance and confidence of high checkers 
compared to low checkers. N/A Data = No data was taken with respect to this variable. 
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were specific to a misleading but not a resolvable context (Harkin & Kessler, 
2009). The replication of our findings in Experiment 2 and the extreme group 
meta-comparison speak to the robustness of our findings. Critically, the only 
difference between misleading and resolvable trials was the absence or 
presence of the Probe-1 letter in the encoding set, respectively. When 
confronted by a misleading mismatch high checkers appear to be unable to 
ignore it and so unnecessarily and fruitlessly search those letters presently 
maintained within WM. This assertion is supported by the observation that 
OCD checkers are poorer at tolerating uncertainty (i.e., misleading probe-1 
letter) than OCD non-checkers and controls (Tolin, Woods, & Abramowitz, 
2003), and that an inability to tolerate uncertainty is associated with 
subsequent checking and repeating rituals (Lind & Boschen, 2009; Tolin, 
Woods, & Abramowitz, 2003). The resultant search and/or competition 
between a strong, visually present misleading letter to fragile letter-location 
representations in the EB likely impairs attention directed to those bindings, 
impairing memory. The extreme group meta-comparison provides evidence 
that the same misleading specific WM impairment was present in subclinical 
checkers who scored in the clinical range and that this impairment was 
numerically larger. This indicates that there may be a relationship between 
severity of checking symptoms and extent of WM impairment (see Omori et 
al., 2007). High checkers’ performance was intact on no-probe-1 trials proving 
that basic WM capacity was in this case intact. 
 
Experiments 3 and 4 were a direct attempt to further target and interfere with 
the fragile bindings maintained within the EB especially in high checkers 
(Harkin & Kessler, 2011a). Experiment 3 increased the load of the encoding 
set by adding the additional binding of colour to letters. The intermediate 
Probe-1 then asked for the colour of a letter which was either misleading or 
resolvable. The results indicated that we may have induced a degree of 
checking in all participants which possibly obscured the clear-cut WM 
impairments observed in the previous experiments. Despite this and in 
support of the strong hypothesis: High checkers had WM impairments in the 
most difficult memory condition (correctly located Probe-2 letters) in 
misleading trials. This indicates that the inability of high checkers to ignore 
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misleading trials was still sufficient to result in WM impairment specific to this 
condition relative to low checkers. Again, no group differences on no-probe-1 
trials were observed. Experiment 4 presented a strong visuospatial distractor 
at a misleading and resolvable location. Therefore, in accord with the weaker 
hypothesis high checkers’ WM was impaired in both conditions indicating that 
a visuospatial distractor generally impaired high but not low checkers’ 
attention to bindings. WM performance in baseline conditions again proved to 
be intact. 
 
Experiment 5 measured eye movements in a slightly modified version of our 
original WM task (Exp. 1 and 2). This was a direct attempt to show that 
checkers’ inhibitory impairments for misleading information result in them 
searching the contents of WM. In line with our strong hypothesis, high 
checkers made more fixations during the presentation of a misleading 
intermediate Probe-1 compared to low checkers. Further analysis revealed 
that in misleading trials high checkers fixated longer on empty encoded set 
locations, in comparison to resolvable trials and low checkers (Harkin, Miellet, 
& Kessler, subm). This provides evidence that checkers’ inhibitory 
impairments do in fact lead them to check the contents of WM in a manner 
which is unnecessary (misleading trials) and uninformative (empty locations). 
Importantly, allowing high checkers to self-terminate the intermediate Probe-1 
appears to have reversed their WM impairments which were previously 
observed when the intermediate probe terminated automatically (Exp. 1-4). 
These findings are comparable to research which has reported intact WM 
performance despite abnormal brain functioning in OCD participants 
(Ciesielski et al., 2007; Henseler et al., 2008). Further, high checkers’ intact 
WM performance across resolvable, misleading and no-probe-1 trials again 
indicates that basic WM capacity is preserved. 
 
7.1.2. Ecologically valid stimuli: Tasks 6-7 and Experiments 8-9 
We then employed ecologically valid stimuli (electrical kitchen appliances) in a 
novel inhibition of return (IOR; Posner & Snyder, 1975) and WM tasks to 
address two central limitations identified in the previous experiments. First, 
while we inferred that high checkers’ WM (Exp. 1-4) and eye movements 
   157 
(Exp. 5) was attributable to their inhibitory impairments, we were aware that 
this conclusion would be strengthened by explicit evidence of this. Second, 
despite letters in locations producing robust and replicable results, as stimuli 
they have limited relevance to the actual symptoms of checkers. Indeed, in 
our IOR task we showed that while high checkers’ inhibitory functioning was 
intact (Task 6) it was impaired when attention was drawn to a threatening ‘ON’ 
cue (Task 7). Thus, an inability to disengage attention from a threatening 
feature was sufficient to impair otherwise normal inhibitory control (i.e., IOR). 
In Experiment 8, high checkers were impaired in their ability to correctly recall 
if an appliance had been ‘ON’ of ‘OFF’. This is consistent with the previous 
findings from Task 7: Focused attention to threatening states may interfere 
with the binding of that state to that actual appliance. In contrast, Experiment 
9 produced the more classic WM pattern, where high checkers’ memory 
impairment was more focused to the misleading context. The intact no-probe-
1 performance of high checkers in Experiment 9 (and Exp. 1-5 generally) 
provides important evidence against the argument that a basic capacity 
impairment underlies their general (across resolvable, misleading, no-probe-1 
trials) WM impairment for appliance states observed in Experiment 8. Further, 
a basic impairment in capacity would not have influenced WM capacity in an 
isolated manner (i.e., Exp. 8 only) but would have impaired WM performance 
across all conditions and experiments (Exp. 1-7). 
 
 
 
 
7.2. Confidence 
Confidence responses revealed a mixed pattern across the present WM 
experiments (see Table 11). In a manner consistent with a large body of 
literature (for review see Woods et al., 2002), high checkers have a general 
task independent impairment in their confidence (Exp. 4 and 9). However, a 
misleading context appears to further attenuate their already inferior 
confidence (Exp. 1), perhaps as the result of the uncertainty and checking 
which arises in this condition (Exp. 5). The complex nature of high checkers 
confidence is further reflected in Experiment 3, where the removal of no-
probe-1 trials from the statistical analysis increased the magnitude of 
difference between groups, with high checkers having poorer confidence 
across conditions (resolvable and misleading) compared to low checkers. This 
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also indicates that in this experiment, for no-probe-1 trials, high checkers have 
comparable confidence to that of low checkers. These divergent findings may 
be explained by the different type of confidence responses used between 
experiments. For example, confidence responses were provided in the 
following manners: (1) Experiments 1-4: on a scale ranging from 1 (totally 
confident) to 6 (totally not-confident), (2) Experiments 5 and 8: used a binary 
response option for confident versus not-confident and (3) Experiment 9 used 
a quantitative scale ranging from 1 (totally not-confident) to 100 (totally 
confident). Furthermore, Experiments 1-5 and 8 used keyboard responses 
while Experiment 9 required the participant to make their response by shifting 
their hand from the keyboard to a mouse. Therefore, the absence and 
presence of general confidence impairment is more likely due to the use of 
the binary/keyboard response option in Experiment 8 as compared to the 
quantitative/mouse option in Experiment 9. In addition, using a 0-100 scale in 
Experiment 9 provided the option of calculating sensitive confidence-accuracy 
correlations which were not available with the confidence response options 
used in the other experiments (1-5 & 8). Therefore, in our future research we 
will continue to use the 1-100 scale as it is flexible to different statistical 
designs and more sensitive to between group differences than the other 
measure employed. 
 
7.2.1. An intricate relationship between working memory performance and 
confidence 
The relationship between WM performance and confidence in high checkers 
is both delicate and complex. High checkers suffer from inhibitory deficits 
which in the correct experimental/environmental circumstances impair their 
memory. They also appear to ‘carry-around’ a task-independent 
metacognitive impairment, which potentially primes them to question their 
memories, actions, and thoughts in relation to stimuli/activities that are 
concordant with their symptoms (Exp. 5 & 9). An absence of a general 
impairment in WM capacity (i.e., intact no-probe-1 trials), argues against the 
idea that poor memory explicitly mediates confidence. Rather, in specific 
circumstances, high checkers’ dysfunctional inhibitory control attenuates a 
general metacognitive impairment which was reflected in their poorer 
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confidence when preceded by a misleading (Exp. 1) or intermediate probe 
(i.e., Exp. 3). However, the direction and strength of causality between 
inhibitory dysfunction and confidence is unclear and highlights an interesting 
avenue for future research 
 
7.3. Clinical implications of checkers’ executive and working memory 
impairments 
From the executive and WM impairments identified in Experiments 1-9 and 
the EBL (Executive Functioning, Binding Complexity, Memory Load) 
classification system (see Section 6), we propose a model (see fig. 27) where 
primary executive dysfunction and secondary memory impairment potentially 
plays a role in the development and maintenance of obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms. For example, in Task 7, high checkers were less able to 
disengage their attention from a threatening ‘ON’ cue to the detriment of 
normal inhibitory functioning (Task 6). In a related manner, Experiment 8 
showed that high checkers were generally impaired in their ability to 
accurately recall the state (‘ON’ or ‘OFF) of an electrical kitchen appliance. 
Combined, the results of Task 7 and Experiment 8 indicate that high checkers 
suffer from a primary executive dysfunction in disengaging their attention from 
threatening states which results in secondary memory impairment by 
impairing state-appliance bindings within the EB. In turn, this poor memory will 
likely evoke a degree of anxiety and doubt regarding its original status which 
will increase the likelihood of intrusive obsessions (“Did I turn it OFF?”) and 
neutralizing checking compulsions (cognitive: checking the contents of WM; 
behavioural: physically checking if it was ‘ON’ or ‘OFF’). This is supported by 
the finding that mental and physical checking of electrical stoves impaired 
memory of the actual knobs checked on the last trial (Radomsky & Alcolado, 
2010). This suggests that if executive-memory impairment plays a key role in 
the development of obsessions and compulsions then targeting executive-
memory dysfunction should necessarily reduce the frequency and severity of 
obsessions and compulsions. Indeed, a body of evidence from the anxiety 
literature indicates that targeting and reducing attentional biases (i.e., 
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executive functioning efficiency) to threat also attenuated anxiety levels (Amir, 
Najmi, & Morrison, 2009; Eldar & Bar-Haim, 2010; Schmidt et al., 2009).  
 
Furthermore, within this model we highlight three important points regarding 
executive impairments. Firstly, while inhibition, set-shifting, organization and 
attention is the primary executive impairments observed in OCD (see Table 4 
in EBL) this is by no means an exhaustive list. This is supported by Miyake et 
al. (2000) who reported that while inhibition, set-shifting and updating were 
relatively independent constructs, they were interconnected in terms of their 
unified reliance upon the attentional resources of the central executive. The 
identification of these executive constructs supports the executive-memory 
link proposed here, whereby an inability to ignore irrelevant stimuli will 
potentially reduce the attention allocated to the concurrent updating of 
information presently maintained in the EB of WM. Secondly, executive 
impairments do not operate in isolation, for example, dysfunctional 
organization (whole-object vs. parts) will influence attentional focus (broad vs. 
narrow, respectively). Finally, we argue that executive impairments are state-
like and situationally dependent compared to obsessions and compulsions 
which once established become increasingly trait-like and stable in nature. 
Thus, while executive dysfunction is consistently observed in OCD (e.g., 
Bannon, Gonsalvez, & Croft, 2008), they only impair memory in a specific 
combination of EBL scores (see fig. 27, 28A, 28B) when confronted with 
stimuli/situations which are concordant with their primary symptoms. 
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EPISODIC LTM 
(Memorizing stove 
states over long-term)  
CENTRAL 
EXECUTIVE 
EPISODIC BUFFER  
(Binding of stove 
burners + knobs to 
on/off codes 
/letters to locations) 
Attention  Set-Shifting Organisation 
- Hyper 
Rehearsal/Checking 
Control 
- Poor at Shifting Cognitive-Set 
from Distracting/Misleading/Details  
To Relevant/Global Information  
Inhibition 
- Lack of Suppression of 
Distracting/Misleading 
Information 
- Inefficient Encoding of 
Complex (Bias for Details 
over Global) Information 
- Comparison of 
External/Internal 
Stimuli/Thoughts to 
those in WM 
- Competition between 
Irrelevant and Relevant 
Stimuli/Thoughts in WM 
-  Overrepresentation of 
Distracting/Misleading/Details in 
WM Compared to 
Relevant/Global Information 
-  Inefficient (independent 
features) Representation of 
Object in Memory 
- Less Accurate 
Bindings Underlying 
Initial Stimulus Input 
 
ANXIETY PROVOKING 
STIMULUS INPUT (Stove) 
- Inaccurate Memory 
Representation 
 
- Anxiety & 
Doubt 
Regarding 
Initial 
Stimulus 
Input and 
induced by 
Distractions 
OBSESSIONS 
“Did I turn the oven off? If I 
forget it will burn the house 
down!” 
COMPULSIONS 
Check to neutralize 
ANXIETY and POOR 
MEMORY/DOUBT 
 
Figure 33. A proposed perspective, based on the original Harkin and Kessler model (2009), on how executive impairments of organization, 
attention, inhibition and set-shifting interfere with episodic buffer functionality (i.e., binding) impairing memory. From this anxiety and doubt 
develop with respect to the original memory which increases the likelihood of obsessions (e.g., “Did I turn the iron off?”) and subsequent 
futile compulsions to neutralize anxiety and to overcome poor memory. Further explanations provided in the text. 
Executive Deficits Activated in Specific Contexts (Stove/Threatening ‘ON’ states) 
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7.4. Limitations and future research 
We now identify the limitations to the present research and, when appropriate, 
propose solutions to these problems in future research. Firstly, high checkers 
were selected from a subclinical sample which possibly limits the extent of the 
conclusions that can be drawn with respect to clinical OCD checkers. 
However, the extreme group meta-comparison employed high checkers which 
scored in the clinical range (15.8) on the checking subscale of the VOCI (see 
Thordarson et al., 2004). In this case, the magnitude of high checkers 
misleading specific WM impairment was increased, suggesting that the WM 
performance of subclinical and clinical scoring checkers was quantitatively 
analogous. Further, in Experiments 3, and 5-9 high checkers had a mean 
checking score which was in the range of the checking score for OCD 
patients. The high checking groups in this case were comparable to clinical 
checking and OCD which further substantiates any conclusions we draw with 
respect to clinical checking patients. Further, using subclinical checkers from 
an undergraduate sample likely removes confounding factors such as 
medication and comorbidity that is likely present in clinical groups (Mataix-
Cols et al., 1997; 1999a). Future research can easily address this by 
employing the present WM and IOR tasks in clinical patient groups. Secondly, 
across the experiments there was no measurement of anxiety, depression or 
an independent cognitive index of WM functioning and so we cannot exclude 
the role of group differences in these areas to the current findings. The first 
two points are presently addressed in the latest version of our WM task series 
where we explicitly measure anxiety and depression with the state-trait 
anxiety inventory (Spielberger et al., 1983) and Beck Depression Inventory 
(Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996), respectively. This latter criticism will be 
addressed in upcoming research where OCD patients will complete the 
Raven’s Progressive Matrices (Raven, Raven, & Court, 2004) as an 
independent test of WM functioning. Thirdly, a criticism of the first 5 
experiments was that letters in locations were not concordant with the primary 
symptoms of checkers. This was addressed by using ecologically valid 
electrical kitchen appliances in the subsequent IOR (Task 6 & 7) and WM 
(Exp. 8 & 9) experiments. A subsequent limitation was the electrical kitchen 
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appliances were not appraised by individual participants and therefore 
differences in perceived threat of low and high checkers is unknown. 
However, as high checkers impaired inhibitory functioning was specific to 
Task 7, this suggests that an unpredictive ‘ON’ cue was sufficiently 
threatening for high checkers to interfere with otherwise normal inhibitory 
functioning (Task 6). Indeed, these effects occurred by using stimuli that were 
general (i.e., present on checking subscale of VOCI) to the symptoms of 
checking despite them not being idiographically selected or appraised. This 
suggests allowing for the idiographic selection of visual stimuli relevant to the 
symptoms of each individual high checker would possibly produce greater 
IOR and WM impairments than presently observed. Alternatively, we would 
have expected larger effects if we had used checkers whose concerns were 
only for electrical appliance. Finally, related to the second and third limitation, 
the focus on checking limits the conclusions to this subgroup. An interesting 
avenue of future research would be to see if the WM performance of OCD 
washers is in the same or opposite direction to that observed for checkers. 
The body of evidence shows that domain specific checking impairs memory in 
that domain. Whereas, in contrast, as washers do not have the same 
cognitive impairments as checkers they may actually show a memory 
advantage for stimuli (i.e., dirty hands, washing paraphernalia) relevant to 
their symptoms in a group general or idiographic fashion. If so, this would 
provide a possible indication of the manner in which the divergent WM 
performance of checkers compared to washers contributes to the 
maintenance and development of their unique symptoms. Furthermore, this 
would highlight the need to separately define checkers and washers in 
memory experiments which would otherwise define OCD participants in a 
homogenous manner. This may control for the possibility of producing null 
findings where checkers’ memory impairments and washers’ enhanced 
memory cancel each other out.  
 
7.5. Contribution of present work to OCD memory research 
Contrary to previous research which has concentrated primarily on the 
outcomes of checking, the present research has proposed and supported the 
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actual mechanism of high checkers’ memory impairments. Specifically, that 
bindings maintained within the EB of WM (see Baddeley, 2000) are sensitive 
to interference, thus when attention from bindings is withdrawn, memory is 
impaired. Thus, the present work shows for the first time that checkers 
memory is impaired when the distractor presented is concordant with their 
inhibitory dysfunctions (Exp. 1-4; Harkin & Kessler, 2009, 2011a). Our eye 
movement study further revealed that high checkers only make more fixations 
during misleading trials to empty locations, in comparison to resolvable trials 
and low checkers (Exp. 5; Harkin, Miellet, & Kessler, subm). This is explicit 
evidence that checkers’ inhibitory impairments result in them checking the 
contents of WM at locations where no additional task-relevant information is 
present. Furthermore, checkers appear to suffer from inhibitory (Tasks 7; 
Harkin & Kessler, in press)) and WM impairments (Exp. 8; Harkin, Rutherford 
& Kessler, 2011) for the same threatening feature of an electrical kitchen 
appliance. This indicates that inhibitory impairments for threatening features 
(ON/OFF states) may interfere with their bindings to appliances in the EB of 
WM, thus impairing memory. Thus, we show explicitly that checking impairs 
memory for the very thing (i.e., “Did I turn the iron off?”) that theywant to be 
100% certain of, which likely motivates further checking and memory 
impairment. Furthermore, we also observed our classic WM impairment 
pattern, when high checkers were impaired in recalling the location of an 
electrical kitchen appliance in a misleading context only compared to low 
checkers (Exp. 9). Critically, high checkers’ intact performance on baseline 
no-probe-1 trials allows us to exclude a capacity-based explanation of their 
actual memory impairments. Then using these findings we created a 
systematic classification system based upon Executive Functioning (E), 
Binding Complexity (B) and Memory Load (L) (Harkin & Kessler, 2011b). We 
used this EBL system to clear up an otherwise messy area in OCD memory 
research, which up until this point has erroneously concentrated upon the 
visual-verbal distinction and capacity domain as a means of explaining 
memory performance in OCD. In sum, we use this to highlight the potential 
role that executive-memory impairments play in the development and 
maintenance of obsessive-compulsive symptoms and thus provide an explicit 
target for cognitive interventions to focus upon (see section 7.3. and fig. 33). 
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Thus, not only does this research indicate the actual mechanism (i.e., 
bindings within episodic buffer of WM) of memory impairment in 
checking/OCD but it also provides a research platform (i.e., EBL factors) on 
which base where we will and will not observe memory impairments in OCD 
participants. 
   166 
References 
Abramowitz, J., McKay, D., & Taylor, S. (2005). Special series subtypes of 
obsessive-compulsive disorder. Behavior Therapy, 36(4), 367-369. 
Alcolado, G. M., & Radomsky, A. S. (2011). Believe in yourself: Manipulating 
beliefs about memory causes checking. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 
49(1), 42-49. 
Allen, R. J., Baddeley, A. D., & Hitch, G. J. (2006). Is the binding of visual features 
in working memory resource-demanding? Journal of Experimental 
Psychology-General, 135(2), 298-313. 
Altmann, G. T. M. (2004). Language-mediated eye movements in the absence of a 
visual world: the 'blank screen paradigm'. Cognition, 93(2), B79-B87. 
Amir, N., Najmi, S., & Morrison, A. S. (2009). Attenuation of attention bias in 
obsessive-compulsive disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 47(2), 153-
157. 
Antony, M. M., Downie, F., & Swinson, R. P. (1998). Diagnostic issues and 
epidemiology in obsessive compulsive disorder. In Richard P. Swinson, 
Martin M. Antony, S. Rachman & M. A. Richter (Eds.), Obsessive-compulsive 
disorder: Theory, research, and treatment. (pp. pp3-32.). New York: Guilford 
Press. . 
Awh, E., & Jonides, J. (2001). Overlapping mechanisms of attention and spatial 
working memory. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 5(3), 119-126. 
Baars, B. J. (2002). The conscious access hypothesis: origins and recent evidence. 
Trends Cogn Sci, 6(1), 47-52. 
Baddeley, A. (1966). Short-term memory for word sequences as a function of 
acoustic, semantic and formal similarity. Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 18, 362-365. 
Baddeley, A. (1986). Working Memory. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press. 
Baddeley, A. (2000). The episodic buffer: a new component of working memory? 
Trends Cogn Sci, 4(11), 417-423. 
Baddeley, A. (2003). Working memory: looking back and looking forward. Nat Rev 
Neurosci, 4(10), 829-839. 
Baddeley, A., & Hitch, G. J. (1974). Working Memory. In G. A. Bower (Ed.), The 
Psychology of Learning and Motivation (pp. pp47-89). 
Baddeley, A., Papagno, C., & Vallar, G. (1988). When Long-Term Learning Depends 
on Short-Term Storage. Journal of Memory and Language, 27(5), 586-595. 
Baddeley, A., Vallar, G., & Wilson, B. (1987). Sentence Comprehension and 
Phonological Memory - Some Neuropsychological Evidence. Attention and 
Performance(12), 509-529. 
Bannon, S., Gonsalvez, C. J., & Croft, R. J. (2008). Processing impairments in OCD: 
it is more than inhibition! Behaviour Research and Therapy, 46(6), 689-700. 
Bannon, S., Gonsalvez, C. J., Croft, R. J., & Boyce, P. M. (2006). Executive functions 
in obsessive-compulsive disorder: state or trait deficits? Australian and New 
Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, 40(11-12), 1031-1038. 
Beck, A., Steer, R., & Brown, G. (1996). Manual for Beck Depression Inventory II 
(BDI-II). San Antonio, TX: Psychology Corporation. 
Behrmann, M., Zemel, R. S., & Mozer, M. C. (1998). Object-based attention and 
occlusion: Evidence from normal participants and a computational model. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology-Human Perception and Performance, 
24(4), 1011-1036. 
   167 
Benton, A. L. (1974). The Revised Visual Retention Test Psychological Corporation. 
New York  
Bohne, A., Savage, C. R., Deckersbach, T., Keuthen, N. J., Jenike, M. A., Tuschen-
Caffier, B., et al. (2005). Visuospatial abilities, memory, and executive 
functioning in trichotillomania and obsessive-compulsive disorder. Journal of 
Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology, 27(4), 385-399. 
Boldrini, M., Del Pace, L., Placidi, G. P., Keilp, J., Ellis, S. P., Signori, S., et al. 
(2005). Selective cognitive deficits in obsessive-compulsive disorder 
compared to panic disorder with agoraphobia. Acta Psychiatrica 
Scandinavica, 111(2), 150-158. 
Botvinick, M. M., Braver, T. S., Barch, D. M., Carter, C. S., & Cohen, J. D. (2001). 
Conflict monitoring and cognitive control. Psychological Review, 108(3), 624-
652. 
Braver, T. S., Barch, D. M., Gray, J. R., Molfese, D. L., & Snyder, A. (2001). 
Anterior cingulate cortex and response conflict: Effects of frequency, 
inhibition and errors. Cerebral Cortex, 11(9), 825-836. 
Bruene, M. (2006). The evolutionary psychology of obsessive-compulsive disorder - 
the role of cognitive metarepresentation. Perspectives in Biology and 
Medicine, 49(3), 317-329. 
Buhlmann, U., Deckersbach, T., Engelhard, I., Cook, L. M., Rauch, S. L., Kathmann, 
N., et al. (2006). Cognitive retraining for organizational impairment in 
obsessive-compulsive disorder. Psychiatry Research, 144(2-3), 109-116. 
Cabrera, A. R., McNally, R. J., & Savage, C. R. (2001). Missing the forest for the 
trees? Deficient memory for linguistic gist in obsessive-compulsive disorder. 
Psychological Medicine, 31(6), 1089-1094. 
Cha, K. R., Koo, M.-S., Kim, C.-H., Kim, J. W., Oh, W.-J., Suh, H. S., et al. (2008). 
Nonverbal memory dysfunction in obsessive-compulsive disorder patients 
with checking compulsions. Depression and Anxiety, 25(11), E115-120. 
Chamberlain, S. R., Blackwell, A. D., Fineberg, N. A., Robbins, T. W., & Sahakian, 
B. J. (2006). Strategy implementation in obsessive-compulsive disorder and 
trichotillomania. Psychological Medicine, 36(1), 91-97. 
Chamberlain, S. R., Blackwell, A. D., Fineberg, N. A., Robbins, T. W., & Sahakian, J. 
(2005). The neuropsychology of obsessive compulsive disorder: the 
importance of failures in cognitive and behavioural inhibition as candidate 
endophenotypic markers. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 29(3), 
399-419. 
Chamberlain, S. R., Fineberg, N. A., Menzies, L. A., Blackwell, A. D., Bullmore, E. 
T., Robbins, T. W., et al. (2007). Impaired cognitive flexibility and motor 
inhibition in unaffected first-degree relatives of patients with obsessive-
compulsive disorder. American Journal of Psychiatry, 164(2), 335-338. 
Chamberlain, S. R., & Menzies, L. (2009). Endophenotypes of obsessive-compulsive 
disorder: rationale, evidence and future potential. Expert Rev Neurother, 9(8), 
1133-1146. 
Chiulli, S. J., Haaland, K. Y., Larue, A., & Garry, P. J. (1995). Impact of Age on 
Drawing the Rey-Osterrieth Figure. Clinical Neuropsychologist, 9(3), 219-
224. 
Ciesielski, K. T., Hamalainen, M. S., Geller, D. A., Wilhelm, S., Goldsmith, T. E., & 
Ahlfors, S. P. (2007). Dissociation between MEG alpha modulation and 
performance accuracy on visual working memory task in obsessive 
compulsive disorder. Human Brain Mapping, 28(12), 1401-1414. 
   168 
Ciesielski, K. T., Rowland, L. M., Harris, R. J., Kerwin, A. A., Reeve, A., & Knight, 
J. E. (2011). Increased anterior brain activation to correct responses on high-
conflict Stroop task in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Clinical 
Neurophysiology, 122(1), 107-113. 
Coles, M. E., Frost, R. O., Heimberg, R. G., & Rhéaume, J. (2003). "Not just right 
experiences": perfectionism, obsessive-compulsive features and general 
psychopathology. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 41(6), 681-700. 
Coles, M. E., & Heimberg, R. G. (2002). Memory biases in the anxiety disorders: 
Current status. Clinical Psychology Review, 22(4), 587-627. 
Coles, M. E., Radomsky, A. S., & Horng, B. (2006). Exploring the boundaries of 
memory distrust from repeated checking: increasing external validity and 
examining thresholds. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 44(7), 995-1006. 
Coughlan, A. K., & Hollows, S. E. (1985). The adult memory and information 
procesing batery. Leeds: St. James's University Hopital. 
Cougle, J. R., Salkovskis, P. M., & Thorpe, S. J. (2008). "Perhaps you only imagined 
doing it": Reality-monitoring in obsessive-compulsive checkers using semi-
idiographic stimuli. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental 
Psychiatry, 39(3), 305-320. 
Cougle, J. R., Salkovskis, P. M., & Wahl, K. (2007). Perception of memory ability 
and confidence in recollections in obsessive-compulsive checking. Journal of 
Anxiety Disorders, 21(1), 118-130. 
Cowan, A. (1999). An embedded-process model of working memory. In A. a. S. 
Miyake, P. (Ed.), Models of Working Memory: Mechanisms of Active 
Maintenance and Executive Control. (pp. 62-101.). Cambridge.: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Cuttler, C., & Graf, P. (2007). Sub-clinical compulsive checkers' prospective memory 
is impaired. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 21(3), 338-352. 
Cuttler, C., & Graf, P. (2008). Sub-clinical checking compulsions are related to 
impaired prospective memory independently of depression, anxiety and 
distractibility. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 22(4), 642-654. 
Cuttler, C., & Graf, P. (2009). Checking-in on the memory deficit and meta-memory 
deficit theories of compulsive checking. Clinical Psychology Review, 29(5), 
393-409. 
de Geus, F., Denys, D. A., Sitskoorn, M. M., & Westenberg, H. G. (2007). Attention 
and cognition in patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder. Psychiatry and 
Clinical Neurosciences, 61(1), 45-53. 
Deckersbach, T., McMurrich, S., Ogutha, J., Savage, C. R., Sachs, G., & Rauch, S. L. 
(2004). Characteristics of non-verbal memory impairment in bipolar disorder: 
the role of encoding strategies. Psychological Medicine, 34(5), 823-832. 
Deckersbach, T., Otto, M. W., Savage, C. R., Baer, L., & Jenike, M. A. (2000). The 
relationship between semantic organization and memory in obsessive-
compulsive disorder. Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics, 69(2), 101-107. 
Deckersbach, T., Savage, C. R., Dougherty, D. D., Bohne, A., Loh, R., Nierenberg, 
A., et al. (2005). Spontaneous and directed application of verbal learning 
strategies in bipolar disorder and obsessive-compulsive disorder. Bipolar 
Disord, 7(2), 166-175. 
Dehaene, S., Changeux, J. P., Naccache, L., Sackur, J., & Sergent, C. (2006). 
Conscious, preconscious, and subliminal processing: a testable taxonomy. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10(5), 204-211. 
   169 
Dehaene, S., & Naccache, L. (2001). Towards a cognitive neuroscience of 
consciousness: basic evidence and a workspace framework. Cognition, 79(1-
2), 1-37. 
Dehaene, S., Sergent, C., & Changeux, J. P. (2003). A neuronal network model 
linking subjective reports and objective physiological data during conscious 
perception. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United 
States of America, 100(14), 8520-8525. 
Dek, E. C. P., van den Hout, M. A., Giele, C. L., & Engelhard, I. M. (2010). Repeated 
checking causes distrust in memory but not in attention and perception. 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 48(7), 580-587. 
Delis, D. C., Kramer, J. H., Kaplan, E., & Ober, B. A. (1988). The California Verbal 
Learning Test. San Antonio, Texas.: The Psychological Corporation. 
Delorme, R., Gousse, V., Roy, I., Trandafir, A., Mathieu, F., Mouren-Simeoni, M. C., 
et al. (2007). Shared executive dysfunctions in unaffected relatives of patients 
with autism and obsessive-compulsive disorder. European Psychiatry, 22(1), 
32-38. 
Delvenne, J. F., & Bruyer, R. (2006). A configural effect in visual short-term memory 
for features from different parts of an object. Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 59(9), 1567-1580. 
Deubel, H., & Schneider, W. X. (1996). Saccade target selection and object 
recognition: Evidence for a common attentional mechanism. Vision Research, 
36(12), 1827-1837. 
Dolcos, F., & McCarthy, G. (2006). Brain systems mediating cognitive interference 
by emotional distraction. Journal of Neuroscience, 26(7), 2072-2079. 
Eldar, S., & Bar-Haim, Y. (2010). Neural plasticity in response to attention training in 
anxiety. Psychological Medicine, 40(4), 667-677. 
Elliott, R., McKenna, P. J., Robbins, T. W., & Sahakian, B. J. (1995). 
Neuropsychological Evidence for Frontostriatal Dysfunction in Schizophrenia. 
Psychological Medicine, 25(3), 619-630. 
Elsley, J. V., & Parmentier, F. B. R. (2009). Is verbal-spatial binding in working 
memory impaired by a concurrent memory load? Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 62(9), 1696-1705. 
Enright, S. J., & Beech, A. R. (1993). Reduced cognitive inhibition in obsessive-
compulsive disorder. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 32 ( Pt 1), 67-74. 
Enright, S. J., Beech, A. R., & Claridge, G. S. (1995). A Further Investigation of 
Cognitive Inhibition in Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder and Other Anxiety 
Disorders. Personality and Individual Differences, 19(4), 535-542. 
Ericsson, K. A., Chase, W. G., & Faloon, S. (1980). Acquisition of a Memory Skill. 
Science, 208(4448), 1181-1182. 
Ericsson, K. A., & Kintsch, W. (1995). Long-term working memory. Psychological 
Review, 102(2), 211-245. 
Exner, C., Martin, V., & Rief, W. (2009). Self-Focused Ruminations and Memory 
Deficits in Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 
33(2), 163-174. 
Eysenck, M. W., & Derakshan, N. (2011). New perspectives in attentional control 
theory. Personality and Individual Differences, 50(7), 955-960. 
Eysenck, M. W., Derakshan, N., Santos, R., & Calvo, M. G. (2007). Anxiety and 
cognitive performance: Attentional control theory. Emotion, 7(2), 336-353. 
   170 
Fenger, M. M., Gade, A., Adams, K. H., Hansen, E. S., Bolwig, T. G., & Knudsen, G. 
M. (2005). Cognitive deficits in obsessive-compulsive disorder on tests of 
frontal lobe functions. Nord J Psychiatry, 59(1), 39-44. 
Ferreri, F., Lapp, L. K., & Peretti, C. S. (2011). Current research on cognitive aspects 
of anxiety disorders. Current Opinion in Psychiatry, 24(1), 49-54. 
Foa, E. B., Amir, N., Gershuny, B., Molnar, C., & Kozak, M. J. (1997). Implicit and 
explicit memory in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Journal of Anxiety 
Disorders, 11(2), 119-129. 
Foa, E. B., Ilai, D., McCarthy, P. R., Shoyer, B., & Murdock, T. (1993). Information-
Processing in Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder. Cognitive Therapy and 
Research, 17(2), 173-189. 
Fougnie, D., & Marois, R. (2009). Attentive tracking disrupts feature binding in visual 
working memory. Visual Cognition, 17(1-2), 48-66. 
Friedman, N. P., & Miyake, A. (2004). The relations among inhibition and 
interference control functions: A latent-variable analysis. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology-General, 133(1), 101-135. 
Gajewski, D. A., & Brockmole, J. R. (2006). Feature bindings endure without 
attention: evidence from an explicit recall task. Psychon Bull Rev, 13(4), 581-
587. 
Gehring, W. J., Goss, B., Coles, M. G. H., Meyer, D. E., & Donchin, E. (1993). A 
Neural System for Error-Detection and Compensation. Psychological Science, 
4(6), 385-390. 
Gehring, W. J., Himle, J., & Nisenson, L. G. (2000). Action-monitoring dysfunction 
in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Psychological Science, 11(1), 1-6. 
Gershuny, B. S., & Sher, K. J. (1995). Compulsive Checking and Anxiety in a 
Nonclinical Sample - Differences in Cognition, Behavior, Personality, and 
Affect. Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment, 17(1), 19-38. 
Goodale, M. A., & Milner, A. D. (1992). Separate visual pathways for perception and 
action. Trends in Neurosciences, 15(1), 20-25. 
Gooding, D. C., & Basso, M. A. (2008). The tell-tale tasks: A review of saccadic 
research in psychiatric patient populations. Brain and Cognition, 68(3), 371-
390. 
Goodwin, A. H., & Sher, K. J. (1992). Deficits in Set-Shifting Ability in Nonclinical 
Compulsive Checkers. Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioral 
Assessment, 14(1), 81-92. 
Graydon, J., & Eysenck, M. W. (1989). Distraction and cognitive performance. 
European Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 1(2), 161-169. 
Greisberg, S., & McKay, D. (2003). Neuropsychology of obsessive-compulsive 
disorder: a review and treatment implications. Clinical Psychology Review, 
23(1), 95-117. 
Grison, S., Paul, M. A., Kessler, K., & Tipper, S. P. (2005). Inhibition of object 
identity in inhibition of return: Implications for encoding and retrieving 
inhibitory processes. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 12(3), 553-558. 
Hajcak, G., & Simons, R. F. (2002). Error-related brain activity in obsessive-
compulsive undergraduates. Psychiatry Research, 110(1), 63-72. 
Harkin, B., & Kessler, K. (2009). How checking breeds doubt: Reduced performance 
in a simple working memory task. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 47(6), 
504-512. 
   171 
Harkin, B., & Kessler, K. (2011a). How Checking as a Cognitive Style Influences 
Working Memory Performance. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 25(2), 219-
228. 
Harkin, B., & Kessler, K. (2011b). The role of Working Memory in compulsive 
checking and OCD: A systematic classification of 58 experimental findings. 
Clinical Psychology Review, 31(6), 1004-1021. 
Harkin, B., & Kessler, K. (in press). Deficient Inhibition-Of-Return in subclinical 
OCD when attention is directed to the threatening aspects of a stimulus. 
Depression and Anxiety. 
Harkin, B., Miellet, S., & Kessler, K. (subm). What checkers actually check: An eye 
tracking study of working memory and executive control. 
Harkin, B., Rutherford, H., & Kessler, K. (2011). Impaired executive functioning in 
subclinical compulsive checking with ecologically valid stimuli in a Working 
Memory task. Frontiers in Psychology, 2. 
Hartston, H. J., & Swerdlow, N. R. (1999). Visuospatial priming and stroop 
performance in patients with obsessive compulsive disorder. 
Neuropsychology, 13(3), 447-457. 
Harvey, N. S. (1987). Neurological Factors in Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder. 
British Journal of Psychiatry, 150, 567-568. 
Head, D., Bolton, D., & Hymas, N. (1989). Deficit in cognitive shifting ability in 
patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder. Biological Psychiatry, 25(7), 
929-937. 
Henderson, J. G., & Pollard, C. A. (1988). Types of Obsessive Compulsive Disorder 
in a Community Sample. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 44(5), 747-752. 
Henseler, I., Gruber, O., Kraft, S., Krick, C., Reith, W., & Falkai, P. (2008). 
Compensatory hyperactivations as markers of latent working memory 
dysfunctions in patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder: an fMRI study. 
Journal of Psychiatry and Neuroscience, 33(3), 209-215. 
Hermans, D., Engelen, U., Grouwels, L., Joos, E., Lemmens, J., & Pieters, G. (2008). 
Cognitive confidence in obsessive-compulsive disorder: Distrusting 
perception, attention and memory. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 46(1), 
98-113. 
Hinton, G. E., McClelland, J. L., & Rumelhart, D. E. (1986). Distributed 
representations. In D. E. Rumelhart & J. L. McClelland (Eds.), Parallel 
distributed processing: Explorations in the microstructure of cognition (Vol. 
1, pp. 77–109). Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Hoenig, K., Hochrein, A., Muller, D. J., & Wagner, M. (2002). Different negative 
priming impairements in schizophrenia and subgroups of obsessive-
compulsive disorder. Psychological Medicine, 32, 459-468. 
Holroyd, C. B., & Coles, M. G. H. (2002). The neural basis. of human error 
processing: Reinforcement learning, dopamine, and the error-related 
negativity. Psychological Review, 109(4), 679-709. 
Hulme, C., Maughan, S., & Brown, G. D. A. (1991). Memory for Familiar and 
Unfamiliar Words - Evidence for a Long-Term-Memory Contribution to 
Short-Term-Memory Span. Journal of Memory and Language, 30(6), 685-
701. 
Hwang, S. H., Kwon, J. S., Shin, Y. W., Lee, K. J., Kim, Y. Y., & Kim, M. S. (2007). 
Neuropsychological profiles of patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder: 
early onset versus late onset. Journal of the International Neuropsychological 
Society, 13(1), 30-37. 
   172 
Hymas, N., Lees, A., Bolton, D., Epps, K., & Head, D. (1991). The Neurology of 
Obsessional Slowness. Brain, 114, 2203-2233. 
Hyun, J. S., Woodman, G. F., & Luck, S. J. (2009). The role of attention in the 
binding of surface features to locations. Visual Cognition, 17(1-2), 10-24. 
Irak, M., & Flament, M. F. (2009). Attention in sub-clinical obsessive-compulsive 
checkers. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 23(3), 320-326. 
Jaafari, N., Rigalleau, F., Rachid, F., Delamillieure, P., Millet, B., Olie, J. P., et al. 
(2011). A critical review of the contribution of eye movement recordings to 
the neuropsychology of obsessive compulsive disorder. Acta Psychiatrica 
Scandinavica, 124(2), 87-101. 
Jang, J. H., Kim, H. S., Ha, T. H., Shin, N. Y., Kang, D.-H., Choi, J.-S., et al. (2010). 
Nonverbal memory and organizational dysfunctions are related with distinct 
symptom dimensions in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Psychiatry Research, 
180(2-3), 93-98. 
Jelinek, L., Moritz, S., Heeren, D., & Naber, D. (2006). Everyday memory 
functioning in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Journal of the International 
Neuropsychological Society, 12(5), 746-749. 
Johnson, M. K., Raye, C. L., Mitchell, K. J., Greene, E. J., Cunningham, W. A., & 
Sanislow, C. A. (2005). Using fMRI to investigate a component process of 
reflection: Prefrontal correlates of refreshing a just-activated representation. 
Cognitive Affective & Behavioral Neuroscience, 5(3), 339-361. 
Jordan, H., & Tipper, S. P. (1998). Object-based inhibition of return in static displays. 
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 5(3), 504-509. 
Kampman, M., Keijsers, G. P. J., Verbraak, M., Naring, G., & Hoogduin, C. A. L. 
(2002). The emotional Stroop: a comparison of panic disorder patients, 
obsessive-compulsive patients, and normal controls, in two experiments. 
Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 16(4), 425-441. 
Keizer, A. W., Colzato, L. S., & Hommel, B. (2008). Integrating faces, houses, 
motion, and action: Spontaneous binding across ventral and dorsal processing 
streams. Acta Psychologica, 127(1), 177-185. 
Kessler, K., & Kiefer, M. (2005). Disturbing visual working memory: 
electrophysiological evidence for a role of the prefrontal cortex in recovery 
from interference. Cerebral Cortex, 15(7), 1075-1087. 
Kessler, K., & Tipper, S. P. (2004). Retrieval of implicit inhibitory processes: The 
impact of visual field, object-identity, and memory dynamics. Visual 
Cognition, 11(8), 965-995. 
Kikul, J., Vetter, J., Lincoln, T. M., & Exner, C. (2011). Effects of cognitive self-
consciousness on visual memory in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Journal of 
Anxiety Disorders, 25(4), 490-497. 
Kim, M. S., Park, S. J., Shin, M. S., & Kwon, J. S. (2002). Neuropsychological profile 
in patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder over a period of 4-month 
treatment. Journal of Psychiatric Research, 36(4), 257-265. 
Kimura, D. (1963). Right temporal lobe damage. Archives of Neurology., 8, 264-271. 
Klein, R. M., & MacInnes, W. J. (1999). Inhibition of return is a foraging facilitator in 
visual search. Psychological Science, 10(4), 346-352. 
Kuelz, A. K., Hohagen, F., & Voderholzer, U. (2004). Neuropsychological 
performance in obsessive-compulsive disorder: a critical review. Biological 
Psychology, 65(3), 185-236. 
Kuelz, A. K., Riemann, D., Halsband, U., Vielhaber, K., Unterrainer, J., Kordon, A., 
et al. (2006). Neuropsychological impairment in obsessive-compulsive 
   173 
disorder - Improvement over the course of cognitive behavioral treatment. 
Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology, 28(8), 1273-1287. 
Kyrios, M., & Iob, M. A. (1998). Automatic and strategic processing in obsessive-
compulsive disorder: Attentional bias, cognitive avoidance or more complex 
phenomena? Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 12(4), 271-292. 
Lavie, N., Hirst, A., de Fockert, J. W., & Viding, E. (2004). Load theory of selective 
attention and cognitive control. Journal of Experimental Psychology-General, 
133(3), 339-354. 
Lavric, A., Rippon, G., & Gray, J. R. (2003). Threat-evoked anxiety disrupts spatial 
working memory performance: An attentional account. Cognitive Therapy and 
Research, 27(5), 489-504. 
Lavy, E., van Oppen, P., & van den Hout, M. (1994). Selective Processing of 
Emotional Information in Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder. Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, 32(2), 243-246. 
Lind, C., & Boschen, M. J. (2009). Intolerance of uncertainty mediates the 
relationship between responsibility beliefs and compulsive checking. Journal 
of Anxiety Disorders, 23(8), 1047-1052. 
Logie, R. H., Brockmole, J. R., & Vandenbroucke, A. R. E. (2009). Bound feature 
combinations in visual short-term memory are fragile but influence long-term 
learning. Visual Cognition, 17(1-2), 160-179. 
Luck, S. J., & Vogel, E. K. (1997). The capacity of visual working memory for 
features and conjunctions. Nature, 390(6657), 279-281. 
MacDonald, P. A., Antony, M. M., Macleod, C. M., & Richter, M. A. (1997). 
Memory and confidence in memory judgements among individuals with 
obsessive compulsive disorder and non-clinical controls. Behaviour Research 
and Therapy, 35(6), 497-505. 
MacLeod, C., & Mathews, A. (1991). Biased cognitive operations in anxiety: 
accessibility of information or assignment of processing priorities? Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, 29(6), 599-610. 
MacLeod, C., Rutherford, E., Campbell, L., Ebsworthy, G., & Holker, L. (2002). 
Selective attention and emotional vulnerability: Assessing the causal basis of 
their association through the experimental manipulation of attentional bias. 
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 111(1), 107-123. 
Makovski, T., Sussman, R., & Jiang, Y. V. (2008). Orienting attention in visual 
working memory reduces interference from memory probes. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 34(2), 369-380. 
Martin, A., Wiggs, C. L., Altemus, M., Rubenstein, C., & Murphy, D. L. (1995). 
Working-Memory as Assessed by Subject-Ordered Tasks in Patients with 
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder. Journal of Clinical and Experimental 
Neuropsychology, 17(5), 786-792. 
Martinot, J. L., Allilaire, J. F., Mazoyer, B. M., Hantouche, E., Huret, J. D., Legaut-
Demare, F., et al. (1990). Obsessive-compulsive disorder: a clinical, 
neuropsychological and positron emission tomography study. Acta 
Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 82(3), 233-242. 
Mataix-Cols, D., Junque, C., Sanchez-Turet, M., Vallejo, J., Verger, K., & Barrios, M. 
(1999a). Neuropsychological functioning in a subclinical obsessive-
compulsive sample. Biological Psychiatry, 45(7), 898-904. 
Mataix-Cols, D., Junqué, C., Vallejo, J., Sànchez-Turet, M., Verger, K., & Barrios, M. 
(1997). Hemispheric functional imbalance in a sub-clinical obsessive-
   174 
compulsive sample assessed by the Continuous Performance Test, Identical 
Pairs version. Psychiatry Research, 72(2), 115-126. 
Mataix-Cols, D., Rauch, S. L., Manzo, P. A., Jenike, M. A., & Baer, L. (1999b). Use 
of factor-analyzed symptom of dimensions to predict outcome with serotonin 
reuptake inhibitors and placebo in the treatment of obsessive-compulsive 
disorder. American Journal of Psychiatry, 156(9), 1409-1416. 
Mather, M. (2007). Emotional Arousal and Memory Binding An Object-Based 
Framework. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 2(1), 33-52. 
Mather, M., Mitchell, K. J., Raye, C. L., Novak, D. L., Greene, E. J., & Johnson, M. 
K. (2006). Emotional arousal can impair feature binding in working memory. 
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 18(4), 614-625. 
Mathews, A., & MacLeod, C. (2002). Induced processing biases have causal effects 
on anxiety. Cognition & Emotion, 16(3), 331-354. 
McNally, R. J., Amir, N., Louro, C. E., Lukach, B. M., Riemann, B. C., & Calamari, 
J. E. (1994). Cognitive Processing of Idiographic Emotional Information in 
Panic Disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 32(1), 119-122. 
McNally, R. J., & Kohlbeck, P. A. (1993). Reality monitoring in obsessive-
compulsive disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 31(3), 249-253. 
Menzies, L., Achard, S., Chamberlain, S. R., Fineberg, N., Chen, C. H., Del Campo, 
N., et al. (2007). Neurocognitive endophenotypes of obsessive-compulsive 
disorder. Brain, 130, 3223-3236. 
Miller, G. A. (1956). The magical number seven, plus or minus two: some limits on 
our capacity for processing information. Psychological Review,, 63(81-97). 
Miyake, A., Friedman, N. P., Emerson, M. J., Witzki, A. H., Howerter, A., & Wager, 
T. D. (2000). The unity and diversity of executive functions and their 
contributions to complex "frontal lobe" tasks: A latent variable analysis. 
Cognitive Psychology, 41(1), 49-100. 
Mogg, K., & Bradley, B. P. (1998). A cognitive-motivational analysis of anxiety. 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 36(9), 809-848. 
Morein-Zamir, S., Craig, K. J., Ersche, K. D., Abbott, S., Muller, U., Fineberg, N. A., 
et al. (2010). Impaired visuospatial associative memory and attention in 
obsessive compulsive disorder but no evidence for differential dopaminergic 
modulation. Psychopharmacology, 212(3), 357-367. 
Moritz, S., Fischer, B. K., Hottenrott, B., Kellner, M., Fricke, S., Randjbar, S., et al. 
(2008). Words may not be enough! No increased emotional Stroop effect in 
obsessive-compulsive disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 46(9), 
1101-1104. 
Moritz, S., Kloss, M., Jahn, H., Schick, M., & Hand, I. (2003). Impact of comorbid 
depressive symptoms on nonverbal memory and visuospatial performance in 
obsessive-compulsive disorder. Cogn Neuropsychiatry, 8(4), 261-272. 
Moritz, S., & von Muehlenen, A. (2008). Investigation of an attentional bias for fear-
related material in obsessive-compulsive checkers. Depression and Anxiety, 
25(3), 225-229. 
Moritz, S., & von Muhlenen, A. (2005). Inhibition of return in patients with 
obsessive-compulsive disorder. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 19(1), 117-126. 
Moritz, S., Von Muhlenen, A., Randjbar, S., Fricke, S., & Jelinek, L. (2009). 
Evidence for an attentional bias for washing- and checking-relevant stimuli in 
obsessive-compulsive disorder. Journal of the International 
Neuropsychological Society, 15(3), 365-371. 
   175 
Muller, J., & Roberts, J. E. (2005). Memory and attention in Obsessive-Compulsive 
Disorder: a review. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 19(1), 1-28. 
Murdock, B. B. (1962). Serial Position Effect of Free-Recall. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 64(5), 482-&. 
Nedeljkovic, M., & Kyrios, M. (2007). Confidence in memory and other cognitive 
processes in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 
45(12), 2899-2914. 
Nedeljkovic, M., Kyrios, M., Moulding, R., Doron, G., Wainwright, K., Pantelis, C., 
et al. (2009b). Differences in neuropsychological performance between 
subtypes of obsessive-compulsive disorder. Australian and New Zealand 
Journal of Psychiatry, 43(3), 216-226. 
Nedeljkovic, M., Moulding, R., Kyrios, M., & Doron, G. (2009a). The relationship of 
cognitive confidence to OCD symptoms. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 23(4), 
463-468. 
Nelson, E., Early, T. S., & Haller, J. W. (1993). Visual-Attention in Obsessive-
Compulsive Disorder. Psychiatry Research, 49(2), 183-196. 
Nelson, T. O., & Narens, L. (1994). Metamemory: a theoretical framework and new 
findings. (Vol. 26). New York: Academic Press. 
Olivers, C. N. L., Meijer, F., & Theeuwes, J. (2006). Feature-based memory-driven 
attentional capture: Visual working memory content affects visual attention. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology-Human Perception and Performance, 
32(5), 1243-1265. 
Olley, A., Malhi, G., & Sachdev, P. (2007). Memory and executive functioning in 
obsessive-compulsive disorder: a selective review. Journal of Affective 
Disorders, 104(1-3), 15-23. 
Olson, I. R., Page, K., Moore, K. S., Chatterjee, A., & Verfaellie, M. (2006). Working 
memory for conjunctions relies on the medial temporal lobe. Journal of 
Neuroscience, 26(17), 4596-4601. 
Omori, I. M., Murata, Y., Yamanishi, T., Nakaaki, S., Akechi, T., Mikuni, M., et al. 
(2007). The differential impact of executive attention dysfunction on episodic 
memory in obsessive-compulsive disorder patients with checking symptoms 
vs. those with washing symptoms. Journal of Psychiatric Research, 41(9), 
776-784. 
Osterrieth, P. A. (1944). Filetest de copie d'une figure complex: Contribution a l'etude 
de la perception et de la memoire [The test of copying a complex figure: A 
contribution to the study of perception and memory]. Archives de Psychologie, 
30(286-356). 
Park, H. S., Shin, Y. W., Ha, T. H., Shin, M. S., Kim, Y. Y., Lee, Y. H., et al. (2006). 
Effect of cognitive training focusing on organizational strategies in patients 
with obsessive-compulsive disorder. Psychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences, 
60(6), 718-726. 
Penades, R., Catalan, R., Andres, S., Salamero, M., & Gasto, C. (2005). Executive 
function and nonverbal memory in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Psychiatry 
Research, 133(1), 81-90. 
Petrides, M., & Milner, B. (1982). Deficits on Subject-Ordered Tasks after Frontal-
Lobe and Temporal-Lobe Lesions in Man. Neuropsychologia, 20(3), 249-262. 
Posner, M. I., & Cohen, Y. (1984). Components of visual orienting. In A. a. 
performance (Ed.), (pp. 531-556). Hillsdale NJ: Erlbaum. 
   176 
Posner, M. I., Cohen, Y., & Rafal, R. D. (1982). Neural Systems Control of Spatial 
Orienting. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London Series 
B-Biological Sciences, 298(1089), 187-198. 
Posner, M. I., & Snyder, C. R. (1975). Facilitation and Inhibition. In P. Rabbitt & S. 
Dornick (Eds.), Attention and Performance V (pp. 669-682). New York: 
Academic Press. 
Purcell, R., Maruff, P., Kyrios, M., & Pantelis, C. (1998a). Cognitive deficits in 
obsessive-compulsive disorder on tests of frontal-striatal function. Biological 
Psychiatry, 43(5), 348-357. 
Purcell, R., Maruff, P., Kyrios, M., & Pantelis, C. (1998b). Neuropsychological 
deficits in obsessive-compulsive disorder: a comparison with unipolar 
depression, panic disorder, and normal controls. Archives of General 
Psychiatry, 55(5), 415-423. 
Rachman, S. (2002). A cognitive theory of compulsive checking. Behaviour Research 
Therapy, 40(6), 625-639. 
Rachman, S., & Hodgson, R. J. (1980). Obsessions and compulsions. Englewood 
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall. 
Rachman, S., & Shafran, R. (1998). Cognitive behavioural features of obsessive–
compulsive disorder. In R. Swinson, M. Antony, S. Rachman & M. Richter 
(Eds.), Obsessive–compulsive disorder: theory, research and treatment. (pp. 
51-78). New York: Guilford Publications. 
Rachman, S., Thordarson, D. S., Shafran, R., & Woody, S. R. (1995). Perceived 
responsibility: structure and significance. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 
33(7), 779-784. 
Radomsky, A. S., & Alcolado, G. M. (2010). Don't even think about checking: Mental 
checking causes memory distrust. Journal of Behavior Therapy and 
Experimental Psychiatry, 41(4), 345-351. 
Radomsky, A. S., Ashbaugh, A. R., & Gelfand, L. A. (2007). Relationships between 
anger, symptoms, and cognitive factors in OCD checkers. Behaviour Research 
and Therapy, 45(11), 2712-2725. 
Radomsky, A. S., Gilchrist, P. T., & Dussault, D. (2006). Repeated checking really 
does cause memory distrust. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 44(2), 305-
316. 
Rampacher, F., Lennertz, L., Vogeley, A., Schulze-Rauschenbach, S., Kathmann, N., 
Falkai, P., et al. (2010). Evidence for specific cognitive deficits in visual 
information processing in patients with OCD compared to patients with 
unipolar depression. Progress in Neuro-Psychopharmacology and Biological 
Psychiatry, 34(6), 984-991. 
Rankins, D., Bradshaw, J., Moss, S., & Georgiou-Karistianis, N. (2004). Inhibition of 
return in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Journal of the International 
Neuropsychological Society, 10(1), 54-59. 
Rao, N. P., Reddy, Y. C. J., Kumar, K. J., Kandavel, T., & Chandrashekar, C. R. 
(2008). Are neuropsychological deficits trait markers in OCD? Progress in 
Neuro-Psychopharmacology and Biological Psychiatry, 32(6), 1574-1579. 
Rasmussen, S. A., & Eisen, J. L. (1988). Clinical and epidemiologic findings of 
significance to neuropharmacologic trials in OCD. Psychopharmacology 
Bulletin, 24(3), 466-470. 
Raven, J., Raven, J. C., & Court, J. H. (2004). Manual for Raven's Progressive 
Matrices and Vocabulary Scales. San Antonio, TX: Harcourt Assessment. 
   177 
Reed, G. F. (1985). Obsessional experience and compulsive behavior. A cognitive-
structural approach. London: Academic Press. 
Ridderinkhof, K. R., Ullsperger, M., Crone, E. A., & Nieuwenhuiss, S. (2004). The 
role of the medial frontal cortex in cognitive control. Science, 306(5695), 443-
447. 
Riesel, A., Endrass, T., Kaufmann, C., & Kathmann, N. (2011). Overactive Error-
Related Brain Activity as a Candidate Endophenotype for Obsessive-
Compulsive Disorder: Evidence From Unaffected First-Degree Relatives. 
American Journal of Psychiatry, 168(3). 
Roh, K. S., Shin, M. S., Kim, M. S., Ha, T. H., Shin, Y. W., Lee, K. J., et al. (2005). 
Persistent cognitive dysfunction in patients with obsessive-compulsive 
disorder: A naturalistic study. Psychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences, 59(5), 
539-545. 
Rotge, J. Y., Clair, A. H., Jaafari, N., Hantouche, E. G., Pelissolo, A., Guehl, D., et al. 
(2008). A challenging task for assessment of checking behaviors in obsessive-
compulsive disorder. European Neuropsychopharmacology, 17, S300-S301. 
Roth, R. M., Milovan, D., Baribeau, J., & O'Connor, K. (2005). Neuropsychological 
functioning in early- and late-onset obsessive-compulsive disorder. Journal of 
Neuropsychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences, 17(2), 208-213. 
Roth, R. M., Milovan, D. L., Baribeau, J., O'Connor, K., & Todorov, C. (2004). 
Organizational strategy use in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Psychiatry 
Research, 128(3), 267-272. 
Rubenstein, C. S., Peynircioglu, Z. F., Chambless, D. L., & Pigott, T. A. (1993). 
Memory in sub-clinical obsessive-compulsive checkers. Behaviour Research 
and Therapy, 31(8), 759-765. 
Rudner, M., & Ronnberg, J. (2008). The role of the episodic buffer in working 
memory for language processing. Cogn Process, 9(1), 19-28. 
Sahakian, B. J., Morris, R. G., Evenden, J. L., Heald, A., Levy, R., Philpot, M., et al. 
(1988). A Comparative-Study of Visuospatial Memory and Learning in 
Alzheimer-Type Dementia and Parkinsons-Disease. Brain, 111, 695-718. 
Salkovskis, P. M. (1999). Understanding and treating obsessive-compulsive disorder. 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 37 Suppl 1, S29-52. 
Salkovskis, P. M., Forrester, E., & Richards, C. (1998). Cognitive-behavioural 
approach to understanding obsessional thinking. British Journal of Psychiatry. 
Supplement(35), 53-63. 
Sanz, M., Molina, V., Calcedo, A., Martin-Loeches, M., & Rubia, F. J. (2001). The 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test and the assessment of frontal function in 
obsessive-compulsive patients: An event-related potential study. Cognitive 
Neuropsychiatry, 6(2), 109-129. 
Savage, C. R., Baer, L., Keuthen, N. J., Brown, H. D., Rauch, S. L., & Jenike, M. A. 
(1999). Organizational strategies mediate nonverbal memory impairment in 
obsessive-compulsive disorder. Biological Psychiatry, 45(7), 905-916. 
Savage, C. R., Deckersbach, T., Wilhelm, S., Rauch, S. L., Baer, L., Reid, T., et al. 
(2000). Strategic processing and episodic memory impairment in obsessive 
compulsive disorder. Neuropsychology, 14(1), 141-151. 
Sawamura, K., Nakashima, Y., Inoue, M., & Kurita, H. (2005). Short-term verbal 
memory deficits in patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder. Psychiatry 
and Clinical Neurosciences, 59(5), 527-532. 
   178 
Schmidt, B. K., Vogel, E. K., Woodman, G. F., & Luck, S. J. (2002). Voluntary and 
automatic attentional control of visual working memory. Perception and 
Psychophysics, 64(5), 754-763. 
Schmidt, N. B., Richey, J. A., Buckner, J. D., & Timpano, K. R. (2009). Attention 
Training for Generalized Social Anxiety Disorder. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, 118(1), 5-14. 
Segalas, C., Alonso, P., Labad, J., Jaurrieta, N., Real, E., Jimenez, S., et al. (2008). 
Verbal and nonverbal memory processing in patients with obsessive-
compulsive disorder: its relationship to clinical variables. Neuropsychology, 
22(2), 262-272. 
Sher, K. J., Frost, R., & Otto, R. (1983). Cognitive deficits in compulsive checkers: an 
exploratory study. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 21, 357-363. 
Sher, K. J., Mann, B., & Frost, R. O. (1984). Cognitive Dysfunction in Compulsive 
Checkers - Further Explorations. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 22(5), 
493-502. 
Shimamura, A. P. (2000). Toward a cognitive neuroscience of metacognition. 
Consciousness and Cognition, 9(2 Pt 1), 313-323; discussion 324-316. 
Shin, M. S., Park, S. J., Kim, M. S., Lee, Y. H., Ha, T. H., & Kwon, J. S. (2004). 
Deficits of organizational strategy and visual memory in obsessive-compulsive 
disorder. Neuropsychology, 18(4), 665-672. 
Simpson, H. B., Rosen, W., Huppert, J. D., Lin, S. H., Foa, E. B., & Liebowitz, M. R. 
(2006). Are there reliable neuropsychological deficits in obsessive-compulsive 
disorder? Journal of Psychiatric Research, 40(3), 247-257. 
Smith, E. E., & Jonides, J. (1999). Neuroscience - Storage and executive processes in 
the frontal lobes. Science, 283(5408), 1657-1661. 
Spielberger, C. D., Gorssuch, R. L., Lushene, P. R., Vagg, P. R., & Jacobs, G. A. 
(1983). Manual for the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory. 
SR.Research.Ltd. (2002). Eye Link II: User Manual. Mississauga, Canada. 
Stein, M. B., Forde, D. R., Anderson, G., & Walker, J. R. (1997). Obsessive-
compulsive disorder in the community: an epidemiologic survey with clinical 
reappraisal. American Journal of Psychiatry, 154(8), 1120-1126. 
Sweeney, J. A., Levy, D., & Harris, M. S. H. (2002). Commentary: Eye movement 
research with clinical populations. In Brain's Eye: Neurobiological and 
Clinical Aspects of Oculomotor Research (Vol. 140, pp. 507-522). 
Tallis, F. (1997). The neuropsychology of obsessive-compulsive disorder: a review 
and consideration of clinical implications. British Journal of Clinical 
Psychology, 36 ( Pt 1), 3-20. 
Tallis, F., Pratt, P., & Jamani, N. (1999). Obsessive compulsive disorder, checking, 
and non-verbal memory: a neuropsychological investigation. Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, 37(2), 161-166. 
Theeuwes, J., Belopolsky, A., & Olivers, C. N. L. (2009). Interactions between 
working memory, attention and eye movements. Acta Psychologica, 132(2), 
106-114. 
Thordarson, D. S., Radomsky, A. S., Rachman, S., Shafran, R., Sawchuk, C. N., & 
Ralph Hakstian, A. (2004). The Vancouver Obsessional Compulsive Inventory 
(VOCI). Behaviour Research and Therapy, 42(11), 1289-1314. 
Tipper, S. P., Grison, S., & Kessler, K. (2003). Long-term inhibition of return of 
attention. Psychological Science, 14(1), 19-25. 
   179 
Tipper, S. P., Jordan, H., & Weaver, B. (1999). Scene-based and object-centered 
inhibition of return: Evidence for dual orienting mechanisms. Perception & 
Psychophysics, 61(1), 50-60. 
Tolin, D. F., Abramowitz, J. S., Brigidi, B. D., Amir, N., Street, G. P., & Foa, E. B. 
(2001). Memory and memory confidence in obsessive-compulsive disorder. 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 39(8), 913-927. 
Tolin, D. F., Abramowitz, J. S., Brigidi, B. D., & Foa, E. B. (2003). Intolerance of 
uncertainty in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 
17(2), 233-242. 
Tolin, D. F., Woods, C. M., & Abramowitz, J. S. (2003). Relationship between 
obsessive beliefs and obsessive-compulsive symptoms. Cognitive Therapy and 
Research, 27(6), 657-669. 
Treisman, A. (1996). The binding problem. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 6(2), 
171-178. 
Tulving, E. (1985). Memory and Consciousness. Canadian Psychology-Psychologie 
Canadienne, 26(1), 1-12. 
Tuna, S., Tekcan, A. I., & Topcuoglu, V. (2005). Memory and metamemory in 
obsessive-compulsive disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 43(1), 15-
27. 
Unoki, K., Kasuga, T., Matsushima, E., & Ohta, K. (1999). Attentional processing of 
emotional information in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Psychiatry and 
Clinical Neurosciences, 53(6), 635-642. 
Ursu, S., Stenger, V. A., Shear, M. K., Jones, M. R., & Carter, C. S. (2003). 
Overactive action monitoring in obsessive-compulsive disorder: Evidence 
from functional magnetic resonance imaging. Psychological Science, 14(4), 
347-353. 
van den Hout, M., Engelhard, I. M., de Boer, C., du Bois, A., & Dek, E. (2008). 
Perseverative and compulsive-like staring causes uncertainty about perception. 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 46(12), 1300-1304. 
van den Hout, M., Engelhard, I. M., Smeets, M., Dek, E. C. P., Turksma, K., & Saric, 
R. (2009). Uncertainty about perception and dissociation after compulsive-like 
staring: Time course of effects. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 47(6), 535-
539. 
van den Hout, M., & Kindt, M. (2003a). Phenomenological validity of an OCD-
memory model and the remember/know distinction. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 41(3), 369-378. 
van den Hout, M., & Kindt, M. (2003b). Repeated checking causes memory distrust. 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 41(3), 301-316. 
van den Hout, M., & Kindt, M. (2004). Obsessive-compulsive disorder and the 
paradoxical effects of perseverative behaviour on experienced uncertainty. 
Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 35(2), 165-181. 
van der Wee, N. J., Ramsey, N. F., Jansma, J. M., Denys, D. A., van Megen, H. J., 
Westenberg, H. M., et al. (2003). Spatial working memory deficits in 
obsessive compulsive disorder are associated with excessive engagement of 
the medial frontal cortex. Neuroimage, 20(4), 2271-2280. 
van der Wee, N. J., Ramsey, N. F., van Megen, H. J., Denys, D., Westenberg, H. G., 
& Kahn, R. S. (2007). Spatial working memory in obsessive-compulsive 
disorder improves with clinical response: A functional MRI study. European 
Neuropsychopharmacology, 17(1), 16-23. 
   180 
van Veen, V., Cohen, J. D., Botvinick, M. M., Stenger, V. A., & Carter, C. S. (2001). 
Anterior cingulate cortex, conflict monitoring, and levels of processing. 
Neuroimage, 14(6), 1302-1308. 
Veale, D. M., Sahakian, B. J., Owen, A. M., & Marks, I. M. (1996). Specific cognitive 
deficits in tests sensitive to frontal lobe dysfunction in obsessive-compulsive 
disorder. Psychological Medicine, 26(6), 1261-1269. 
Watkins, L. H., Sahakian, B. J., Robertson, M. M., Veale, D. M., Rogers, R. D., 
Pickard, K. M., et al. (2005). Executive function in Tourette's syndrome and 
obsessive-compulsive disorder. Psychological Medicine, 35(4), 571-582. 
Watson, C., & Purdon, C. (2008). Attention Training in the Reduction and 
Reappraisal of Intrusive Thoughts. Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 
36(1), 61-70. 
Wechsler, D., & Stone, C. P. (1945). Manual for the Wechsler Memory Scale. New 
York: Psychological Corporation. 
Wells, A. (1990). Panic Disorder in Association with Relaxation Induced Anxiety - an 
Attentional Training Approach to Treatment. Behavior Therapy, 21(3), 273-
280. 
Wells, A. (2000). Emotional disorders and metacognition: Inovative cognitive 
therapy. Chichester: Wiley. 
Wheeler, M. E., & Treisman, A. M. (2002). Binding in short-term visual memory. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology-General, 131(1), 48-64. 
Williams, J. M. G., Watts, F. N., MacLeod, C., & Mathews, A. (1997). Cognitive 
psychology and emotional disorders (Vol. (2nd ed.)). Chichester: Wiley. 
Wolters, G., & Raffone, A. (2008). Coherence and recurrency: maintenance, control 
and integration in working memory. Cognitive Processing, 9(1), 1-17. 
Woods, C. M., Vevea, J. L., Chambless, D. L., & Bayen, U. J. (2002). Are 
compulsive checkers impaired in memory? A meta-analytic review. Clinical 
Psychology-Science and Practice, 9(4), 353-366. 
Zielinski, C. M., Taylor, M. A., & Juzwin, K. R. (1991). Neuropsychological deficits 
in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Neuropsychiatry, Neuropsychology, and 
Behavioral Neurology, 4(2), 110-126. 
Zitterl, W., Urban, C., Linzmayer, L., Aigner, M., Demal, U., Semler, B., et al. 
(2001). Memory deficits in patients with DSM-IV obsessive-compulsive 
disorder. Psychopathology, 34(3), 113-117. 
 
 
   181 
 
Appendix 1: 5 published and 1 submitted paper from this thesis in peer 
reviewed journals 
 
1. Harkin, B. & Kessler, K. (2009). How Checking Breeds Doubt: Reduced 
Performance in a Simple Working Memory Task. Behaviour Research 
and Therapy, (47), 504-512. 
 
2. Harkin, B. & Kessler, K. (2011a). How Checking as a Cognitive Style 
Influences Working Memory Performance. Applied Cognitive 
Psychology (24), 1-16. 
 
3. Harkin, B., & Kessler, K. (2011b). The role of Working Memory in 
compulsive checking and OCD: A systematic classification of 58 
experimental findings. Clinical Psychology Review, 31(6),1004-1021 
 
4. Harkin, B., Rutherford, H., & Kessler, K. (2011) Impaired executive 
functioning in subclinical compulsive checking with ecologically valid 
stimuli in a Working Memory task. Frontiers in Psychopathology, 2 (78). 
 
5. Harkin, B., & Kessler, K. (2012). Deficient Inhibition-Of-Return in 
subclinical OCD only when attention is directed to the threatening 
aspects of a stimulus Depression and Anxiety. 
 
6. Harkin, B., Miellet, S., & Kessler, K. (accepted pending revision). What 
checkers actually check: An eye tracking study of working memory and 
executive control. 
 
